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3 
INTRODUCTION
Th ree years ago, three Brussels based think tanks thought it useful to join eff orts 
in analysing potential implications of the Lisbon Treaty in the fi eld of institutions. 
At the time that Treaty had not been ratifi ed and the question of whether it would 
ever come into force was an open one. Th e result of their eff orts was published in 
November 2007 as a joint study under the title Th e Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing 
the Institutional Innovations[1]. It attracted the attention of policy makers, national 
and European administrations and the academic community.
Now that the Treaty has come into force and that the institutional innovations are 
gradually being implemented, the same three think tanks have thought it useful to 
revisit and develop their joint analysis. It is obviously too early to pass fi nal judg-
ment on the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the institutional framework of 
the Union. Past experience shows that it takes a period of fi ve to ten years to be able 
to exercise that sort of judgment. But some trends are already apparent.
One aspect common to all European treaties is that, as a general rule, they are 
not implemented in the exact context, and with the precise objectives, in which 
they were conceived. Th is is due in part to the length of the ratifi cation process, 
particularly signifi cant in the case of the Lisbon Treaty. It is also due to changing 
circumstances.
Two major challenges, which were not so obvious when the Treaty texts were ini-
tially drafted, determine the context in which they are being implemented. Climate 
and energy is accepted as the major issue of the new century and the European 
Union strives to infl uence global solutions, not always successfully as was shown by 
the Copenhagen conference. Th e banking and fi nancial crisis, initiated in the United 
States, has economic and monetary consequences which are gradually unfolding, 
and they infl uence the balance of economic power in the world. Both challenges 
are a source of considerable external pressure as the European Union, like other 
world actors, tries to adapt to the co-management of globalisation. 
It is with those considerations in mind, that ten issues have been identifi ed and are 
dealt with in the following chapters. As in any collective eff ort, the three institu-
tions involved share the general conclusions to which they have come, but do not 
necessarily feel bound by the specifi c formulations in each chapter.
[1] Joint Study The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institutional Innovations (Brussels, CEPS, EGMONT and EPC, Novem-
ber 2007), retrievable at: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/SD/Joint_Study_complet.pdf, hereafter referred to as “First 
Lisbon Study”.

5 
THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

7The European Council
1. BEFORE LISBON
Th e European Council was created at the Paris summit of 1974 in order to ensure 
progress and overall consistency in European aff airs. A regular but informal “fi reside 
chat” (kamingespräch, said Willy Brandt) of Heads of State or Government should 
give new dynamism and political impulse to European integration. Jean Monnet 
called it the beginning of a European authority. Tindemans hoped that it would 
give the continuing political momentum needed for the construction of Europe.
High expectations have certainly been fulfi lled. By the end of the century it was 
being called “the arbiter of systemic change”, “the principal agenda setter and the core 
of the EU’s executive”[1], or “the primary source of history making decisions”[2].
Th e gradually increasing power of the Heads of State or Government can be mapped 
through the history of treaty changes. Th ey had only marginal infl uence on the 
drafting of the Single European Act (1985). Th ey played a more signifi cant role in 
the Maastricht negotiation (1992), but completing essential work done beforehand 
by Foreign (CFSP) and Finance Ministers (Monetary Union). Th ey took centre 
stage in the Amsterdam negotiation (1997) and have never left it since. Both the 
Nice Treaty and the six-year saga that leads from the end of the Convention to the 
ratifi cation of the Lisbon Treaty were determined and fi nally resolved by action at 
European Council level. 
Th ere is no doubt that the European Council has been a positive instrument of 
change. It has moved the fl edgling European Community of the sixties to the 
larger, more diverse, but certainly more integrated European Union of today. An 
instrument deliberately created by some (and feared by others) as purely inter-
governmental, has led to, or at least condoned, more supranational authority, for 
instance in Parliament or on the euro.
But it is also clear that the European Council has gained power and political space at 
the expense of the original Community institutions. Quite obviously the Commis-
sion is no longer today the main initiator of the integration process, as it was in the 
early years of the Community. Th e Council of Ministers is no longer the ultimate 
decision taker on most important issues. Th ose roles have been in practice taken 
over by the European Council. Gradually over two decades, real power, political 
guidance and impetus, moved to an entity outside the institutional framework. 
When that happens the institutional structure is inevitably weakened. 
[1] LUDLOW, P., The Laeken Council (European Council Commentary) (Brussels, EuroComment, 2002), pp. 5-15.
[2] PETERSON, J. and BOMBERG, E., Decision-Making in the European Union (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), p. 33. 
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Over the years the main achievement of the European Council has been the abil-
ity to fi nd solutions where normal Council procedures were failing: on the British 
budgetary problem in the eighties for instance. It has also usefully operated as a 
collective head on major policy issues, such as enlargement or the euro. But per-
ceived weaknesses came in parallel with the achievements.
Two weaknesses, that became very obvious in the nineties, were overload and 
procedural improvisation: 
Too many issues landed on the table of the European Council which should • 
have been settled elsewhere within the institutional system of the Union. 
Too many problems were postponed for discussion in an indefi nite future 
because of obvious or suspected disagreement. Written conclusions were 
clogged with irrelevant material. In view of their national obligations, Heads 
of State or Government simply do not have the time to settle a wide variety 
of European issues. Th ey operate optimally when dealing with one central 
issue, but at most meetings they found a dozen on their agenda.
Because the European Council was not initially conceived as an institution • 
it operated in a world apart. Successive meetings were held in an improb-
able variety of Renaissance fortresses and palaces, nineteenth century hotels, 
modern conference buildings and trade centres, housing an ever-increasing 
number of delegates and journalists. Successive presidencies had their own 
objectives, their own ways of preparing meetings through personal contacts, 
a lightning tour of capitals and telephone calls. Conclusions were drafted in 
the night and distributed at dawn. Responsibility for the implementation of 
decisions remained diff use and uncertain.
Th is combination resulted in chaos. Tony Blair, leaving the Nice European Coun-
cil in 2000 famously stated: “We cannot go on working like this”. Th e Secretary 
General of the Council, Javier Solana, was tasked with the drafting of a report 
on the functioning of the European Council. His report was uncompromising: 
the European Council has been sidetracked from its original purpose, he stated, 
and presidency is used for furthering national preoccupations and inappropriate 
exercises in self-congratulation.
Th is stark analysis resulted in a number of procedural changes adopted at Seville 
in June 2002. European Council meetings were generally held in Brussels.[1] 
[1] This results from Declaration 22 annexed to the Final Act of the Nice Treaty: “When the Union comprises 18 members, 
all European Council meetings will be held in Brussels”.
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 COREPER and the General Aff airs Council undertook the preparation of draft 
conclusions prior to the meeting itself. Some eff ort was made to limit the size of 
delegations, the number of points on the agenda and the length of conclusions. It 
was certainly a change for the better. 
2. FROM CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY TO LISBON RATIFICATION
Th e Convention, which met in 2002 and 2003 to prepare treaty changes, led to 
an unprecedented exercise in collective refl ection on institutional matters. Part of 
that exercise was devoted to the European Council and, with hindsight, it seems 
that two structural fault lines, which insiders and outsiders have been underlining 
for a number of years, were correctly identifi ed. 
2.1. The Presidency
Traditionally the President of the European Council played a quasi-exclusive role 
in preparing, organising and managing the meetings and in presenting the results 
to internal and external audiences. European Councils, the highlights of succes-
sive presidencies, allowed political leaders to bask in the limelight and to show to 
their national audience that Union membership, and especially its Presidency, 
were not vacuous concepts. But of course six months is a short time to master the 
intricate details of Community fi les. Successive enlargements have made it more 
diffi  cult to identify and understand the details of partner governments’ positions. 
Adequate preparation of an enlarged European Council has become more time 
consuming, and, in a busy agenda, the temptation is to pay less attention to the 
views of smaller partners. A lot depends on personalities and national political 
profi ciency does not necessarily prepare to chair and guide an international body 
with potentially confl icting interests. It needs a fair sense of balance: inertia is criti-
cized but activism can be resented. Writing about the Sarkozy Presidency in 2008, 
Peter Ludlow remarks: “As the weeks have passed, other member state governments 
have become increasingly concerned by the Presidency’s tendency to disregard procedures 
and to bombard them with paper after paper. Th ere was real crisis of confi dence prior 
to the 7 November meeting”.[1]
[1] LUDLOW, P., The EU and the Financial Crisis: The European Councils of October and November 2008, A View From Brussels, 
Briefi ng Note Vol. 6, No. 4 & 5 (Brussels, Eurocomment, November 2008), p. 6.
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2.2. The General Aff airs Council
Part of the defi ciencies of the European Council had always been attributed to 
malfunctioning of the Council and singularly the inability of the General Aff airs 
Council, composed of Foreign Ministers, to ensure adequate preparation and 
follow-up of European Council meetings, which presumes a coordinating role 
across the diff erent formations of the Council. Th e problem was not new: it was 
indeed part of the reason for creating the European Council in the fi rst place. But 
it had clearly become more intractable over time as the Union grew in size and 
scope of activity and as a wider range of ministers has been swept up into Euro-
pean aff airs. Enlargement magnifi ed existing problems by making coordination 
more time consuming. More and more problems, some of a very complex nature 
such as the fi nancial perspectives, were left to the arbitration of Heads of State 
or Government. Th e procedural rules adopted at Seville in 2002 went some way 
towards ensuring better preparation of European Council meetings but they were 
only partly successful. 
Institutional changes concerning the European Council adopted in the Convention 
were meant to address those concerns, as also to increase the international visibility 
of the Union. Th ey remained largely unchanged in the lengthy ratifi cation process 
which came to an end on 1 December 2009.
3. A FORMAL INSTITUTION
In legal terms, the most obvious modifi cation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is 
the fact that the European Council now becomes a recognised part of the institu-
tional framework. It is mentioned as an institution, for the fi rst time, in Article 15 
of the Treaty on European Union, immediately after the European Parliament. It 
shall “provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall defi ne 
the general political directions and priorities thereof”. Th at formula comes from the 
Constitutional Treaty and diff ers only slightly in wording from the text introduced 
by Article D of the Treaty of Maastricht nearly twenty years ago. But the fact that 
this task is no longer exercised by an intergovernmental meeting of Heads of State 
or Government is of course signifi cant, it gives legal basis to current practice.
Over the years the European Council had gradually taken over some real power 
and impetus initially vested in the institutional framework of the Community. 
Th at locus of power, formerly separate, is now integrated, and this can be seen as a 
consolidation of the institutional framework. It gives a stronger legitimacy to the 
European Council’s guidance. But it also formalizes a transfer of power:
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Th e Commission keeps the exclusive right of initiative for legislation. But in • 
the fi eld of political initiative, where it once, in practice, also had a monop-
oly, this right is now, according to the Treaty, shared with the European 
Council, as also with Parliament, and indeed the citizens through the right 
of petition. 
Th e Council was initially the sole decision making institution. For some • 
years it has formally shared that right with Parliament through co-decision, 
and informally with the European Council who defi ned general political 
directions and priorities. Th e latter is now formalised and the authority of 
the European Council strengthened by the creation of a semi-permanent 
President. 
Th e legal nature of the European Council, which had been the subject of some 
academic debate, is clarifi ed. It is not a superior form of the Council, but a diff er-
ent institution. It is not part of the legislative process (Art. 15 TEU). Th e quaint 
formula of the “Council meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government”, 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, has now disappeared. 
One of the less noticed consequences is that the European Council will have, in 
some circumstances, the power and the obligation to adopt acts having legal eff ect, 
which was not the case before. Th e Court of Justice will have the power to control 
the legality of such acts. When taking such decisions, the European Council will 
therefore need to pay more attention to legal form than has been the case in the 
past. Th is explains why its fi rst act, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, was 
formally to adopt its own rules of procedure. 
4. COMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
Article 15 TEU para. 2 says: “Th e European Council shall consist of the Heads of State 
or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of 
the Commission. Th e High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security 
Policy shall take part in its work”. Paragraph 3 of the same article adds: “When the 
agenda so requires, the members of the European Council may decide each to be assisted 
by a minister and, in the case of the President of the Commission, by a member of the 
Commission.” 
Th is means that Foreign Ministers who had been de jure participants in the Euro-
pean Council from the very beginning have lost that capacity. Th e justifi cation 
generally given for that decision is that in an enlarged Union the presence of two 
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members per delegation leads to a meeting of sixty or more people round the table 
which becomes diffi  cult to manage and loses that intimate character to which 
participants have always attached great importance.
It should be noted however that Foreign Ministers get a sort of proxy presence in 
the European Council through the High Representative, who is chairman of the 
Foreign Aff airs Council. Moreover Foreign Ministers, as also Finance Ministers, can 
be called to take part in the discussion of agenda points relevant to their competence. 
Experience will tell whether the European Council decides to make a generous or a 
parsimonious use of this faculty. Pressure from the minister level can be expected, 
but past experience shows that a signifi cant number of Heads of State or Govern-
ment are happy to meet with their counterparts in a secluded club.
5. FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS
Article 15 para. 3 TEU and Article 1 of the Rules of Procedure indicate that 
the European Council shall meet at least four times a year. In fact regular use of 
informal meetings, and occasional meetings in the margins of summits with third 
countries, lead to more frequent contacts, particularly in times of crisis. Under the 
French Presidency in 2008 Heads of State or Government met practically every 
month. Th e trend towards more frequent meetings seems likely to continue and 
is probably inevitable in view of the increased responsibilities of the European 
Council. Given the size of the Union, and the natural inertia of such a large body, 
occasional meetings will not, in the words of Article 15 TFEU, “provide the Union 
with the necessary impetus”. 
More frequent meetings at the highest level have a potential impact on the decision-
making machinery in general. On controversial issues, Ministers meeting in Council 
have frequently been tempted in the past to leave the diffi  cult decisions to Heads of 
State or Government. Th e temptation is greater when a European Council meeting 
is scheduled in the near future. Some restraint will have to be exercised to avoid 
clogging the agenda at the top level. 
6. THE SEMI-PERMANENT PRESIDENCY
Article 15 para. 5 of the TEU which says that the European Council will be chaired 
by a president elected for a two and a half year period, renewable once, is one of 
the most spectacular changes in the institutional framework. Hotly debated in 
the Convention, and initially rejected by the smaller Member States (on the basis 
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of a Benelux memorandum), it later, and relatively quickly, became part of the 
“acquis”. At a speech in Florence in May 2007, the Belgian Foreign Minister even 
stated that this innovation could not be abandoned (“simply not for sale”) in the 
drafting of a new treaty.[1]
Th e potential consequences of this change, its merits and weaknesses, are analysed 
in some detail by the initial Joint Study to which the present publication is a sequel. 
One of its conclusions was that “the well-worn confl icting notions of, on the one hand, 
a President who is simply a chairman, and on the other hand, a President in the fullest 
sense of the word, loses much of its relevance […] the Member States sought to rule out 
both the notion of a single fi gurehead, in a role limited to giving people the fl oor and 
making appropriate declarations, and that of a supreme fi gure of authority, ultimately 
responsible for the fate of the Union”.[2]
Th is point is worth looking at in the light of the debate that preceded the appoint-
ment of the fi rst President of the European Council.
It is clear that the hype surrounding the candidacy of Tony Blair was based on the 
notion that the external dimension of the new job should predominate, and that 
it should indeed be held by a fi gure of authority “capable of stopping the traffi  c in 
Washington or Beijing”.
It is no less clear that the choice made by the Heads of State or Government is based 
on the opposite notion that, without minimising the external role, it is the internal 
dimension which should predominate and that it should be held by a fi gure apt at 
consensus building and group leadership.
On the basis of our previous analysis that was indeed what the Treaty implied.
Th e Joint Study identifi ed the four main tasks which, together with external repre-
sentation at his level, are entrusted by the Treaty to the President of the European 
Council:
preparing the meetings,• 
conducting the debates,• 
drawing conclusions,• 
following them up.• 
Th ey are worth looking at again.
[1] Speech by Karel DE GUCHT at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, 17 May 2007, Towards a Union that 
is fi t for the global era.
[2] First Lisbon Study, p. 49
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7. PREPARING THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
“Th e President of the European Council […] shall ensure the preparation and continuity 
of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commis-
sion, and on the basis of the work of the General Aff airs Council” [Art. 15 para.6(b) 
TEU]. “Th e General Aff airs Council […] shall prepare and ensure the follow-up to 
meetings of the European Council, in liaison with the President of the European Council 
and the Commission” (Art. 16 para. 6 TEU).
Th ese articles do not imply new procedures. Th e preparation of a European Council 
has always been largely in the hands of the Presidency, working with the General 
Aff airs Council and the Commission. Prior to ratifi cation of the Lisbon Treaty, that 
procedure was seen as not entirely satisfactory in practice. Th e question is therefore 
whether changes in the European Council presidency and in the General Aff airs 
Council are likely to give better results.
A successful European Council meeting, like any other meeting, implies that the 
chair(wo)man starts with a good knowledge of the substantial issues to be debated 
and a clear understanding of confl icting views and interests round the table. He/
She can then manage the discussion in such a way that agreement becomes pos-
sible. It is clear that the new President of the European Council has a signifi cant 
advantage over his predecessors: he has more time to prepare himself and to prepare 
the meeting. Moreover he can look forward and planify future meetings which 
he will also be chairing. “Time”, as President Van Rompuy said, “is a politicians’ 
prime material”.[1]
Combining the duties and responsibilities of a national Head of State or Govern-
ment with the duties and responsibilities linked to the preparation and chairman-
ship of the European Council has always been somewhat problematic, even more 
so for the bigger Member States than for the smaller ones. Th e diffi  culty has been 
compounded by successive enlargements because views and interests are more 
varied, and the personal relationship between participants less intimate. Visiting 
each capital in the last few days before a meeting used to be accepted practice. 
With 27 capitals it becomes practically impossible, and those omitted in the tour 
are understandably aggrieved.
[1]  Speech by the President of the European Council Herman VAN ROMPUY at the “Klausurtagung” of the CSU-Landes-
gruppe Wildbad Kreuth, Germany, 7 January 2010, retrievable at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/pressdata/en/ec/112174.pdf.
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Th e single most important advantage of the new system is that the President of the 
European Council will, in normal circumstances, begin each meeting with a deeper 
understanding of the issues and a better knowledge of the respective positions of 
the participants, with whom he will have had personal contact. Th is advantage, by 
itself, probably justifi es the innovation.
Th at said, the hybrid nature of the new overall concept, and the overlapping authori-
ties which result from it, remain a source of concern. 
If we take the example of the preparation of an important foreign policy statement 
to be delivered by the European Council, the scenario would be approximately 
the following:
An initial draft would be discussed in the Political and Security Committee • 
(COPS) under the chairperson appointed by the High Representative.
It would then go to COREPER (which insists on vetting all documents before • 
they go to the ministerial level) chaired by the Permanent Representative of 
the rotating Presidency.
COREPER would forward it to the External Relations Council, chaired by • 
the High Representative, for ministerial approval.
It would then move to the General Aff airs Council preparing the European • 
Council which is chaired by the rotating Presidency (Art. 3 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the European Council).
And then appear on the agenda of the European Council chaired by the • 
President of that institution.
A proposal on development aid introduced by the Commission would follow a 
similar track: working group, COREPER, External Relations Council, General 
Aff airs Council, European Council. 
In both cases the initial draft would be discussed in meetings chaired in succession 
by three diff erent sources of authority (High Representative, rotating Presidency, 
president of the European Council) which have no hierarchical link between them. 
On paper this is a very dysfunctional way of proceeding. Now experience shows 
(notably in Belgium) that procedures that are clearly dysfunctional in theory, can 
sometimes work reasonably well in practice. Many observers already considered 
that the institutional framework resulting from the Maastricht Treaty was quite 
dysfunctional, yet it cannot be said that decision-making in the Union has broken 
down. But such procedures do not make life easier for the person who is ultimately 
responsible for presenting a draft to the European Council, namely its President. 
16
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In practice such a system can only work if there are good personal relations, and 
some similarity in goals, between the President of the European Council, the Presi-
dent of the Commission, the High Representative and leading political fi gures in 
the rotating Presidency. Th ere is no reason to believe that this will not happen. But 
a system which is to a high degree dependent on good personal relations is fragile, 
confl ict prone and time consuming.
8. THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL
In this respect, the main innovation introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is the 
fact that the General Aff airs Council has been split from the External Relations 
Council and specifi cally tasked with the preparation of the European Council. 
Th is last point is made more specifi c by Article 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
European Council: 
Contributions by other Council confi gurations shall be forwarded to the • 
General Aff airs Council at the latest two weeks before the meeting of the 
European Council.
Draft conclusions and draft decisions of the European Council, shall be • 
discussed in the General Aff airs Council.
A fi nal meeting of the General Aff airs Council shall be held within the fi ve • 
days preceding the meeting of the European Council. In the light of that 
fi nal discussion, the President of the European Council shall draw up the 
provisional agenda.
Except for imperative and unforeseeable reasons, no other confi guration of • 
the Council or preparatory body may, between the session of the General 
Aff airs Council at the end of which the provisional agenda for the European 
Council is drawn up and the European Council meeting, discuss any subject 
submitted to the European Council.
Similar rules, though less clearly formulated, have been in place since 2002 (Euro-
pean Council in Seville). Th ey had a benefi cial eff ect but, as indicated above, were 
only partly successful. Th e question arises whether the new structure is likely to be 
more effi  cient and the answer is not self-evident.
Doubt is partly justifi ed by the fact that both the main “preparatory body” (namely 
COREPER) and the President of the European Council sit permanently in Brussels, 
and will presumably talk to each other and to other signifi cant actors such as the 
Commission, whereas the General Aff airs Council will only occasionally meet there. 
17
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Experience shows that, in such circumstances, regular contact has more impact than 
occasional meetings on the preparation of a debate on complex issues. 
Two further points give food for thought:
In most administrations the chairman of a group that prepares a meeting sits • 
personally in that meeting, to listen, explain and ensure continuity. Th is will 
not be the case here. On the basis of Article 15 para. 2 TEU, the President of 
the General Aff airs Council has no seat in the European Council. To ensure 
effi  ciency and continuity in the process, it would seem reasonable to examine 
the legal possibility of ensuring his regular participation.
Conversely the President of the European Council has no status in the Gen-• 
eral Aff airs Council. In our previous Joint Study, we suggested that, in order 
to enable him to exercise the role conferred by the Treaty, he should have 
“a right to intervene and to make proposals in all areas directly or indirectly 
related to the preparation and implementation of European Council decisions” 
both in specialised Councils and in the General Aff airs Council.[1] Th is is 
not the practice which is presently evolving. It seems that direct participa-
tion in Council meetings is considered inappropriate for the President of 
the European Council. Instead informal contacts with the General Aff airs 
Council will be organised on a regular basis before each European Council 
meeting. It remains to be seen if such informal contacts, however useful, 
enable a coordinated in depth preparation. 
As things stand, there seems to be a clear hiatus between the formal preparation 
of the meeting and the meeting itself. From the point of view of effi  ciency, this is 
certainly not the best solution. 
One other unknown is the future composition of the General Aff airs Council. In 
the previous combination of General Aff airs and External Relations the incumbents 
were the Ministers for Foreign Aff airs. In practice they frequently left their seat, 
especially when dealing with “General Aff airs”, to junior ministers. Experience has 
shown that these were not in fact able to have much impact on the preparation 
of European Council meetings. Unless there is some quite radical change in the 
composition of the General Aff airs Council that experience is likely to prevail.
Radical change might for instance consist in requesting the Head of State or Gov-
ernment of the rotating Presidency to chair the General Aff airs Council. Th is would 
presumably upgrade the whole exercise but it seems a very unlikely solution, given 
[1] See First Lisbon Study, pp. 49-50.
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the increased frequency of meetings, and the fact that the President of the European 
Council is not inclined to sit there himself. Th e Foreign Minister of the rotating 
Presidency, who loses the chairmanship of the External Relations Council, is a 
more likely choice, but there is no reason to believe that he will be able to ensure 
a higher level of participation than was previously the case. Th e fact that Foreign 
Ministers will no longer automatically sit on European Council meetings may well 
reduce their, already limited, commitment to preparatory work.
On the basis of the treaty texts, the General Aff airs Council will clearly be a neces-
sary preparatory step for each European Council meeting. Whether it will exercise 
major infl uence on the conclusions of such meetings remains to be seen.
9. CONDUCTING THE DEBATE AND DRAWING CONCLUSIONS
Th e President of the European Council has never been entirely master of the agenda. 
Th ere is no way of preventing a Head of State or Government from talking about 
something he is determined to talk about. But the Rules of Procedure (Art. 3 para. 
1) do give the President a powerful infl uence both on setting the agenda and on 
drawing the conclusions.
“• At least four weeks before each ordinary meeting of the European Council […] 
the President of the European Council, in close cooperation with the member of 
the European Council representing the Member State holding the six-monthly 
Presidency of the Council and with the President of the Commission, shall submit 
an annotated draft agenda to the General Aff airs Council”. 
“• Th e President of the European Council, in close cooperation as referred to in the 
fi rst subparagraph, shall prepare draft guidelines for the European Council conclu-
sions and, as appropriate, draft conclusions and draft decisions of the European 
Council, which shall be discussed in the General Aff airs Council”.
Even before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it was already the case that 
prior debate in COREPER and, up to a point, in the General Aff airs Council, 
enabled the Presidency to have a view on potential conclusions.
Th is should be reinforced by the fact that, as indicated above, the President will, in 
most circumstances, have had time to acquire, from the outset, a better knowledge 
of the issues to be debated, and a better understanding of the respective positions, 
than any of the other participants. Coupled with a large degree of control on the 
agenda and on draft conclusions, this should enable him to conduct the debate 
effi  ciently and to draw whatever conclusions can be reached in a given situation.
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10. FOLLOW UP
Diffi  culties to be expected in the follow up of European Council decisions are likely 
to stem from the same source as diffi  culties in preparing the meeting, namely that 
the President does not have direct authority on the various Council formations 
(not to speak about the Commission) which need to take action.
However, compared to the situation prevailing before the entry into force 
of the  Lisbon Treaty, the President has two advantages which are likely to be 
determinant:
Presence.•  In cases where Ministers have been known to diff er from European 
Council conclusions they have mostly reacted by stealth. For obvious reasons, 
Ministers will not openly contradict Heads of State or Government. Th ey 
have been known, however, in some circumstances, to fail to act, to sidestep 
or ignore a decision which they judge misguided. Th is will be less easy with a 
President of the European Council permanently present in Brussels, able to 
recall in public statements, in the press or in Parliament, what the conclusions 
were, what the consequences are, what action needs to be taken.
Time.•  Because his mandate is not limited to a few months, the President can 
take time to persuade, to argue, to convince. He can call on support from 
public opinion, Heads of State or Government or Parliament. In stubborn 
cases he can wait for a change of the rotating Presidency. Time is on his side. 
He has continuity, durability and predictability which are important assets 
in politics.
11. EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Article 15(6) para. 2 TEU says that “Th e President of the European Council shall, at 
his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues 
concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy”. Th is 
is not the clearest of treaty texts and it is probably the one which has given rise to 
the most abundant interrogation and comment. For some political observers, and 
part of public opinion, his external role has been considered as the major task of 
the new fi gure. President Van Rompuy has clearly taken a more balanced view, but 
the implementation of that paragraph will obviously be delicate and important. His 
role in the functioning of the External Action Service, for instance in the receiving 
and sending of credentials, will be signifi cant. 
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For reasons of presentation and coherence, the role of the President of the European 
Council in common foreign and security policy is dealt with in another section 
of this study, together with external relations in general. It is however essential to 
keep in mind that his internal and his external role are closely interconnected. In 
diplomacy, internal credibility and external credibility interact. If the President is 
seen to have authority in the working of the European Council, his credit with third 
parties will increase. If he books a success on the international stage, his authority 
within the system will be greater.
12. CONCLUSION
Th e fact that the European Council formally becomes an institution of the Union 
will not, by itself, bring a major change in the decision-making mechanism. It con-
fi rms, and ratifi es in legal terms, an evolution which practice had already brought 
about. Th e fact is that, well before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Commission was no longer the main initiator of the integration process. Th e 
Council was no longer the ultimate decision taker on complex and diffi  cult issues. 
Th ose tasks had in practice been taken over by the European Council. Th ere is no 
reason to believe that its role will in future be substantially diff erent from what it 
was before the Lisbon Treaty.
Similarly the fact that Foreign Ministers are no longer de jure members of the Euro-
pean Council confi rms existing practice, namely that those ministers have, for some 
time, been unwilling or unable to ensure eff ective horizontal coordination of issues 
dealt with in various formations of the Council. In a way the new composition of 
the European Council confi rms the reality of integration: European policy issues 
can no longer, as they were in the fi rst years of the Community, be considered to 
be essentially foreign policy issues. But here again there is no reason to expect a 
substantial modifi cation of the role and power of the European Council as a result 
of this innovation. With a reduced membership, meetings may become more easily 
manageable, slightly more intimate, allowing for participants to get to know each 
other better. Th at at least is the intention, as is shown by the fact that President 
Van Rompuy called the fi rst meeting in Brussels of the European Council under 
the new Treaty, admittedly an informal one, not in the cavernous halls of the Justus 
Lipsius building, but in the Art Nouveau setting of the Solvay Library. 
Th e potential role of the new “General Aff airs” Council, as a preparatory organ to 
the European Council, remains unclear.
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But the substantial innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is the semi-per-
manent Presidency. Th e previous joint study already indicated that the President 
of the European Council was likely to be neither a simple fi gurehead, with a role 
limited to giving the fl oor and making declarations, nor a supreme fi gure of author-
ity, along the lines of the President of the French Republic. Subsequent events have 
confi rmed that analysis. In appointing Herman Van Rompuy, the Heads of State 
or Government chose a political fi gure coming from a tradition of compromise and 
consensus, not of presidential supremacy. But they chose a Prime Minister in power, 
not a fi gurehead. His fi rst act, as new President, was to call an informal meeting, 
showing that he had the capacity, and the will, to bring together the members of 
the European Council whenever he thought that useful.
Chairing a relatively large group of people, each of which is the main source of 
political power in his, or her, own country, has never been an easy task, as successive 
presidents have found out. But the semi-permanent president has a natural asset 
which was denied to the rotating chair, namely time. Time to study the fi les, time 
to understand the sources of disagreement, time to look for solutions. Perhaps most 
importantly, time to establish a personal relationship with all participants. Personal 
relations of trust and understanding between Heads of State or Government have 
always played an important role in the decision-making process of the European 
Council. Th e most frequently quoted examples concern the Franco-German rela-
tionship but there are many others. An increased number of members, the result of 
successive enlargements, have made that form of relationship more time consum-
ing, and more diffi  cult to establish and maintain. Tensions between big and small 
Member States, between old and new participants, which, to a certain degree, have 
always existed, are today more acute. Th ey are frequently an obstacle to mutual 
trust. A permanent chair can do much to alleviate them.
Th e new President of the European Council derives signifi cant powers from the 
Treaty: he proposes the agenda, he prepares the meeting, he chairs it, then presents 
its conclusions and oversees their execution. Combined with the availability of 
time, this should enable him to exercise real leadership. And the European Union 
clearly needs leadership.
However he will not exercise leadership in isolation. Even leaving aside external 
relations, which are dealt with in another part of this study, potential rivalries are 
built in the system. Two “semi-permanent” presidents are simultaneously operat-
ing in Brussels, respectively at the Head of the Commission and of the European 
Council. Two forms of presidency coexist in the Council, the rotating one and 
the semi-permanent. Th e resulting complexity in the decision-making system is 
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described in the preceding pages. Treaty texts off er no clear solution. Regular and 
eff ective communication, consultation and coordination, is essential if the system 
is to work.
In fact experience shows that the European Council and the Commission comple-
ment each other. Political decisions at the highest level frequently require legisla-
tive proposals, which the Commission alone can initiate, or executive measures to 
be implemented by Commission services. And the most successful Commission 
Presidents have known how to persuade the European Council to support their 
views or their proposals.
Similarly the institutional system established by the new Treaty, partly because of 
its complexity, imposes a high level of coordination between rotating Presidencies 
and the new President of the European Council. Neither branch can hope to book 
meaningful successes without close cooperation with the other.
Logic would therefore command that all protagonists concentrate on cooperation 
rather than rivalry and confl ict. Treaty texts can always be interpreted in various 
ways and some articles of the Lisbon Treaty open wide avenues for contradiction 
and debate. But however dysfunctional the system may appear on paper, it will be 
made to work if main actors agree that it must. “It is my fervent intention to work 
in partnership and to mobilise all the energies and competencies in the Union. It is the 
only way to progress”, says Herman Van Rompuy.[1]
One of the classical exercises in the academic analysis of European institutions is to 
examine with a powerful lens, and weigh with a delicate balance, the intergovern-
mental versus the supranational character of each new text. On this scale the Treaty 
of Lisbon is frequently considered to be on the intergovernmental side, because 
the legal confi rmation of the institutional role of the European Council as primary 
source of initiative weakens the Commission. In fact the Lisbon Treaty, like all its 
predecessors since the Treaty of Maastricht, is quite ambiguous on this score. It does 
indeed introduce the European Council in the institutional framework, but it also 
recognises the international legal personality of the Union, strengthens the powers 
of the European Parliament and increases the possibilities of majority voting. Th e 
fact that the European Council has a President who is no longer a member of a 
national government should presumably be interpreted, in this narrow analytical 
debate, as a step away from pure intergovernmentalism.
[1] Speech by Herman VAN ROMPUY at the Collège d’Europe, Bruges, 25 February 2010, The Challenges for Europe in a 
Changing World, retrievable at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/113067.pdf.
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Th is debate, which has been going on for half a century, is increasingly irrelevant. 
Th e fundamental question for the next few years is whether political forces and 
public opinion in Member States is suffi  ciently committed to the European proc-
ess, irrespective of its institutional character, to move it forward as an instrument 
of power and infl uence in a globalised world. Obviously academic analysis cannot, 
by itself, give an answer to that question.
ANNEX
Rules of Procedures of the European Council 
(adopted on 1 December 2009)
Article 1: Notice and venue of meetings
The European Council shall meet twice every six months, convened by its 
President.
At the latest one year before the beginning of a six-month period, in close coopera-
tion with the Member State which will hold the Presidency during that six-month 
period, the President of the European Council shall make known the dates which 
he or she envisages for the meetings of the European Council during that six-
month period.
When the situation so requires, the President shall convene a special meeting of 
the European Council.
Th e European Council shall meet in Brussels.
In exceptional circumstances, the President of the European Council, with the 
agreement of the General Aff airs Council or the Committee of Permanent Repre-
sentatives, acting unanimously, may decide that a meeting of the European Council 
will be held elsewhere.
Article 2: Preparation for and follow-up to the proceedings of the European 
Council
1. Th e President of the European Council shall ensure the preparation and continu-
ity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the 
Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Aff airs Council.
2. Th e General Aff airs Council shall prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings 
of the European Council, in liaison with the President of the European Council 
and the Commission.
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3. Th e President shall establish close cooperation and coordination with the Presi-
dency of the Council and the President of the Commission, particularly by means 
of regular meetings.
4. In the event of an impediment because of illness, in the event of his or her 
death or if his or her term of offi  ce is ended in accordance with Article 15(5) of 
the Treaty on European Union, the President of the European Council shall be 
replaced, where necessary until the election of his or her successor, by the member 
of the European Council representing the Member State holding the six-monthly 
Presidency of the Council.
Article 3: Agenda and preparation
1. In order to ensure the preparation provided for in Article 2(2), at least four weeks 
before each ordinary meeting of the European Council as referred to in Article 1(1), 
the President of the European Council, in close cooperation with the member of 
the European Council representing the Member State holding the six-monthly 
Presidency of the Council and with the President of the Commission, shall submit 
an annotated draft agenda to the General Aff airs Council.
Contributions to the proceedings of the European Council by other Council con-
fi gurations shall be forwarded to the General Aff airs Council at the latest two weeks 
before the meeting of the European Council.
Th e President of the European Council, in close cooperation as referred to in the 
fi rst subparagraph, shall prepare draft guidelines for the European Council conclu-
sions and, as appropriate, draft conclusions and draft decisions of the European 
Council, which shall be discussed in the General Aff airs Council.
A fi nal meeting of the General Aff airs Council shall be held within the fi ve days 
preceding the meeting of the European Council. In the light of that fi nal discussion, 
the President of the European Council shall draw up the provisional agenda.
2. Except for imperative and unforeseeable reasons linked, for example, to current 
international events, no other confi guration of the Council or preparatory body 
may, between the session of the General Aff airs Council at the end of which the 
provisional agenda for the European Council is drawn up and the European Council 
meeting, discuss any subject submitted to the European Council.
Th e European Council shall adopt its agenda at the beginning of its meeting.
As a rule, issues entered on the agenda should have been examined beforehand, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article.
Article 4: Composition of the European Council, delegations and the conduct of 
proceedings
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1. Each ordinary meeting of the European Council shall run for a maximum of two 
days, unless the European Council or the General Aff airs Council, on the initiative 
of the President of the European Council, decides otherwise.
Th e member of the European Council representing the Member State holding the 
Presidency of the Council shall report to the European Council, in consultation 
with its President, on the work of the Council.
2. Th e President of the European Parliament may be invited to be heard by the 
European Council. Such exchange of views shall be held at the start of the meet-
ing of the European Council, unless the European Council unanimously decides 
otherwise.
Meetings in the margins of the European Council with representatives of third 
States or international organisations or other personalities may be held in excep-
tional circumstances only, and with the prior agreement of the European Council, 
acting unanimously, on the initiative of the President of the European Council.
3. Meetings of the European Council shall not be public.
4. Th e European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of the 
Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission. 
Th e High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy shall 
take part in its work.
When the agenda so requires, the members of the European Council may decide 
each to be assisted by a minister and, in the case of the President of the Commis-
sion, by a member of the Commission.
Th e total size of the delegations authorised to have access to the building where the 
meeting of the European Council is held shall be limited to 20 persons for each 
Member State and for the Commission, and to fi ve for the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy. Th at number shall not include 
technical personnel assigned to specifi c security or logistic support tasks. Th e names 
and functions of the members of the delegations shall be notifi ed in advance to the 
General Secretariat of the Council.
Th e President shall be responsible for the application of these Rules of Procedure 
and for ensuring that discussions are conducted smoothly.
Article 5: Representation before the European Parliament
Th e European Council shall be represented before the European Parliament by the 
President of the European Council.
Th e President of the European Council shall present a report to the European 
Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council.
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Th e member of the European Council representing the Member State holding the 
Presidency of the Council shall present to the European Parliament the priorities 
of its Presidency and the results achieved during the six-month period.
Article 6: Adoption of positions, decisions and quorum
1. Except where the Treaties provide otherwise, decisions of the European Council 
shall be taken by consensus.
2. In those cases where, in accordance with the Treaties, the European Council 
adopts a decision and holds a vote, that vote shall take place on the initiative of 
its President.
Th e President shall, furthermore, be required to open a voting procedure on the 
initiative of a member of the European Council, provided that a majority of the 
members of the European Council so decides.
3. Th e presence of two thirds of the members of the European Council is required 
to enable the European Council to vote. When the vote is taken, the President 
shall check that there is a quorum. Th e President of the European Council and 
the President of the Commission shall not be included in the calculation of the 
quorum.
4. Where a vote is taken, any member of the European Council may also act on 
behalf of not more than one other member.
Where the European Council decides by vote, its President and the President of 
the Commission shall not take part in the vote.
5. Procedural decisions adopted by the European Council by virtue of these Rules 
of Procedure shall be adopted by a simple majority.
Article 7: Written procedure
Decisions of the European Council on an urgent matter may be adopted by a written 
vote where the President of the European Council proposes to use that procedure. 
Written votes may be used where all members of the European Council having 
the right to vote agree to that procedure.
A summary of acts adopted by the written procedure shall be drawn up periodically 
by the General Secretariat of the Council.
Article 8: Minutes
Minutes of each meeting shall be drawn up; a draft of those minutes shall be pre-
pared by the General Secretariat of the Council within 15 days. Th e draft shall be 
submitted to the European Council for approval, and then signed by the Secretary-
General of the Council.
Th e minutes shall contain:
a reference to the documents submitted to the European Council;• 
27
The European Council
a reference to the conclusions approved;• 
the decisions taken;• 
the statements made by the European Council and those whose entry has • 
been requested by a member of the European Council.
Article 9: Deliberations and decisions on the basis of documents and draftsdrawn 
up in the languages provided for by the language rules in force
1. Except as otherwise decided unanimously by the European Council on grounds 
of urgency, the European Council shall deliberate and take decisions only on the 
basis of documents and drafts drawn up in the languages specifi ed in the rules in 
force governing languages.
2. Any member of the European Council may oppose discussion where the texts 
of any proposed amendments are not drawn up in such of the languages referred 
to in paragraph 1 as he or she may specify.
Article 10: Making public votes, explanations of votes and minutes and access to 
documents
1. In cases where, in accordance with the Treaties, the European Council adopts a 
decision, the European Council may decide, in accordance with the voting arrange-
ment applicable for the adoption of that decision, to make public the results of votes, 
as well as the statements in its minutes and the items in those minutes relating to 
the adoption of that decision.
Where the result of a vote is made public, the explanations of the vote provided 
when the vote was taken shall also be made public at the request of the member of 
the European Council concerned, with due regard for these Rules of Procedure, 
legal certainty and the interests of the European Council.
2. Th e provisions concerning public access to Council documents set out in Annex 
II to the Rules of Procedure of the Council shall apply mutatis mutandis to Euro-
pean Council documents.
Article 11: Professional secrecy and production of documents in legal 
proceedings
Without prejudice to the provisions on public access to documents, the delibera-
tions of the European Council shall be covered by the obligation of professional 
secrecy, except insofar as the European Council decides otherwise.
Th e European Council may authorise the production for use in legal proceedings of 
a copy of or an extract from European Council documents which have not already 
been released to the public in accordance with Article 10.
Article 12: Decisions of the European Council
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1. Decisions adopted by the European Council shall be signed by its President 
and by the Secretary-General of the Council. Where they do not specify to whom 
they are addressed, they shall be published in the Offi  cial Journal of the European 
Union. Where they specify to whom they are addressed, they shall be notifi ed to 
those to whom they are addressed by the Secretary-General of the Council.
2. Th e provisions concerning the form of acts set out in Annex VI to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Council shall apply mutatis mutandis to decisions of the Euro-
pean Council.
Article 13: Secretariat, budget and security
1. Th e European Council and its President shall be assisted by the General Secre-
tariat of the Council, under the authority of its Secretary-General.
2. Th e Secretary-General of the Council shall attend the meetings of the European 
Council. He or she shall take all the measures necessary for the organisation of 
proceedings.
3. Th e Secretary-General of the Council shall have full responsibility for adminis-
tering the appropriations entered in Section II — European Council and Coun-
cil — of the budget and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are 
properly managed. He or she shall implement the appropriations in question in 
accordance with the provisions of the Financial Regulation applicable to the budget 
of the Union.
4. Th e Council’s security rules shall apply mutatis mutandis to the European 
Council.
Article 14: Correspondence addressed to the European Council
Correspondence to the European Council shall be sent to its President at the fol-
lowing address:
European Council
rue de la Loi 175
B-1048 Brussels.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the introduction in 1979 of direct EU-wide elections, the European 
Parliament has steadily gained in power and prestige as successive treaty changes, 
from the Single Act onwards, have extended its reach, in diff ering ways, into most 
policy areas at the European level. Th ese gains have been the consequence of two 
factors: fi rstly the readiness of the Member States, when amending the treaties, 
to agree to extend the Parliament’s formal powers as part of the wider process of 
European integration, and secondly, the ambition and ability of the Parliament 
to exploit these formal powers to acquire additional infl uence. In doing so, the 
European Parliament is following a long tradition of national assemblies which have 
attributed to themselves the objective of advancing their interests and extending 
their prerogatives against those of a powerful executive. It seems inherent in the 
defi nition of a parliament.
Th e Lisbon Treaty, like its predecessor the European Constitution, continues the 
trend of extending the formal powers of the European Parliament. Most signifi -
cant is the very large extension of policy areas to which the co-decision procedure 
(renamed as the “ordinary legislative procedure”) applies, but the Parliament also 
gains in its ability to exercise oversight of the executive (particularly the Com-
mission but also, to a lesser extent, the Council — see chapter on comitology). 
Th e budgetary procedures have been modifi ed, with a de facto shift to co-decision 
(although the impact of this remains unclear), and the Parliament’s role in the 
area of international relations is enhanced signifi cantly through the requirement 
for its endorsement of the majority of international agreements. Parliament’s new 
responsibilities will undoubtedly require some structural reorganisation, although 
the initial low level of legislative activity means that it will probably be some time 
before it becomes clear what form this will take. In the meantime the Parliament 
has secured additional fi nancial resources for 2010 to assist it in coping with the 
impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
Aside from the obvious observation that the extension by the Lisbon Treaty of the 
Parliament’s powers is simply the continuation of a long-standing process, there 
are a number of explanations for the extent of these changes. Firstly, not only was 
there a signifi cant level of representation (and an even higher level of infl uence) 
of MEPs in the Convention which drew up the Constitution, but the Parliament 
moreover had to give its formal consent, as with any treaty change, and therefore 
had to be taken seriously. Secondly, at the time, many Member States’ delegations 
overly focussed on other institutional innovations (in particular vote weighting 
and the arrangements governing the Presidency), whilst others sought precisely to 
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ensure that the Parliament’s powers were enhanced in order to strengthen demo-
cratic accountability.
Th e result was that there was very little serious assessment of many of the new 
provisions. Some, such as the extension of co-decision, were based on existing 
experience — there was little reason or political scope to question them. Others 
appeared modest in their eff ect. As a result the Council has been surprised by the 
extent to which the Lisbon Treaty has, both directly and indirectly, aff ected the 
behaviour of the European Parliament. At best it has led to the Council having to 
adjust the way in which it manages its relations with the Parliament; at worst it 
has put it on the defensive as it has considered it necessary to take rearguard action 
to protect its prerogatives.
Th is chapter looks at a number of key areas in which the Parliament has gained 
powers under the Lisbon Treaty. Th ey are grouped together under the headings of 
the Parliament’s task of providing political oversight, its function as co-legislator, 
its budgetary role and its involvement in the Union’s external policies.
2. POLITICAL OVERSIGHT
2.1. The Commission
Th e Lisbon Treaty strengthens the degree to which the Parliament exercises political 
oversight of the Commission. For the fi rst time this relationship is made explicit 
by the statement that “Th e Commission, as a body, shall be responsible to the Euro-
pean Parliament” in Article 17(8) of the TEU. Th is general statement is a logical 
consequence of the existing provision allowing the Parliament to bring a motion of 
censure against the Commission, and thereby bring it down, as was so powerfully 
demonstrated by the downfall of the Santer Commission in 1999.
Th e procedures for the appointment of the Commission now also give the Parlia-
ment a stronger role, even if this change is relatively modest. Th e new provisions, by 
requiring the European Council, when it puts forward its candidate for Commission 
President, to take into account the election to the European Parliament, explicitly 
politicises the appointment.[1] Th is, combined with the subsequent “election” of 
the Commission by the European Parliament, provides the Parliament with an 
opportunity to bring a more high-profi le and party political angle to the selection 
[1] See First Lisbon Study, pp. 26-27, for a more extensive analysis of this elected Commission President.
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procedure [Art. 17 (7) TEU].[1] Interestingly, the process this time round (which 
began with the European Council putting up the incumbent President Barroso 
in June 2009 - before the Lisbon Treaty was in force), turned out to be less about 
party political preferences within the Parliament itself (although these certainly 
existed) but refl ected more the concern of the Parliament as a whole to consolidate 
its institutional role. Th is was for two reasons: fi rstly, the presentation by Barroso 
as President-designate to the Parliament in September 2009 of his programme 
containing something for everybody, and therefore in the end very little; there was 
no real choice of policy on off er for the Parliament; secondly, the Socialists although 
not offi  cially supporting Barroso, off ered no alternative candidate with the result 
that there was no political choice other than to vote for or against Barroso. He was 
endorsed with a very respectable majority.
If the early part of the process ended up neutralising a genuinely party political 
contest, the procedures associated with the appointment of the rest of the Com-
mission served to put the emphasis on the institutional role of the Parliament. 
Th e updating of the 2005 Framework Agreement between the Commission and 
Parliament was, at the latter’s insistence, discussed with Barroso as President-elect, 
and he was forced into a corner to accept in principle a number of new (and in 
some cases far-reaching) provisions as the price to pay for the Parliament’s overall 
endorsement of his team.[2]
Th ese new provisions, on which formal negotiations began subsequently under 
the guidance of Commission Vice-President Sefcovic, caused consternation in the 
Council, which considered that many of them went far too far. For example both 
the proposal that the President of the Commission involve the Parliament in deci-
sions to reshuffl  e Commissioners’ portfolios, and the suggestion that information 
on individual infringement proceedings be made available to the Parliament, would 
confer prerogatives on the Parliament for which the Treaties do not provide.
2.2. The Council
Th e Parliament has never had much of a hold over the Council. Th ere is no provi-
sion in the Treaty which allows the Parliament to censure the Council, and the 
Council has proved to be stubborn in its refusal to accept greater oversight of its 
activities. Much of the pressure to do so arises from the late 1990s when the EU 
[1] See First Lisbon Study, pp. 13-14, 27, for further debate on the possible politicisation of the Commission resulting 
from the EP’s increased oversight powers. 
[2] See European Parliament resolution of 9 February 2010 on a revised Framework Agreement between the European 
Parliament and the Commission for the next legislative term, P7_TA(2010)0009.
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began to make serious moves towards developing a common foreign and security 
policy, for which the Council had primary executive responsibility, and over which 
the Parliament, to its great frustration, has very little infl uence.
Th e entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has sharpened Parliament’s keenness to 
hold the Council to account. In a discussion on 17 December 2009 on the imple-
mentation of the Lisbon Treaty, the Conference of Chairs of Political Groups 
decided to instruct the Secretary-General to ensure equal treatment and reciprocity 
with the Council for all administrative arrangements. Reciprocity (covering issues 
such as sharing of document and access to meetings) is now quoted regularly by 
the Parliament as a principle which should guide the relationship between the two 
institutions.
Th e Framework Agreement between the Parliament and Commission[1], together 
with Barroso’s attempts to create a special relationship between the two by con-
stant references to the “two Community institutions par excellence” has tended 
to pit both against the Council. Although this is in line with the tendency for the 
Commission to depend increasingly on the Parliament over the years, the shift in 
the respective prerogatives of the institutions as a result of the Lisbon Treaty could 
also draw the Parliament and Council closer together as they realise that they have 
interests in common, not least as the Council sheds its executive responsibilities to 
the External Action Service. In many other areas the Council and Parliament now 
act as co-legislators and share equal and joint responsibility for establishing the 
whole of the EU budget. Both depend on the Commission for legislative initiatives, 
and both rely on it for information in most international negotiations.
2.3. The European Council
With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council becomes for the fi rst time an insti-
tution in its own right and is chaired by a stable President appointed for a two and 
a half year term which is renewable.[2] Th e Parliament has for many years sought a 
place for its President at the table of the European Council. Th is has been resisted 
by Member States, although the President of the Parliament normally addresses 
the European Council before the start of its formal meetings, and has on occasions 
participated in dinner and lunch discussions. Th e Prime Minister of the rotating 
Presidency has also traditionally reported to the Parliament’s plenary on the out-
come of European Council meetings.
[1] Ibid.
[2] Arts 13 & 15 TEU.
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For the Parliament, the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty presented an 
opportunity also to change the relationship between the two institutions. It sought 
a more systematic presence by President Van Rompuy at its plenary sessions, and 
announced its intention to amend its own internal rules to allow parliamentary 
questions to be put to the European Council. In both cases the response to these 
initiatives has been negative. President Van Rompuy made it very clear from the 
outset that he would fulfi l his Treaty obligation to report to the plenary after each 
European Council, but no more.
Th e argument for resisting any direct parliamentary oversight of the European 
Council is that it is not strictly speaking part of the institutional triangle. It can-
not exercise any legislative function and its role is largely to give strategic direction 
to the Union. Parliamentary questions to the European Council could thus pose 
particular problems both on principle and practical grounds. Th e views of the 
European Council are expressed through the conclusions to its meetings. Beyond 
these, it cannot express any view, nor can the President do so on its behalf. Regular 
contacts between the presidents of the two institutions are a diff erent matter since 
each is able to represent the interests of his institution in a less public manner. 
Hence the initiative to establish regular meetings between President Buzek and 
President Van Rompuy seems very useful.
2.4. Rotating Presidency
Th e fragmentation of the Presidency created by the Lisbon Treaty engenders both 
challenges and opportunities for relations between the Council and the Parliament. 
Th e fact that the Parliament has two stable interlocutors in the posts of President of 
the European Council and High Representative will certainly increase the consist-
ency, and therefore probably the quality, of the dialogue. At the same time, neither 
of them, even with the best will, is likely to be able to devote as much time to the 
Parliament as it would wish. President Van Rompuy has also, as mentioned earlier, 
regarded himself in any case as constrained by the provisions of the Treaties on this 
point. Th e rotating Presidency will remain the Parliament’s principal interlocutor 
on legislative issues, but political debates in plenary tend to focus on topical, high-
profi le and international issues. In the six months following the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the Presidency has found itself by default speaking on behalf 
of the Council on many issues where the policy lead now lies with either Herman 
Van Rompuy or Catherine Ashton. Despite its best eff orts, the rotating Presidency 
has not been able completely to hide the fact that it is no longer the Parliament’s 
main interlocutor for many non-legislative issues.
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2.5. Conclusion
Whilst the Lisbon Treaty has provided the Parliament with a few additional tools 
to assist it in overseeing the two other principal institutions, the overall nature of 
political control within the European Union has not fundamentally changed. Aside 
from its legislative role, the Council plays an important policy-making (or executive) 
function, which largely falls outside the scope of oversight by the Parliament, and 
parliamentary control of the Commission, although more developed than that of 
the Council, is less formalised than the relevant Treaty provisions would appear 
to suggest. In short, parliamentary oversight within the Union cannot, at present, 
be compared to the classical constitutional system which functions at the level of 
the Nation State.
3. CO-LEGISLATOR
One of the more consistent threads in the process of European integration has 
been the increasing involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative 
process. Successive treaty changes have modifi ed the types of legislative procedures, 
culminating in the introduction in the Treaty on European Union in 1992 of the 
co-decision procedure, which in eff ect gave the Council and Parliament equal and 
joint responsibility for the adoption of legislation. Th e number of policy areas 
covered by this procedure was initially limited, but was subsequently extended by 
the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and, to a lesser extent, by the Nice Treaty (2001). 
Th e Lisbon Treaty took this process much further by providing for about forty 
new policy areas to be covered by co-decision, now the “ordinary legislative pro-
cedure”. In so doing, it has established this procedure as the principal method of 
legislating in the Union.[1]
Some of the policy areas now subject to the ordinary legislative procedure are very 
signifi cant. Th ey include provisions under Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU (TFEU): Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: border controls, legal 
immigration, judicial cooperation in civil matters with cross-border implications, 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation. Also covered are 
the market organisations under the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies 
(CAP and CFP), the common commercial policy, intellectual property rights and 
measures necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency.
[1] For a brief analysis of the type of internal reform that could aid the European Parliament in managing its increased 
legislative workload, see First Lisbon Study, pp. 8-9.
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Th e co-decision procedure has in general been regarded as a success story, which 
partly explains why Member States were ready to agree to such a signifi cant exten-
sion of its scope. It off ers an opportunity to bring expertise from both Council and 
the Parliament jointly to the negotiations, and it is a process which is designed to 
facilitate negotiation and compromise. Indeed the success of the procedure has 
meant that a signifi cant number of dossiers are settled at fi rst reading as a result of 
deals struck between the Council Presidency and the rapporteur, prompting some 
to suggest that the Parliament should in fact prolong the process in order to try to 
secure a more favourable outcome at least at second reading.
It is too early to reach a considered view on the changes introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty in this area, not least because the delay in appointing the new Commission 
resulted in a signifi cant drop in legislative activity at the end of 2009 and beginning 
of 2010. However some preliminary observations can be made.
Firstly, the actual procedure itself remains largely unchanged. Th e fact that the 
Treaties contain concise and clear rules on how exactly co-decision functions has 
tended to limit the possibility for Parliament to seek to interpret or exploit the 
provisions to its own advantage. However, the possibility of linkage has always 
existed, and this could increase with the passage to co-decision of several important 
horizontal instruments, not least the Financial Regulation. Indeed the Parliament 
has already taken the line that the need to amend both the Financial Regulation 
and Staff  Regulations in order to establish the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) gives it de facto a co-decision role on all aspects of the Service, on which 
formally it only has the right to be consulted.
Secondly, some of the policy areas which pass to co-decision have traditionally 
been among the more important for the Union. Th e application of co-decision to 
agriculture and fi sheries in particular has led to much speculation as to what impact 
this could have on future CAP reform. Th e traditionally corporatist attitude towards 
agriculture across all the institutions could be challenged when Parliament comes to 
decide on proposals on future market organisation. Given the existing pressure from 
within the Parliament to rebalance the EU’s expenditure towards more “modern” 
policy areas such as research and development, and with the prospect in any case 
of a more signifi cant redistribution of CAP money to the Member States which 
joined in 2004 with eff ect from the next Multiannual Financial Framework in 
2014, the extension of co-decision to the CAP could act as a catalyst in prompting 
further reform even if it is diffi  cult at this stage to predict what form and direction 
this might take.
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Th irdly, even if the co-decision procedure itself is clearly spelt out in the Treaties, 
the scope of its application is not always so obvious. In several of the new areas 
covered by co-decision, the Parliament has already made it clear that it has a much 
more generous interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty than either the Council or the 
Commission. Th e dividing line in Article 43 TFEU between the common organisa-
tion of agricultural markets and implementing measures is one example; another 
is the extent to which the Parliament has a role in the subsequent implementation 
of the (co-decided) rules which will set out the framework for the common com-
mercial policy. Both these issues are closely related to the wider discussions which 
will be needed between the institutions on the horizontal rules and principles on 
implementing acts (Art. 291 TFEU).
Fourthly, the wide generalisation of the co-decision procedure should have the 
eff ect of bringing the Council as a whole into a more systematic and consistent 
relationship with the Parliament. In particular, it involves directly COREPER II 
meetings of the 27 ambassadors in co-decision dossiers for the fi rst time (until now 
almost all such dossiers fell within the remit of their deputies in COREPER I). Th e 
relationship between the Parliament and Council will increasingly centre on the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Th is means that diff erences of view will largely be 
contained and resolved within a fi xed framework of rules, holding out the hope of 
more stable and mature relations between the two institutions.
Th e Lisbon Treaty generalises what has been a largely successful procedure. Th e 
ordinary legislative procedure off ers legitimacy to a negotiating process which brings 
together expertise from both the Council and Parliament, and has therefore suc-
cessfully guaranteed the quality and acceptability of EU legislation. Th e prospect 
of these benefi ts now being extended across a wider range of policy areas is almost 
certain to be to everyone’s advantage.
4. BUDGETARY ROLE
Th e Parliament’s powers in the area of the budget are longstanding, dating back even 
before the fi rst direct elections in 1979. It has therefore had plenty of experience 
in using these powers to considerable eff ect, not least when it rejected the 1980 
draft budget, prompting a minor crisis between the institutions as the Council in 
particular was confronted with the reality of a Parliament with new powers and 
the willingness to use them.
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the procedures for establishing the annual budget were 
based on a distinction between “compulsory” expenditure (i.e., that which fl ows 
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directly from existing commitments), and “non-compulsory” or “discretionary” 
expenditure. Th e Council had the fi nal word on compulsory expenditure and the 
Parliament on discretionary expenditure.
Th e Lisbon Treaty signifi cantly changes these procedures, removing the distinction 
between the two types of expenditure and introducing a Conciliation Commit-
tee which will provide a mechanism for managing negotiations between the two 
institutions. In practice this means that in the future the annual budget will be 
co-decided (Art. 314 TFEU). A further signifi cant change is the creation of a new 
legal basis for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF — previously known 
as the Financial Perspective) which is agreed unanimously by the Council after 
obtaining the consent of the Parliament (Art. 312 TFEU).
It will only be possible to make an assessment of the new budget procedures once 
an entirely new budget cycle has been completed. However, some preliminary 
observations can already be made.
Firstly, the Parliament has consistently stressed that its powers are strengthened 
under the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. At fi rst sight, this is not obvious. Under 
the previous arrangements Parliament had the fi nal word over all non-compulsory 
expenditure which over the years had grown to about 60% of the total budget. Th e 
Lisbon Treaty provides for shared responsibility by the Council and Parliament 
for the whole of the budget, although the very marginal advantage it gives to the 
Parliament at the very end of the annual budget process bears witness to Parlia-
ment’s constant struggle in the treaty negotiations to have the last word (Arts 310 
& 314 TFEU).
Secondly, since the late 1980s the annual budget has had to comply with the MFFs. 
Th ese have traditionally been the subject of particularly diffi  cult negotiations, 
culminating in a degree of horse-trading at the level of Heads of State or Govern-
ment. Although prior to the Lisbon Treaty the results of these negotiations had 
subsequently to be translated into an Inter-Institutional Agreement, the scope for 
the Parliament to reopen the fi gures was extremely limited; so far Parliament has 
not seriously challenged the collective will of the European Council. Th e creation 
of a specifi c legal base for the MFF may well draw the Parliament into the nego-
tiations at an earlier stage, making it more diffi  cult for the Council (or European 
Council) to strike a prior deal on its own. Th e fact that the Parliament is suggesting 
that the current duration of seven years covered by the MFF should be reduced 
to fi ve (which would be possible under the Treaty) in order to align it with the 
institutional timetable looks like an attempt to bring wider political pressure to 
bear on the negotiations.
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Th irdly, the new provisions under the Lisbon Treaty will inevitably have an impact 
on a number of other practices and procedures in the budgetary area, many of which 
have never been fully codifi ed or formalised. One such administrative arrangement 
is the so-called “gentlemen’s agreement” according to which neither the Council nor 
the Parliament calls into question the other’s administrative budget, thereby ensur-
ing budgetary autonomy. Th e change in the dynamics of the budget negotiating 
process as a result of the introduction of a co-decision type procedure means that 
the “gentlemen’s agreement” is likely to be revisited. Th e main impetus for doing 
so is coming from the Council, which considers that it has little to lose in allowing 
further oversight of its own administrative budget, and potentially much to gain 
by questioning the rationale behind the (much larger) Parliament budget.
It is diffi  cult to see where these developments may end up, but with the possible 
exception of the Multiannual Financial Framework, the major battles of the past 
are unlikely to be repeated. Control of the purse gives Parliament strong infl uence 
over policy and to some extent a lever over the other institutions. But the budget is 
one of the fi rst areas where the Parliament gained signifi cant power, and this is now 
fi rmly embedded in both law and practice. Th e Lisbon Treaty, although introducing 
apparently signifi cant changes to the budget procedure, is likely in the long-term 
to do little more than consolidate an accepted and well-established process.[1]
5. OVERSIGHT OF EXTERNAL POLICIES
Th e Parliament has always considered that it lacked an appropriate degree of over-
sight in the whole area of the Union’s external policies, not least in the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. Th e Lisbon Treaty addresses some, but certainly not 
all, of Parliament’s concerns.
For the fi rst time the Parliament is given a signifi cant role in the formulation of 
the Union’s common commercial policy, as the main instruments setting out the 
framework for implementing the policy pass to co-decision (Art. 207 TFEU). It 
also gains important new powers in the area of international agreements, of which 
a very signifi cant number are from now on subject to the consent of the Parliament 
[Art. 218 (6)(a) TFEU]. Th is has had some immediate practical consequences. Th e 
Parliament has held up ratifi cation of an agreement with South Korea (which was 
negotiated and initialled before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) primarily 
because of concerns that the text contained insuffi  cient safeguards to protect Euro-
[1] For a similar conclusion see already First Lisbon Study, p. 11.
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pean industry. Even more politically sensitive is the proposal to allow the Turkish-
occupied part of Cyprus to trade directly with the EU. Th is has been blocked by 
Cyprus, but passes to co-decision under the Lisbon Treaty provisions, removing 
Cyprus’ veto and giving the Parliament direct infl uence over the matter.
In general, in the few months since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
whole area of international agreements has been the scene of a series of skirmishes 
between the three institutions which have in some cases had implications which go 
well beyond the institutions themselves. In February 2010 the Parliament, with a 
substantial majority, voted down an agreement on the transfer of data to the US for 
the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Traffi  cking Program (known as the “SWIFT” 
agreement), primarily because of concerns about data protection. Th e impact of the 
vote was considerable, with the US subsequently acknowledging that in the future 
they would need to devote more attention and resources to the Parliament.
In this area more than any other, the Parliament regards the Treaty provisions as 
a starting point rather than the end, and has been active in attempting to exploit 
its new powers to extend its prerogatives even further. One example is the issue of 
the authorisation for the opening of negotiations on an international agreement. 
According to the Treaty, this is the sole prerogative of the Council, upon a recom-
mendation of the Commission or (in the case of exclusively CFSP agreements) the 
High Representative [Art. 218 (2) & (3) TFEU]. At the same time the Council can 
(and usually does) adopt negotiating directives to guide the negotiator. Th e Treaty 
gives no role to the Parliament at this stage of the process, but the latter has insisted 
that if it is expected to endorse the outcome of the negotiations, then it needs to 
have some infl uence over the content from the outset. Th e Council’s response to 
this has been simply to recall the provisions of the Treaty. Th e Commission, which 
in most cases has the responsibility for drawing up draft negotiating directives, 
has already demonstrated a much greater degree of openness. For example, when 
the Commission put forward a draft mandate for a revised SWIFT agreement in 
April 2010, it ensured that the Parliament not only had sight of it, but also the 
opportunity to debate it. In practice, the Member States sold the pass on this when 
they signed the Treaty.
As far as the negotiating process is concerned, the Treaty provides that the Parlia-
ment “shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure” [Art. 
218 (10) TFEU]. How exactly this will happen is largely a matter for the Commis-
sion, and will be an important part of the new Framework Agreement. But some 
in the Parliament consider that they have a right to much more than information, 
and are putting pressure on both the Commission and Council to secure partici-
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pation by the Parliament both in the negotiations themselves and in EU internal 
coordination meetings. In doing so, the Parliament looks to be more inspired by 
the example of the US Senate than the procedures in most EU Member States. 
However practice in the US does distinguish between the formal powers of congres-
sional oversight and the practice of regular informal briefi ngs which are provided 
to targeted congressmen during the course of the negotiations.
Th e demands of the Parliament in general go further than the practice of national 
parliaments within Europe. Th ey would, if accepted, also constitute a radical 
departure from current practice whereby the involvement of MEPs is limited to 
international conferences, and then only with the agreement of the Council and 
Commission, and subject to respect for some basic ground-rules. Until now there 
has been a clear separation of the role of the executive and legislature, and the pro-
posal for a rather diff erent approach raises quite signifi cant issues of principle as to 
how a Parliament can have a stake in the outcome of international negotiations, 
and yet also play the role of impartial assessor.
Parliament’s role in the SWIFT aff air highlighted another aspect which rises in 
the context of the Lisbon Treaty: that of access to confi dential information. Th e 
Council has already accepted the need for the Parliament to be given access to all 
parts of an international agreement — including classifi ed annexes (as was the case 
with the SWIFT agreement) — in cases where it is being asked to give its consent. 
But Parliament is also seeking a wider and more systematic access to classifi ed 
information as part of its role in ensuring parliamentary accountability in its wid-
est sense. Much (although not all) of this information relates to CFSP, which is 
an area where implementing the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty has so far proved 
particularly time-consuming.
Th e Lisbon Treaty provides no new direct powers to the European Parliament in 
the area of CFSP. If there were any doubt about this from the Treaty provisions 
themselves, Declaration 14 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty is unambiguous: “the 
provisions governing the Common Security and Defence Policy do not give new powers 
to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European 
Parliament”.
Yet such broad declaratory statements cannot conceal that as a matter of fact the 
Lisbon Treaty provides considerable scope for the Parliament to extend its reach 
over CFSP. One of the key levers at its disposal is the decision to establish the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). Although it is only formally consulted 
on this decision, in reality it has the power to block (and therefore also to infl uence 
considerably) the establishment of the Service. As already mentioned, this stems 
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primarily from the fact that two important legislative instruments (the Financial 
Regulation and Staff  Regulation) necessarily require amendment in order for the 
EEAS to function. Both pass to co-decision under the Lisbon Treaty (Arts 322 & 
336 TFEU). From the outset, the Parliament, which has traditionally been very 
persistent in its desire to carve out a role in CFSP, has been clear that the establish-
ment of the EEAS will be a package (i.e. that it will only give a view on the draft 
decision establishing the EEAS once a satisfactory agreement has been reached on 
the two legislative instruments).
A signifi cant part of the negotiations on the EEAS (on which the Commission and 
Council reached agreement relatively quickly, despite some signifi cant initial dif-
ferences) focused on its position and structure (and in particular the call from the 
Parliament that the EEAS budget be integrated within that of the Commission, 
whereas the position of Member States has always been that it is an independent 
body with a separate budget). Th is exposed a major diff erence of principle. However 
the focus of negotiations subsequently turned to the more general issues of parlia-
mentary accountability, including the provision of information to the Parliament, 
ex ante consultation of the Parliament before the launching of ESDP missions, and 
oversight by the Parliament of senior appointments.
However, the prospect of the Parliament being seen to hold up one of the most 
vaunted aspects of the Lisbon Treaty has no doubt assisted some MEPs in putting 
the issue within a wider perspective, as the fi nal result indicates. Some were already 
openly backing their own governments’ view on the importance of adequate par-
ticipation by Member State diplomats in the EEAS, and the need for “geographical 
balance”.
It is nevertheless almost certain that the Parliament will gain some new powers of 
oversight in the area of CFSP. If it chooses to place those powers at the disposal of 
the Union as a whole, to avoid micromanaging foreign policy, in a genuine desire to 
achieve a more eff ective and more accountable CFSP (which entails acknowledging 
the continuing specifi c nature of CFSP, and the limits of Parliament’s own role set 
against that of national parliaments), then the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in 
this area will fulfi l many of the expectations which have been placed in them.
6. CONCLUSION
Th e three most important innovations in the Lisbon Treaty (and in the Constitution 
which preceded it), are the strengthening of the European Council, the revision of 
qualifi ed majority voting, and the raft of new powers which have been given to the 
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European Parliament. As stated in the introduction, the focus was always much 
more on the former than the latter. Th e nature and scope of the Convention’s 
work meant that it was diffi  cult for it to engage at the time in detailed analysis of 
the implications of the Parliament’s new powers, with the result that the Council 
has given the impression of being repeatedly surprised at the extent of these new 
powers, and has therefore found itself constantly on the defensive. Th e reaction of 
the Commission, by contrast, has been more limited.
If the Parliament is astute, it will use the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty to 
carve out a new and signifi cant role for itself. But this will require a solid understand-
ing of its proper role within an institutional structure which was designed with its 
own checks and balances. It requires the Commission to be more willing to take 
a stand when its own powers and prerogatives are threatened; if the Commission 
can no longer play the role of impartial arbiter of the common European good, it 
runs the risk of losing infl uence within the overall institutional structure. It also 
means that the Council will need to embrace more willingly the new powers which 
the Lisbon Treaty attributes to the Parliament rather than giving the impression 
constantly of trying to recover what has already been granted. Th at does not mean 
complete passivity; like the Commission it must be ready collectively to uphold 
its prerogatives when challenged, but it needs to choose carefully, and with greater 
discrimination, where to take a stand, and then to do so with vigour.
If the Parliament pushes too far (its claim to have an active participation in inter-
national negotiations is an obvious example), it risks confusing the distinction 
between the legislative and executive authorities. Th is could upset the delicate 
institutional balance, and provoke a backlash from the other institutions (not least 
from the European Council itself).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Th e Commission is one of the few areas where the Lisbon Treaty introduced 
a genuine departure from the failed Constitutional Treaty. Following the Irish 
referendum, the plans for a reduced Commission were abandoned in favor of a 
Commission composed of one Commissioner per Member State.[1] Th is alters the 
terms of the debate triggered by the Treaty’s implementation. In addition, several 
other reforms retained by the Lisbon Treaty are likely to — and can to some extent 
already be observed to — considerably impact upon the Commission’s legitimacy 
and weight.
First of all, it must be underlined that the abandonment of a smaller College set-up 
does not amount to a complete overhaul of the situation as it would have been under 
the Constitutional Treaty. Indeed, while the Constitutional Treaty prescribed a 
reduced Commission, it did so subject to a system of equal rotation between the 
Member States. Hence, the diff erence between the two treaties lies in the number 
of Commissioners, but not in the equal representation of the Member States. 
Under the Constitutional Treaty equal representation was guaranteed “in time” 
through rotation, whereas under the Lisbon Treaty such equality is established 
on a permanent basis by having one Commissioner per Member State. Clearly, 
this does have an impact on the format of the Commission, which undoubtedly 
becomes more diffi  cult to manage. 
Th e Lisbon Treaty has however preserved several other reforms introduced by the 
Constitutional Treaty which are likely to aff ect the Commission. Some concern the 
Commission itself (the new appointment procedure of the President of the Com-
mission[2]). Others relate to the other institutions (the strengthening of the European 
Parliament’s powers, the creation of the President of the European Council) and 
thus aff ect the institutional framework within which the Commission operates. 
Within this new context, the Commission is essentially confronted with one major 
challenge. How can it recover its legitimacy which has, according to most observers, 
diminished during the last 20 years? 
Before envisaging some possible recommendations, it is essential to identify 
the structural causes of this evolution. Neither the equal representation of the 
[1] Note however that the Treaty text still prescribes the reduction of the number of Commissioners to 2/3 of the number 
of Member States by 2014. Art. 17 (5) TEU itself however foresees the possibility to revise this by means of a European 
Council decision by unanimity. Hence the Member States have committed themselves to adopt this decision to ensure 
the Irish yes, but this solution has not been unanimously accepted.
[2] See First Lisbon Study, pp. 26-27.
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Member States within the College, nor the behavior of the successive Commis-
sion’ presidents, however good or bad, are part of them. Rather, four elements 
(at least) seem to have played a key role. Firstly, the areas of EU interventions 
have progressively been extended. Th ey touch now much more upon sensitive 
topics (for example taxation, social security, internal security). Secondly, the 
EU itself has been steadily enlarged, and has become much more heteroge-
neous. In such a context, the defi nition of the common interest has become 
considerably harder. Th irdly, the powers of other institutions (especially the 
European Parliament) have been increased — sometimes directly in their rela-
tion with the Commission — by successive Treaty revisions. Fourthly, the 
increased call for democratization of the European Union in the early 1990’s 
has undermined the Monnet-style output legitimacy traditionally relied upon 
by the Commission. 
Th e debate concerning the legitimacy of the Commission generally turns on three 
topics: its political representativeness, its ability to deliver, and its place in a moving 
institutional square/quadrangle. Th is can be illustrated by various examples drawn 
from the Barroso I and early Barroso II Commissions, without however going into 
detail on this already extensively debated question.
2. POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVENESS
2.1. The Two Faces of a Fundamental Question 
In the course of the last decades, EU actions have multiplied, and therefore become 
more prone to confl ict. Th e EU, which was in its fi rst decades largely (and mis-
takenly) perceived by the public opinion as a “technical” project, has progressively 
turned into a “political” one, interfused with increased national and ideological 
oppositions. In this new context, the Commission was increasingly contested from 
various often opposite sides as lacking democratic legitimacy. Indeed, in compari-
son with the elected European Parliament or the Council, composed of elected 
governments, it resembled more a “technocratic” institution. 
During the last Treaty revisions, this has created a tendency to increase the Par-
liament’s role in the nomination of the Commission, fi nally resulting in the new 
Lisbon Treaty regime whereby the candidate for President of the Commission is 
elected by the European Parliament [Art. 17 (7) TEU]. However, this election 
procedure combined with the Commission’s responsibility towards the European 
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Parliament [Art. 17 (8) TEU] also increases the former’s dependency on the Parlia-
ment. Clearly, recouping a strong legitimacy is all but an easy task. 
Moreover, an additional problem has compounded the fi rst one. Indeed, during the 
last two decades, two cumulative types of enlargement have transformed the EU, 
i.e. the increase in its membership and the extension of its areas of competence. As 
a result, all Member States experienced a loss of infl uence. Consequently, since the 
Amsterdam Treaty negotiations, their respective weight in the diff erent institutions 
became a considerably more sensitive issue. 
Th is eventually resulted in the new Lisbon Treaty regime. At the European Council 
of 18 and 19 June 2009 it was decided that “provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into 
force, a decision would be taken, in accordance with the necessary legal procedures, to 
the eff ect that the Commission shall continue to include one national of each Member 
State” (conclusions, point 2). Just as a reduced College would have caused the small 
Member States to feel that the Commission fails to properly recognize all Member 
States, the Lisbon solution maintains —and even amplifi es — the feeling in the large 
Member States that the Commission lacks demographic legitimacy. Once again, 
recovering a strong legitimacy proves a challenging matter. An additional problem 
caused by the equality of the Member States in the Commission’s composition is 
that it accentuates a tendency to consider the Commissioners as representatives of 
their Member State. 
By comparison, it is useful to recall the early days of the Commission. From the 
1950s onwards, the legitimacy of the Commission did not come from the equal 
representation of the Member States. On the contrary, the large Member States 
had in fact twice as many Commissioners as the smaller ones.[1] Rather, the Com-
mission derived its legitimacy mainly from its ability to defi ne the common interest 
of the Member States. 
2.2. The Decline of Voting
Anyway, the recurring malaise about the Commission’s political representativeness 
has obviously become a barrier to voting. Despite the perspective held by some that 
equal representation of the Member States increases the input legitimacy of the 
[1] Seen from another angle, the big Member States had two thirds of the commissioners.
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Commission[1], the workings of Barroso I and early Barroso II seem to indicate the 
reverse. Indeed, under Barroso I voting by simple majority no longer took place 
within the Commission[2] because it was felt that no legitimate vote could be held 
in a system where a majority of Member States representing only a minority of the 
population can outvote the rest.
2.3. Increased “Nationalization”
In addition, this legitimacy based on the Member States being represented by “their 
Commissioner” seems to have backlashed already at the start of Barroso II where 
the partly incorrect yet necessary myth of a Commission somewhat independent 
from national confl icting interests was brutally shattered by the painful political 
show surrounding the nomination of the Frenchman Barnier as the Commissioner 
for Internal Market and services (including fi nancial services). Indeed, the wholly 
inappropriate triumphant statements by President Sarkozy that the British had lost 
the competition for economic top jobs and that Barnier would have the mandate 
to recast the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism, severely damaged the image of 
independence of the Commissioners. 
Likewise, Barroso’s response of appointing a British Director-General Jonathan 
Faull at the top of DG Internal Market as counterbalance further reinforced the view 
that Commissioners are mere servants of their national interests. According to some 
media sources, the UK government had lobbied for a British Director-General, 
but contested M. David Wright, the original nominee, as being too eurocratic[3]. 
Even more strikingly, this appointment as a sort of guarantee for the City’s interests 
discredits also the independence of permanent senior Commission offi  cials.
Even if the independence of Commissioners is subject to nuance and in reality 
amounts to their willingness to seek a compromise between their national and the 
[1] According to this perspective, the presence of a commissioner from each Member State increases the “representa-
tiveness” of the College and thus indirectly its legitimacy. However, if representativeness of the Commission is judged 
from the perspective of the numerical weight of the Member States in terms of population, the current constellation 
(like the equal rotation mechanism) might be thought to fall short and thus lack legitimacy. In the First Lisbon Study, it 
was already suggested that such lack of representation could lead to a lack of national support from the “key” Member 
States, thereby seriously aff ecting the clout of the Commission. Obviously, the main loyalty of a Commissioner should 
lie with the Community’s interest, but political reality teaches that such Community interest will be much easier to sell 
to the Member States and its citizens if they “have a man in”. 
[2] Art. 250 TFEU (old Art. 219 EC).
[3] http://www.euractiv.com/en/fi nancial-services/brit-quits-commission-after-london-snub-news-493766?utm_
source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign=4b0387fd76-my_google_analytics_key&utm_medium=email (updated 
12 May 2010). 
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European interest, it remains an important general principle which is crucial for 
the Commission’s legitimacy and authority. 
2.4. A Possible Drift Towards Intergovernmentalism 
in Foreign Relations
Th is threat of increased “nationalisation” could become greater in the fi eld of 
external relations. One of the most essential topics in the lengthy debate between 
the Council and the European Parliament on the creation of the European External 
Action Service was the control over the external dimension of Community policy 
areas (for example development, Echoaid, and especially trade) and over the Com-
mission’s delegations. Th e fi nal compromises reached are complex and the jury is 
still out on this matter[1]. Likewise, the functioning of the High Representative/
Vice President of the Commission awaits further evaluation[2]. 
3. ABILITY TO DELIVER 
Traditionally the Commission’s ability to defend the common interest of the Member 
States has provided the main source of its legitimacy. Hence, the impact of the 
structural changes identifi ed above (enlargement, extension into sensitive policy 
areas, increased powers of the other institutions and democracy demands) on 
these “functional” sources of legitimacy needs to be examined. However, given 
the multifaceted nature of the Commission’s assignment, this argument needs to 
be subdivided in relation to the diverse functions exercised by the Commission, 
paying special attention to the experiences of the last years. 
3.1. Policy Maker: Initiator of Policy Development 
and “Motor of Integration”
Despite fears to the contrary, the Lisbon Treaty has retained and reaffi  rmed the 
Commission’s quasi-exclusive “right of initiative” to propose legislation and thus 
theoretically places it at the vanguard of policy development.[3] Nonetheless, if the 
[1] See chapter on External Action. 
[2] Interestingly, it appears that the media failed to notice that Mrs Ashton did not take the oath which in principle all 
members of the Commission take before the Court of Justice of the European Union, by which they undertake “to be 
completely independent in the performance of (their) duties, in the general interest of the Communities; in the performance 
of these duties, neither to seek nor to take instructions from any government or from any other body”. 
[3] Art. 17 (2) TEU.
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Commission possesses the quasi-monopoly over the formal right of legislative initia-
tive, it has to share the right of political initiative with the European Council[1], the 
Council[2], the European Parliament[3], and since the introduction of the Citizens’ 
initiative, the organized civil society[4], who can request it to draft a proposal[5]. Th ese 
various actors, and in particular the European Council, have increasingly exercised 
this right of political initiative. Most likely, the installation of a semi-permanent 
President of the European Council “at the heart of the Brussels’ institutional scene” 
will further reinforce the European Council’s position and attempts to take over 
the political initiative from the Commission[6].
Still, this quasi-monopoly to formally initiate legislation endows the Commission 
with the power to decide íf it responds to a request for legislative action from the 
other institutions, and if so, how it will design the particular measure. Hence, 
when drafting legislative proposals, even if on request, the Commission retains 
considerable power to shape the particular measures and thereby indirectly steer 
the policies developed. 
With regard to its power to infl uence the “big picture” and engage in strategic 
policy development, the Commission has several avenues at its disposal to do so. 
In addition to its right of legislative initiative, the Commission is expected to set 
the legislative agenda for each coming year (so-called work programme) and has the 
prerogative to deliver opinions on any EU matter. Well-known examples of such 
successful general policy strategies launched by the Commission in the past are the 
Single Market and the EMU, and more recently the climate and energy package. 
However, despite these powerful instruments at its disposal, the Commission’s 
infl uence as a strategic policy developer is generally thought to have decreased relative 
to the other institutions from the 1990’s onwards. Indeed, over the last decades the 
Commission has shown much more reluctance to exercise its right of initiative.[7] 
[1] Art. 15 (1) TEU: “The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall 
defi ne the general political directions and priorities thereof”.
[2] Hence the Council has increasingly used Art. 241 TFEU (old Art. 208 EC) on the basis of which it “may request the 
Commission to undertake any studies the Council considers desirable for the attainment of the common objectives, and to 
submit to it any appropriate proposals”, as well as the adoption of resolutions and opinions to pressure the Commission 
into undertaking specifi c legislative action.
[3] Art. 225 TFEU which allows the EP to request the Commission to submit appropriate proposals on matters where it 
deems that Union action is required to ensure the implementation of the Treaties.
[4] Art. 11 TEU.
[5] Note that the Commission can refuse but will have to explain why. See chapter on Citizen’s Initiative. 
[6] See chapter on the Presidencies’ triangle.
[7] Both Santer and Barroso occasionally presented the reduction of the Commission’s propositions as a positive objec-
tive per defi nition. 
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In addition, during the Barroso I Commission, the wish to forego confronta-
tion in favour of consensus often resulted in comparatively non ambitious legis-
lative proposals which were beforehand stripped from potentially controversial 
elements.[1] Th e drafting of the climate and energy package was quite illustrative 
of this approach.
Admittedly, for the Barroso I Commission, the context of lingering uncertainty 
as to the fate of the “Constitution” after the negative referenda, of learning to 
swim with an enlarged Union as well as of various global crises (commodity crisis, 
fi nancial crisis,...) did not always facilitate ambitious projects. Be as that may be, 
from the perspective of the capitals, the Barroso I Commission further lost cred-
ibility precisely by reason of its failure to respond adequately to the fi nancial and 
economic crisis.[2] 
If the Commission’s role as strategic policy developer is generally thought to have 
decreased relative to the other institutions, this evolution could, however, be seen 
as a logical step in the maturing of the Union’s institutional set-up. In Monnet’s 
day, the lack of trust in the political process in a traumatized post-war Europe 
arguably justifi ed his strong reliance on the technical expertise and performance of 
the Commission as a basis for the legitimacy of its decisions. However, the already 
tenuous credibility of the argument that its decisions were mere “technical” trans-
lations of the objectives decided upon by the founding fathers and set out in the 
Treaty became more and more unsustainable as the European actions wandered 
off  into more politically sensitive policy domains. In parallel with this evolution, 
the Union’s overarching “integration”-objective lost some of its unconditional 
character. Indeed, in the early 1990’s the calls to revalue the “diversity” part of the 
“Unity in diversity” motto became inescapable.
Th us, in today’s Europe it might make sense that a non-directly elected body like 
the Commission should not be entrusted with genuine political powers solely on 
the basis of its technical expertise. From this perspective, the gradual loss of political 
initiative to the elected “political” institutions of the EU can be seen as a natural 
evolution. Similarly, the emancipation of the European Parliament, while limit-
[1] Thus, rather than leaving the national interest-compromise to the Council and fulfi lling its role of guardian of “the 
general interest of the Union”, the Barroso I Commission is sometimes criticised for having curtailed its own initiatives by 
seeking the lowest common denominator. Arguably this attitude could also partially be explained by the desire of the 
Commission to avoid being by-passed by a fi rst reading agreement between the Council and the European Parliament 
which would rob it of any infl uence on the content of the resulting legislative measure.
[2] See the survey conducted by Piotr Maciej KACZYNSKI, The European Commission 2004-09: A Politically Weakened Institu-
tion? Views from the National Capitals, EPIN Working Paper No. 23, May 2009, at http://www.ceps.be/book/european-
commission-2004-09-politically-weakened-institution-views-national-capitals; See also: The next Commission: doing more 
and better, EPC Challenge Europe Issue No. 19, June 2009, at http://www.epc.eu/PDF/Ce19.pdf, p. 15.
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ing the Commission’s powers to some extent, refl ects a maturing of the traditional 
institutional triangle.
Th is should not mean that the long-term vision on the general interest of the Union 
which a “technocratic” Commission was able to bring to the political table is lost. 
Th e Commission remains in charge of translating the “grand political statements” in 
concrete policy measures, an exercise for which the other institutions remain highly 
dependent on its expertise, thus granting it substantial infl uence in the process. 
3.2. Mediator or Facilitator
Th e Commission’s reduced strategic policy making role should not necessarily be 
interpreted as a loss in terms of effi  ciency. Its defence of the common interest does 
not solely depend on its capacity to take the political lead but rather on its ability 
to act as a “broker of interests” who ensures that all interests can interact at the 
European level in a balanced manner.
Given its involvement in all stages of the legislative process, providing it with a 
thorough insight in the strategic considerations of the various institutions, the 
Commission fi nds itself in a unique position to mediate between these diff erent 
institutional actors.[1] Moreover, in view of its relative independence from national 
and party-political infl uence, it is traditionally perceived as possessing the neutrality 
needed to act as an “honest broker”. 
In particular its right of legislative initiative endows the Commission with a stra-
tegically important instrument to conduct this brokering act and ensure that all 
interests are equally taken into account. Aside from the ability to reconcile various 
interests when shaping its legislative proposal, it can moreover exercise substantial 
pressure on the negotiating partners by means of its right to withdraw or modify 
its proposal. However, the rise of the ordinary legislative (“co-decision”) procedure 
has encroached upon this power by preventing the Commission from withdrawing 
its proposal once it has become subject of a conciliation between the European 
Parliament and the Council. Moreover, the increased practice of the Council to 
seek agreement with the Parliament during the fi rst and second reading of such a 
co-decision procedure clearly sidelines the Commission since it can hardly hold 
on to its proposal if both institutions have agreed on a diff erent text. In addition, 
the increased accountability of the Commission towards the European Parliament 
has in some matters created the image — at least in the eyes of the Council — of 
[1] PETERSON, J. and SHACKLETON, M., The Institutions of the European Union, 2nd edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2006), pp. 152-153.
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a Commission acting as the spokesman of the European Parliament rather than 
an “honest broker”.[1] Similarly, the consultation of the Member States — even 
before adopting a legislative proposal — has sometimes given an analogous feeling 
to the European Parliament. 
It could thus be argued that also in its role of broker, the Commission has lost 
some of its infl uence. During the last years, at least in some debates such as the 
notorious Services Directive, the European Parliament has even taken over the role 
of mediating between the diverging Member State interests within the Council. 
In addition, the lack of genuine disagreement between the centre-right European 
Parliament and Council seems to have further reduced the need for a Commission’s 
mediation between the institutions. 
Despite these evolutions, the Commission’s “oiling” role in the legislative process, 
even in a co-decision procedure, remains important. Its unmatched expertise and 
permanency simply make it an indispensable actor upon whom both the European 
Parliament and the Council rely to support the preparation of their legislative work 
as well as to streamline their negotiations. In view of this crucial task, it seems 
however preferable to advise against a further politicisation of the Commission 
which would jeopardize its independence. 
3.3. Day-to-Day Manager
In a more day-to-day fashion, the Commission fulfi ls important “routine tasks” 
such as the administration of common policies, the organization and supervision 
of the implementation of EU legislation. However, the increase in policy areas to 
be dealt with has forced the Commission to “delegate” certain of its management 
tasks to agencies. Furthermore, the implementation of several of its core policies 
such as agriculture and structural funds has been increasingly decentralised. 
In addition it acts as a legal guardian of EU law by fi ling infringement procedures 
against failing Member States and by instigating competition law inquiries of sus-
pect economic actions. In respect of its core competence of competition policy, 
the Commission has arguably lost some power by reason of the decentralisation 
following Regulation 1/2003.[2] Yet during the recent fi nancial and economic crisis 
it fi rmly established its authority in the area of State aid law.
[1] JACQUÉ, J.-P., The Principle of Institutional Balance, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2004, p. 390.
[2] Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003.
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Another non-negligible component of the Community’s tasks is the external rep-
resentation of the EU in several areas, the most far-reaching being external trade 
policy.[1] However, this role is certainly made more complex by the Lisbon Treaty, 
which has introduced new actors in that fi eld[2].
Despite the necessity to delegate certain of its management tasks in the ever growing 
number of policy areas entrusted to it, the Commission with its unmatched techni-
cal in-house expertise thus still plays a pivotal role in managing these increasingly 
complex policy areas. Likewise its power in the enforcement of the competition 
law rules provides it with an important instrument to pursue the objective of a 
competitive internal market. Clearly, the legitimate exercise of both roles requires 
a suffi  ciently independent Commission. 
To conclude, the observed “decline of the Commission”[3] is thus mainly based on 
the diminished action of the Commission as a strategic policy maker or initiator. 
However, if more recognition is given to the Commission’s core tasks of acting as 
broker between the various interests and of taking on the day-to-day management 
of the Union’s interests and policies, this does not seem quite as problematic. It 
does however require the Commission to reaffi  rm its traditionally relatively inde-
pendent status
4. EVOLVING WEIGHT IN THE INSTITUTIONAL QUADRANGLE
Finally, the Commission’s weight in the Union has been greatly infl uenced by the 
changes in powers and authority of the other institutions in the rectangle. 
4.1. European Parliament
Th e traditional relationship between the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment has gradually changed over the decades. Indeed, in line with its growing 
infl uence, the European Parliament has little by little modelled its relationship 
on conventional cabinet-parliament interactions. It has continuously aimed to 
extend its powers of scrutiny over the Commission. Already at the start of Bar-
roso I, it became clear how serious the European Parliament is about asserting its 
[1] Note that since the Lisbon Treaty the High Representative for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy also wears the hat 
of Vice-President of the European Commission.
[2] See chapter on Foreign Policy. 
[3] JACQUÉ, J.-P., Le traité de Lisbonne : une vue cavalière, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2008, p. 458; 
See references in PETERSON, J., Conclusion: where does the Commission stand today?, in SPENCE, D. (ed.), The European 
Commission, 3rd edition (London, Harper, 2006).
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control over the Commission. Indeed, when Barroso took the ill-judged decision 
to keep supporting his nominee Commissioner Buttiglione who came under fi re 
following some particularly conservative statements on homosexuality and women, 
the European Parliament refused to give in. Th is led to a somewhat embarrassing 
situation from which Barroso was ultimately saved by the tardy withdrawal of the 
Italian Commissioner. 
Th e Lisbon Treaty has formalized the need for Parliamentary approval of a new 
Commission President to be nominated by the European Council in line with a 
majority in the European Parliament[1]. In addition, the European Parliament was 
formally charged with approving the proposed College of Commissioners before 
it can take offi  ce. Once again the European Parliament exercised its power to the 
fullest during the hearings of the nominees for the Barroso II College by seriously 
criticising the perceived incompetence of the Bulgarian candidate Jeleva leading to 
her pull-out, and by imposing a “retake-hearing” on a couple of other candidates; 
such as the Dutch ex-Commissioner Kroes.
Th e new draft Framework Agreement on the relations between the European Parlia-
ment and the Commission further strengthens these powers of scrutiny. For one, 
when the EP requests the Commission President to withdraw his confi dence in an 
individual commissioner, he is obliged to take this into serious consideration and 
explain any decision to the contrary. Moreover, the practice of requiring individual 
Commissioners to appear before the Parliament and its committees is likely to be 
formalized through the introduction of a Question Hour.[2]
Likewise, the traditionally strong alliance between the European Parliament and 
the Commission in the legislative process has gradually been eroded. Th e expan-
sion of the co-decision procedure has clearly contributed to this changed dynamic 
by allowing the European Parliament to deal directly with the Council on the 
basis of equality rather than to depend on the Commission as the interlocutor 
with the Member States to defend the Parliament’s interests. As was illustrated by 
the Services Directive’s saga, the European Parliament has at times even replaced 
the Commission as the power-broker between the Member States. Moreover, the 
increased practice of the Council to seek agreement with the European Parliament 
in the fi rst and second reading clearly sidelines the Commission since it is much 
[1] See First Lisbon Study, pp. 26-27.
[2] European Parliament resolution of 9 February 2010 on a revised Framework Agreement between the European Par-
liament and the Commission for the next legislative term, P7_TA(2010)0009. Other important victories for the European 
Parliament include the principle of equal treatment for the EP and Council, especially in respect of access to meetings 
and the provision of contributions or other information (in particular on legislative and budgetary matters), as well as 
the extended involvement of the EP in international negotiations.
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more diffi  cult to hold on to its proposal if both institutions have agreed on a dif-
ferent text.[1] Furthermore, the Parliament’s right to request the Commission for a 
legislative proposal on a particular matter is likely to be strengthened by a 3-month 
timeframe for the follow-up to be included in the Framework Agreement. [2]
Th e original relationship between the Commission and the European Parliament 
has gradually been transformed into one characterized by an increasing dependency 
on the Commission’s side. From the perspective of democratic legitimacy, this 
evolution has both positive and negative consequences. While acknowledging the 
inevitability of this move towards more political accountability within a maturing 
EU institutional framework, sight should not be lost of the threat it can pose to the 
Commission’s traditional independence from national as well as party-political lines 
allowing it to credibly pursue the “general interest of the Union”. Furthermore, from 
a purely functional point of view, the European Parliament is badly equipped to 
micro-manage the administrative and representative activities of the Commission. 
Hence, when strengthening its own position at the expense of the Commission’s 
weight in the institutional rectangle, the European Parliament should be careful 
not to undermine its own overarching “integrationist and supranational” project 
by disarming a powerful ally in this quest. Within that context, for example, the 
European Parliament’s demand for its President to be invited to the weekly meet-
ings of the Commission College refl ects more an outdated power-grabbing than a 
balanced interpretation of its role as a political legislative body.
4.2. Council
Th e evolution of the balance of power between the Commission and the Council 
is less clear.
On the one hand, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aff airs and 
Security Policy, with his/her split personality, can be a source of weakening of the 
Commission. Although the impact of the new fi gure of the High Representative 
on the relationship and balance between the Commission and the Council will 
only become clear over the next few years, a strengthening of the position of the 
Commission President might prove necessary to provide counterweight against 
this potentially powerful fi gure. More generally, the Council has tried to steer 
the policy choices of the European Union more actively by making full use of its 
[1] See in that sense, JACQUÉ, J.-P., The Principle of Institutional Balance, op. cit., p. 390.
[2] European Parliament resolution of 9 February 2010 on a revised Framework Agreement between the European 
Parliament and the Commission for the next legislative term, P7_TA(2010)0009.
59
The Commission
right to request the Commission to make appropriate legislative proposals[1] as well 
as its right to adopt opinions and resolutions capable of putting pressure on the 
Commission.[2] In addition, the closer cooperation between the Council and the 
European Parliament has sometimes reduced the Commission’s strategic brokering 
role (and thus power) to reconcile diverging interests.
On the other hand, the further extension of qualifi ed majority voting in the Council 
by the Lisbon Treaty gives the Commission additional strategic leverage to push 
through its proposals. Indeed, stripped from their veto, Member States will be more 
inclined to negotiate with the Commission to avoid being outvoted. 
4.3. European Council and its President
Together with the European Parliament, the European Council is without a doubt 
among the institutions strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, aside from its 
formal recognition as an institution of the European Union, it is also granted a range 
of decision-making powers, and confi rmed as carrying the overall responsibility for 
the Union’s general political directions and priorities.[3] 
Even more important is the introduction of a Permanent President who takes 
over the role of organizing and chairing the European Council meetings from the 
rotating presidencies. Such a permanent representative “at the heart of the Brussels’ 
institutional scene” is likely to further reinforce the European Council’s position 
and attempts to take over the political lead and initiative[4]. Th e fi rst months of Van 
Rompuy’s presidency already produced two particularly striking examples of this. 
Aside from the suggestion to hold monthly meetings of the European Council, the 
decision to take the forefront in establishing genuine economic governance by set-
ting up a special task force[5] was a clear illustration of the intention of the European 
Council to impact more directly on the substance of the Union’s policy-making. 
From the Commission’s perspective, it might thus be useful to strengthen even 
further its President’s position so as to allow him to deal with this new public fi g-
[1] Art. 241 TFEU.
[2] CRAIG, P. and DE BÚRCA, G., EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 52.
[3] Art. 15 TEU.
[4] See chapter on the Presidencies Triangle. 
[5] See Conclusions of the European Council of 25-26 March. Note the quick response by the Commission in drawing up 
its own proposals on economic co-ordination: Communication on Reinforcing economic policy coordination, COM(2010) 
250 fi nal, 12.5.2010.
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ure on a basis of equality. Up to now, both fi gures seem to recognize the need for 
cooperation and have, for example, decided to meet weekly.[1]
After already having lost considerable political clout to the European Council, 
it can reasonably be expected that the arrival on the scene of the new fi gure of a 
Permanent President of the European Council will further challenge the Commis-
sion’s remaining political leadership role. 
5. CONCLUSION
Over the last ten years the position of the Commission has steadily become more 
diffi  cult. It is important to distinguish the essential from the secondary causes of 
this evolution. Th e main causes would appear to be: the extension of the areas of 
EU intervention, the successive enlargements, the successive Treaty reforms — 
including increasing powers for the European Parliament and demands for more 
democracy in the system. In such a context, any Commission would have had 
trouble maintaining its position, whatever its size and whoever was leading it. 
Th ese underlying factors are mutually reinforcing and create a complex situation 
which is not easy to analyse in the abstract, just as it is not easy to manage on a 
daily basis. Given the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has only recently come into force, 
and that it entails a number of signifi cant and simultaneous institutional changes 
impacting upon the Commission, it would be premature to attempt to draw defi ni-
tive conclusions. Th e EU is visibly in a phase of substantial transformation. 
It does, however, seem clear that the Commission has, over the last two decades, 
experienced a form of identity crisis linked to the gradual loss of legitimacy, in 
public opinion, of the European project as a whole. Th is loss has come to the fore 
in successive referenda since the 1990s, fi rst in Denmark and Ireland, later — and 
most signifi cantly — in France and the Netherlands, both founding members of 
the Community. Th e Commission’s position as a main policy maker, initiator of 
legislation, broker of interests and guardian of the treaties, was inevitably challenged 
by this trend. Under its last three presidents, the Commission has tried to fi nd new 
sources of legitimacy but with very limited results. 
Th e institutional debates in the successive treaty negotiations have not been help-
ful. Negotiators from Member States, especially the smaller ones, have mainly 
[1] Indeed, as explained in the contribution on the European Council, the “asset of time” allows a personal relationship 
between both Presidents to develop. This should further facilitate cooperation.
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concentrated on maintaining their level of representation within the Commis-
sion. Yet it was obvious that the composition of the Commission was in no way 
the most important problem facing the institution. By concentrating on this issue 
Member States have perversely increased the public perception of the Commission 
as an intergovernmental body. Th ere was moreover an inbuilt contradiction in this 
debate: the larger the Commission becomes, the more diffi  cult it is to maintain 
the collegiality which was an essential characteristic of the institution, and a most 
valuable one for the smaller Member States. In a large Commission — as experience 
has shown — there is a greater need for strong presidential leadership. And strong 
presidential leadership inevitably diminishes the signifi cance of “national” Com-
missioners. More time and energy should thus have been spent on maintaining the 
power and role of the institution as a whole, rather than on its composition. 
Th e response — implicit in the Lisbon Treaty modifi cations — to this loss of 
legitimacy seems to consist in giving the Commission renewed political legitimacy 
through the increased roles played by the European Council and the European 
Parliament not only in its investiture, but also, up to a point, in its regular work. 
Th is is understood to give a more democratic political character to what was seen — 
certainly by some — as an essentially technocratic structure. Th ere are risks in this 
approach of course. Indeed, it is at least arguable that the role of strategic political 
leadership, exercised by the Commission in former years, has now largely passed to 
the European Council. It is at least arguable that strong politicization of the Com-
mission, which could be the result of an increased dependency upon the European 
Parliament, would hamper the institution’s role as an independent broker. 
Only experience will tell whether, in implementing the Lisbon Treaty, Member 
States and the various institutions concerned will be able to strike the right balance. 
It is not certain, however, that either the European Council or the European Par-
liament can off er a perfect substitute for the lack of the Commission’s leadership. 
Indeed, the Commission has the benefi t of a double source of legitimacy as well as 
of important and numerous technical and administrative means. It should fi nd a 
way to advocate — more effi  ciently than the last 15 years — the need for and the 
added value of action at EU level. 
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1. THE BLUEPRINT
Th ey thought they had discovered the philosopher’s stone. From now on the 
Union was to be led by a stable president, refl ecting a new resolve to map out the 
way ahead, while its interests would be pursued on the international stage by one 
face and one voice, those of the High Representative. Th is would put an end to the 
constant coming and going of presidencies, generally considered to be the source 
of all the Union’s problems. 
Th at revolution, together with the “simplifi cation” which it off ered, constituted 
one of the main selling points of the new Treaty. It was a point which was con-
stantly plugged, in the fi rst instance by the Convention Chairman, Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing, who saw it as putting into eff ect, if not in reality then at least on paper, a 
long-cherished personal dream of his. It was subsequently picked up in the media, 
who with few exceptions joined in all those who sang the praises of an institutional 
breakthrough widely regarded as essential for the Union’s future. 
When the Lisbon Treaty fi nally reached the end of its problematic ratifi cation 
process, the new blueprint for the presidency, long regarded as a panacea, ran up 
against harsh practical reality, which turned out, as often the case, to sit uneasily 
with the intentions of armchair constitution-makers. Th e introduction of the new 
system quickly exposed serious potential weaknesses and attracted swathes of criti-
cism as harsh as the early reviews had been glowing. 
2. INITIAL PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
Th is process of gradual realisation falls into four broad stages. Th e fi rst step was 
to select the cast. After much speculation as to the ideal profi le for the posts: a 
president or just a chairman, a strong fi gure or a more consensual one, as well as 
the usual game of pushing particular favourites: Blair, Juncker, González, etc., 
the curious process of making appointments in the Union, based largely on a 
process of elimination, led to a result. It was to be Herman Van Rompuy for 
the senior post and Baroness Ashton as High Representative/Vice-President of 
the Commission/President of the Foreign Aff airs Council. If the truth be told, 
apart from satisfaction amongst some that a decision had been reached at all, the 
overwhelming sense was one of disappointment, although it would be unkind 
to name those distinguished individuals who saw the appointments as a bitter 
blow to their earlier express wish to have the posts fi lled by charismatic fi gures. 
Only a few more far-sighted commentators understood at the time the reasons 
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for the choice, particularly that of Herman Van Rompuy, which inevitably 
seemed a curious choice to many. Th e latter included knowledgeable experts 
on European aff airs, such as Jean-Louis Bourlanges, who had no hesitation in 
referring to a “lie about visibility and simplicity” and who concluded, for good 
measure, that “Europe’s leaders are very happy with their choice, as the appoint-
ment of two complete nonentities to take charge of their shared home fully satisfi es 
their egos and strengthens their personal legitimacy”[1]. Th is language refl ects, albeit 
in a somewhat exaggerated way, a view which was widely held at that time by 
commentators and the media who had been conditioned by an overly idealistic 
view of the Lisbon Treaty which had dominated thinking up to that point. 
Growing awareness of the realities of the new Presidency system increased when 
it was realised that the rotating Presidency was still alive and well. Although a cur-
sory reading of the Treaty gave the impression that the Presidency now had only a 
walk-on role, Spain’s arrival in the six-monthly chair was a forceful reminder that 
all Council confi gurations, apart from the Foreign Aff airs Council, continued to 
be chaired by the Member State holding the rotating Presidency. Whilst Spain 
in no way sought to abuse that position, it had had to prepare for a conventional 
Presidency in the event that the Treaty would not be ratifi ed, and in so doing had 
made arrangements (such as a number of meetings in Spain) which suggested to 
some that the entry into force of the new Treaty made little or no diff erence. Th at 
impression was further reinforced by the publication of a Spanish Presidency pro-
gramme, presented as such by the Prime Minister. Th is prompted Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing, ever eager to play the role of elder statesman, to say that “Mr Zapatero has 
not read the Treaty properly; there are now only two political presidencies in Europe: the 
President of the European Council and the President of the Commission”[2]. Although 
this is an overly succinct way of describing it, his point was not entirely unreason-
able given some of the muddled thinking in the press and elsewhere, as can be seen 
from an article published shortly beforehand, which turned things completely on 
their head by stating that “on taking charge of the European Union (sic) for six months, 
Mr José Luis Zapatero will have to come to an arrangement with the fi gures introduced 
under the Lisbon Treaty”[3].
Th e revelation that the six-monthly Presidency continued to exist, combined 
with the arrival of new players in ill-defi ned roles, led to a third realisation. 
With the proliferation of fi gures able to speak on behalf of the Union on the 
[1] Le Figaro, 23 November 2009.
[2] Le Point, 4 February 2010.
[3] Le Monde, 31 December 2009.
67
The Presidency Triangle
international scene (up to at least half a dozen), one of the most hackneyed 
slogans of the supporters of the Treaty, the notion of a single face and voice who 
would from now on represent the Union, was suddenly called into question.[1] 
Th is further disenchantment inevitably prompted some commentators to allude 
to Henry Kissinger’s well-known quip about his European counterpart’s phone 
number, making the point that, under the new rules, he would need an entire 
telephone directory. Leaving aside such deliberate exaggerations and malicious 
interpretations, this rather discouraging revelation was said by some to lie in 
part behind the decision of Barack Obama to stay away from the EU-US sum-
mit planned under the Spanish Presidency. Th e EU’s partners, including the 
most important, were clearly worried about the way the new institutions would 
function! Since the real interest of the US certainly lies in having as reliable a 
European partner as possible, the paradox is only superfi cial.
One fi nal incident linked to the Treaty’s tentative beginnings saw the successor 
to the post held by Javier Solana sharply criticised for failing in her duties for not 
having visited Haiti in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, as well as for having 
stayed away from two meetings between the EU and non-member countries. High 
Representative (HR) Ashton was later accused of leaning too heavily in the direction 
of either the Commission or the Member States in the delicate negotiations on the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). Yet it was the Lisbon Treaty which gave 
Catherine Ashton two hats to wear (in reality three, as she is High Representative, 
Vice-President of the Commission and President of the Foreign Aff airs Council 
all at once)[2], without giving her the capacity to be in more than one place at a 
time! And it was the same Treaty which led to her having to manage confl icting 
loyalties, without off ering her any answer as to how to resolve the confl icts which 
this complex construction inevitably creates, apart from the vague notion of trying 
to be even-handed. Such criticism can only be addressed by referring to the old 
maxim: “Tu patere legem quam fecisti”.
3. FIRST APPRAISAL
Such a sophisticated construction cannot be assessed on the basis of an emotional 
reaction prompted more by pique than reasoned analysis. So what does the picture 
look like? While some caution is still needed, a combination of practical experi-
ence so far, the behaviour of the various parties concerned, some more refl ective 
[1] See already First Lisbon Study, p. 47.
[2] Article 18 TEU.
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observations and even off -the-record remarks carefully gleaned from the media 
make it possible to make some assessment, albeit preliminary and tentative, about 
the future of the system.
3.1.  The President of the European Council: 
Cometh the Hour, Cometh the Man
First, the stable Presidency of the European Council should be looked at. Th e Treaty 
provisions [Art. 15 (6) TEU] are clear, stating that “the President of the European 
Council is to cooperate closely with the General Aff airs Council in driving forward, 
preparing for and ensuring continuity in the work of the European Council; he is also, 
at his level and in his capacity, to ensure the Union’s external representation.” Both 
the letter and the spirit of those provisions seem to have been respected on the fi rst 
occasions at which they were applied. Th ere would be no point in attempting, by 
analysing in detail the proceedings of the European Council meetings, to deter-
mine the diff erent roles played by the various actors in the outcome, as the credit 
attributed to them depends on commentators’ egos, interests and imagination. It 
is more helpful to take a close look at the strategy devised by Herman Van Rompuy 
in order to establish an infl uence which no-one contests. Th at strategy boils down 
to a twin approach: putting the European Council at the heart of the political 
process and then placing himself in the driving seat in the preparations of that 
process. Th is is perhaps paradoxical, given his reputation for modesty, something 
not found in abundance among his peers. His interest lies in making eff ective use 
of his power: i.e. achieving results for their own sake, rather than simply creating 
a reputation for himself.
His fi rst aim was to place the European Council at the heart of the political process. 
Th e various ways in which the European Council’s role under the Lisbon Treaty is 
strengthened have been considered in another contribution[1] and there is thus no 
need to repeat them here. What can be seen however from the brief experience of 
implementing the Treaty provisions on the European Council is how what was, 
after all, a mere presumption has quickly become fi rmly established in everyday 
political reality.
On the basis of the saying “if you want a thing done well, do it yourself”, the 
European Council has assigned itself a key role in directing the Europe 2020 
strategy, which is the successor to the Lisbon agenda, and, more generally, in 
introducing real economic governance, which has turned out to be particularly 
[1] See the chapter on the European Council. 
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pressing since the onset of the Greek crisis. Th e new permanent President of 
the European Council has stated in the clearest terms that the fi rst result of the 
informal summit on 11 February had been to establish the European Council’s 
place in the Union’s economic governance. Th at aspiration was amply borne 
out by the European Council conclusions of 25 and 26 March 2010, specifying 
that “the European Council’s responsibility is to show the way ahead” (sic). 
Such systematic, early involvement of the European Council has necessarily meant 
inverting the process by which Council business is prepared. Instead of being invited 
passively to endorse decisions which have already been prepared in advance, the 
European Council has emerged as the main source of guidance for subordinate bod-
ies, which are called upon to carry out specifi c mandates and follow the European 
Council’s direction in their work. Th is top down rather than bottom up approach has 
already led the European Council to schedule a number of thematic discussions on 
the EU’s strategy towards its main partners (16 September 2010), on research and 
innovation policy (October 2010) and on energy problems (early 2011). It is open 
to question, however, whether all Council confi gurations, particularly those such 
as the ECOFIN Council which have been traditionally reluctant to accept such 
guidance, will willingly go along with this new approach, even though it is entirely 
in keeping with the spirit of the Treaty (see Art. 6 TEU). Th is inversion in the 
sequence of the decision-making process also requires a degree of acceptance from 
the rotating Presidency, which could lead to tensions, although the six-monthly 
Presidency will tend to diminish as a political force. Th ere are also some who con-
sider that the intervention of the European Council early on in the decision-making 
process could undermine the power of initiative of the Commission.
Placing the European Council at the heart of the political process on its own would 
mean having 27 Heads of State or Government (who it has even been suggested 
should meet once a month!) all steering the Community vessel. Such a situation is 
inconceivable since it would inevitably lead sooner or later to a shipwreck. Th is is 
where the new permanent President comes in, cleverly operating at two levels. On 
one level he has addressed the issue of his role with modesty and self-eff acement 
saying that he doesn’t have any opinions or beliefs, being merely a facilitator seek-
ing consensus within a very varied club. At the same time, he has discreetly yet 
actively participated in all of the work behind the scenes, guiding high level talks 
in order to establish the Union’s position on issues as sensitive as the new Europe 
2020 strategy or the arrangements for assisting Greece.
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One Brussels daily appropriately described Herman Van Rompuy as a President 
who operates by stealth, and that is how he is best placed to perform his role.[1] He 
does this in two ways; through understanding what his role is, and then by fulfi lling 
that role by striking the right note, drawing on his personal qualities of astuteness 
and discretion. Th e clearest evidence of the trust which his peers have placed in 
him is in the statement of 25 March 2010 by the Heads of State or Government 
of the euro area, in which the President of the European Council is asked to “estab-
lish, in cooperation with the Commission, a task force with representatives of Member 
States, the rotating Presidency and the ECB, to present to the Council, before the end 
of this year, the measures needed [for the] strengthening of surveillance of economic and 
budgetary risks and the instruments for their prevention, including the excessive defi cit 
procedure, and consideration of a robust framework for crisis resolution, respecting the 
principle of Member States’ own budgetary responsibility”. Against this background, 
such a mandate says far more about the place now occupied by the President of the 
European Council within the Union’s machinery than any number of comments 
or declarations.
3.2.  The Rotating Presidency: 
Moving Towards a “Functional” Presidency
Having been somewhat forgotten, the rotating Presidency made a strong comeback, 
to the discomfort of the purists, at the start of the Spanish Presidency. In fact it 
turned out to be a rather artifi cial comeback, driven by the initial need for Spain 
to plan for all eventualities, including the possibility that the Lisbon Treaty would 
not be in force. In general, the fi rst half of 2010 should be regarded as a kind of 
transition period. Spain, followed by those Member States due to subsequently hold 
the Presidency, quickly realised that times had changed and the heyday of the six-
month Presidency was drawing to a close. Th is existential crisis gave rise to a group 
therapy session led by the Finnish Minister for Foreign Aff airs, Alexander Stubb, 
at an informal meeting with his counterparts in Lapland. It is perhaps understand-
able that Foreign Ministers were worried. Removed from the chair of the Foreign 
Aff airs Council, stripped of their supporting role in the European Council, they 
also found themselves having to cope with the challenge of the transfer of work to 
the High Representative, and her supporting cast in the shape of the future External 
Action Service, as well as with the reality that President Van Rompuy would be 
speaking on a regular basis on behalf of the Union.
[1] Le Soir, 11 February 2010.
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Th is reduction in status of Foreign Ministers as well as of the rotating Presidency 
more generally prompted some refl ection on how to recover lost ground. Th is refl ec-
tion focussed on the ideas of association and delegation. Th e fi rst idea is already in 
the Treaty, which foresees that preparations for the European Council are carried 
out, on an equal footing, by the permanent President of the European Council and 
by the General Aff airs Council, chaired by the rotating Presidency [Art. 15 (6)
(b) TEU]. Early experience of this new arrangement does not seem to have given 
rise to any particular diffi  culties, with the permanent President initiating texts, in 
close consultation with the six-month Presidency. Th e same idea of association 
was taken further in the decision to ask President Van Rompuy and the Spanish 
Prime Minister Zapatero to prepare together the Union’s position for the forth-
coming G20 meeting in Toronto on strengthening global fi nancial discipline. 
Similarly, the six-month Presidency was associated ex offi  cio with the remit to 
President Van Rompuy to improve economic governance (see above). In fact, all of 
these apparently generous concessions are simply a logical consequence of the fact 
that, however one would like it, the rotating Presidency retains full responsibility 
for the smooth operation of all Council confi gurations (apart from the Foreign 
Aff airs Council) and that the smooth functioning of the European Council depends 
in large part on the functioning of the Councils themselves.
Th e second way, in which the rotating Presidency could be revitalised, particularly 
in the area of foreign policy, is through delegated power. Th is is an arrangement very 
well-suited to Foreign Ministers. It was already raised by some of them (A. Stubb 
and B. Kouchner) at the meeting in Finland, where it was suggested that ministers 
could act as special envoys to trouble spots around the globe, instead of the current 
practice (which follows that of the US) of assigning such tasks to diplomats. Th e 
question then arises as to whether that privilege should be limited to the minister 
from the country holding the six-month Presidency or whether it should extend 
to all of his counterparts, depending on their own particular country’s experience 
or historical connections with any particular part of the world. Th e presence of 
the French minister, representing HR Ashton, at a conference in Montreal on aid 
for Haiti appeared to presage such an arrangement, and created some uneasiness 
within the Spanish Presidency. Fortunately, the latter has since received a number 
of similar remits (in particular, Foreign Minister Moratinos’ tour of the Caucasus 
and Central Asia in March 2010, or preparations for the tricky Euro-Mediterranean 
summit; although in this particular case it might be more accurate to say that the 
Presidency assigned this role to itself).
To complete the picture, it should be noted that there is a provision in the Coun-
cil’s Rules of Procedure [Art. 2 (5)] whereby the EU High Representative for 
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Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy may, where necessary, ask to be replaced in 
the chair of the Foreign Aff airs Council by the representative of the six-month 
Presidency. Th e picture to emerge of the rotating Presidency’s role is therefore not 
a passive one, as some would have us believe, but rather an auxiliary one. It has 
in eff ect exchanged its former political and institutional role for a functional one, 
which might appear more prosaic, but is not insignifi cant.
Th is change in the six-month Presidency will be greatly helped by fortuitous timing. 
It is reasonable to assume that the Belgian Presidency (in the second half of 2010) 
will provide an opportunity for two compatriots to settle defi nitively the relation-
ship between the rotating Presidency and the stable European Council Presidency 
in a way which will not necessarily be unfavourable to the latter! Coincidentally, 
too, the order of six-month Presidencies to come over the years ahead, apart from 
Poland in 2011, does not include any larger Member States which might risk 
overshadowing the rise of the two new “institutional” presidencies.
3.3. The High Representative
Th e question of relations between the HR and the rotating Presidency has been 
extensively dealt with in discussing the latter’s role. Th at leaves her relations with 
the President of the European Council. For once, it appears, the Treaty is relatively 
clear on the matter, and there is no doubt at what is meant when it is said that 
the President shall represent the Union at his level, meaning that his presence is 
required when his peers — Heads of State or Government — are involved, whether 
the meeting is a multilateral or bilateral summit. Th is seems to have been the case 
up to now.
4. THE PRESIDENTIAL GALAXY
Th e analysis of the relationship between the diff erent points of the triangle is not the 
end of the story as regards the arrangements provided for in the Lisbon Treaty. Th is 
three-part system, complicated enough as it is, includes further components which 
are in diff erent ways related to the overall structure. Moreover, the triangle is itself 
subject directly or indirectly to outside infl uences that determine the behaviour 
of the main players. Only an overview of these additional elements and how they 
relate to the core can do full justice to the complexity of the system.
Th e High Representative post is in fact a triangular arrangement in itself, since 
it combines three functions: the High Representative for Foreign and Security 
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policy (in which capacity the High Representative is able to put forward propos-
als under her own responsibility and represent the Union at her level for external 
relations issues), Vice-President of the Commission (in which capacity alone she is 
subject to the Commission’s rules of collegiality), and Chair of the Foreign Aff airs 
Council.
Th is complexity has become apparent in particular in relation to the frequent ques-
tion of how the High Representative is represented given the practical impossibility 
of fulfi lling all three functions simultaneously. As High Representative she can in 
practice ask any Minister for Foreign Aff airs to conduct a mission on her behalf 
(for example Bernard Kouchner at the Haiti Conference), as Vice-President of 
the Commission she can be replaced by another Commissioner, in line with the 
Commission’s internal rules, and as President of the Council she can request the 
Foreign Minister of the rotating Presidency to chair in her place.
It will no doubt take some time for each of those concerned (and not least the High 
Representative herself) to fi nd their place in this complex set-up. In the meantime, 
several tensions are obvious. In the Commission the responsibility of a politician of 
British nationality (and therefore by defi nition an inter-governmentalist!) for the 
coordination of all external policies is seen by some as a Trojan Horse. Equally, but 
conversely, the High Representative’s function within the Commission continues 
to be viewed by some with suspicion.
4.1. The President of the Euro Group: a Man on the Up
Th e new Treaty makes the Euro Group offi  cial, but also extends the range and 
number of issues which are decided within the Council with only the euro area 
members voting. [1] Th e Euro Group is increasingly becoming a political decision-
making body, with the ECOFIN Council the venue for informing the rest and 
making decisions offi  cial. A sign of the times: Mr Juncker has set out his presidency 
programme; he also has a website on which the “decisions” of the Euro Group are 
published (euphemistically described as “terms of reference”). [2]
Th e President of the Euro Group is therefore becoming increasingly an interlocutor 
of the European Council President, but without eroding his power. Th us Herman 
Van Rompuy has been asked to lead the Task Force on economic governance (see 
[1] See Arts 136-138 TFEU and Protocol No 14.
[2] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=1825&lang=en.
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above) and to chair the meeting of the Euro Group at the level of Heads of State 
or Government.
Th e relationship between the President of the Euro Group and the other presi-
dencies does not in principle raise any particular problems. Th is is due inter alia 
to the particular position of Jean-Claude Junker who is both Prime Minister and 
Minister of Finance. Th e Euro Group and its President played an important role 
in addressing the Greek crisis in apparently close harmony with the political lead-
ers of the Union. 
4.2. The Presidential “Trio”: Fact or Fiction?
Second presidential avatar: the team of three Member States that “share” presi-
dential responsibility for 18 months (also known as the trio).[1] Th is arrangement, 
already in operation for several years but formalised by the Lisbon Treaty[2], has 
not so far attracted any signifi cant attention from commentators. Apart from a 
general obligation of mutual assistance, notably in the event of unavailability, its 
main visible activity — the establishment of a common programme for the three 
Presidencies — has gone more or less unnoticed as everyone tends to look more at 
the national version of the programme which is circulated at the same time.
Seen from the perspective of the new presidential system, however, there are three 
points to be made about the trio: 1) it has the genuine merit of teaching national 
administrations how to work together — not a negligible consideration in making 
Presidencies more eff ective; 2) the inversion of the sequence of decision-making 
within the Council — top down rather than bottom up — requires greater conti-
nuity in implementing the guidelines set by the European Council, which can be 
facilitated by programming activities over 18 months, and 3) it is important to bear 
in mind that while the text of the decision on the functioning of the trio stipulates 
that each country is to chair all Council confi gurations (apart from the Foreign 
Aff airs confi guration) for six months, it also provides for the three Member States 
concerned to “decide alternative arrangements” — i.e. derogate from that rule. Th is 
seemingly banal clause theoretically opens the door to a Presidency set-up whereby 
each trio member would chair one third of the Council meetings for an 18-month 
[1] See also First Lisbon Study, p. 44.
[2] Declaration 9 on Article 16 (9) of the Treaty on European Union concerning the European Council decision on the 
exercise of the Presidency of the Council.
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period. If that happened — unlikely as it seems, at least for the time being — it 
would certainly have a major impact on the operation of the system as a whole.[1] 
4.3. The Presidencies of Preparatory Bodies: a Mix of Genres
Th ird presidential avatar: the Presidency of the Council’s preparatory bodies. Th is 
is not the place to go into the details of this complicated subject. [2] Suffi  ce it to say 
that the Presidency of the “foreign aff airs” preparatory bodies is shared between 
offi  cials of the common external service and offi  cials from the rotating Presidency. 
Conversely all the preparatory bodies in other areas, including COREPER, are 
chaired by the rotating Presidency, with the exception of a very limited number 
which have more permanently elected chairs.
Th ere is an anecdote to relate here. Many members of COREPER were anxious to 
know who was to represent President Van Rompuy before their August Committee 
when it dealt with preparations for the European Council. Discussion resulted in 
the quite natural conclusion that it is of course the Chairman of COREPER who 
represents him by virtue of the principle of unity of the presidential function, even 
if it is manifested in diff erent forms. Th is does not of course exclude the possibil-
ity of the Head of Cabinet of the President of the European Council maintaining 
close contacts with the Chair of COREPER and participating regularly in its 
meetings.
4.4. The President of the Commission: a Potential Rival?
Th e potential rivalry between the new President of the European Council and the 
President of the Commission was one of the arguments put forward by those — and 
there were many of them — who were unconvinced by the idea of a permanent 
presidency. Th is rivalry was all the more predictable, they argued, because the 
Commission President was strengthened politically by the Treaty through the 
enhanced legitimacy off ered by endorsement from the Parliament. In other words, 
there was general concern that a battle of egos would break out between the two 
[1] Article 2 (2) of Council Decision of 1 December 2009 laying down measures for the implementation of the European 
Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of preparatory bodies of the 
Council (2009/908/EU) OJ L 322, 9.12.2009, pp. 28-34.
[2] See European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council (2009/881/EU) 
OJ L 315, 2.12.2009, p. 50; Council Decision of 1 December 2009 laying down measures for the implementation of the 
European Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of preparatory 
bodies of the Council (2009/908/EU) OJ L 322, 9.12.2009, pp. 28-34, and annexes. Both decisions are found at the end of 
this chapter. 
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new leading lights of the Union over the virtual but ever-tempting position of de 
facto President of Europe! 
Th ere is no reason so far to suggest that there is a risk of this prediction becoming 
true. On the contrary, it seems that President Van Rompuy and President Barroso, 
conscious of the risks inherent in trying to upstage each other, are vying — at least 
in public — to demonstrate that particular care is being taken in public pronounce-
ments to avoid giving off ence, with the aim of portraying the image of a happy 
couple. Th is impression is confi rmed by two initiatives that have been taken to 
avoid any conceivable risk of friction. Th e fi rst, simple but eff ective, was for the two 
Presidents to decide to meet at least once a week to take stock of the most impor-
tant issues. Th e second, more elaborate, was to draw up a modus vivendi, set out in 
writing, on the rules for the Union’s external representation at presidential level (see 
Annex I). Both these initiatives show that the risks are real but equally that both are 
determined to overcome them. It remains that the existence of these two presidents 
certainly fails to provide a simplifi ed external representation of the EU. 
4.5. The Prime Minister/Head of State of the Country Holding 
the Six-Monthly Presidency: Frustration Recompensed?
Second theoretical threat to the integrity of the role of the new permanent President: 
the Prime Minister/Head of State of the country holding the rotating Presidency, 
who is the main loser under the new regime. After toying with various ideas such 
as having him chair the General Aff airs Council (which was quickly abandoned), 
the European Council’s Rules of Procedure limit his role to that of Rapporteur, 
both to the European Parliament, to which he presents his Presidency’s priorities 
and the results achieved during the six-month term, and to the European Council 
itself, to which he reports on the proceedings of the Council [Arts 4 (1) & 5 para. 
3]. Clearly, these limited prerogatives cannot disguise the fact that this is a serious 
demotion, a source of much frustration which all Heads of Government will seek 
to make up for in various ways. Th e organisation of high-profi le political events — 
such as meetings with third countries — could help to mitigate this frustration 
without challenging the principle that European Council meetings should continue 
without exception to be held in Brussels.
4.6. The “Directorate”: a Virtual Vice-Presidency?
President Van Rompuy will not only be faced with the occasional outburst of envy 
from his colleagues who have been ousted from the presidential chair. He will, on 
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a daily basis, have to contend with the often contradictory and to varying degrees 
reasonable (or unreasonable) demands of his peers, and fi nd ways of dealing with 
them through seeking consensus. But some peers are more equal than others. 
Experience has already shown that in exercising this much-vaunted function of 
facilitator, the President of the European Council has had to take account of the 
vision of the Union’s aff airs held by the (somewhat elusive) “Directorate” of the 
large Member States, including the Franco-German duo (provided they settle their 
own diff erences). Th e ways in which recent European Councils have been organised 
demonstrate this clearly. But this must not become so intrusive as to undermine 
the lively independence of mind which, along with skill and intellectual rigour, is 
the mark of men of infl uence. Th e fact that President Van Rompuy said that no-
one could prevent him from playing the role of facilitator before and during the 
Council is reassuring. Th e Prince’s hand will not be at the service of one group at 
the expense of others, even if the principle of realpolitik means that no group can 
be completely overlooked. 
4.7. The Secretariat: a Valuable Unifying Factor…
Th e General Secretariat of the Council (hereafter “GSC”) is unique. It acts as a 
common denominator of all those who now embody the presidential function. It is 
above all in the relationship between the rotating Presidency and the President of 
the European Council that the GSC can help coordinate the various proceedings 
properly and ensure that the machine runs smoothly.
It is because it is equidistant — the word being very much in fashion — from the 
President of the European Council and the rotating Presidency that it can serve 
both actors fairly and eff ectively. Th e GSC can in particular help the President of 
the European Council to digest the mass of information coming from the Council 
bodies and, if necessary, sound a note of warning. Moreover, with its fi nger on the 
Council’s pulse, it is well placed to inform President Van Rompuy of the collec-
tive view within the Council, and not just the individual positions of particular 
capitals.
In the external fi eld the GSC’s role will change as a result of the creation of the 
EEAS, to which some of its existing functions and resources will be transferred. 
But the GSC will keep its traditional tasks of a secretariat in the strict sense — 
continuing to serve the Foreign Aff airs Council, as well as its preparatory bodies. 
Th is fact has been overlooked by many, but is important since it will help place 
the Secretariat and its Secretary General at the hub of the complex institutional 
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structure resulting from the Lisbon Treaty. As such, it will have a vital role to play 
in ensuring the eff ectiveness of the new presidential system. 
5. CONCLUSION
Th e change in presidential system — along with the extension of co-decision (now 
the “ordinary legislative procedure”) and the common external action service — is 
undoubtedly one of the major innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. Th ere is no ideal 
solution to the question of the Council Presidency, only imperfect formulas. Forced 
to choose, the Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference decided to move 
away from a Presidency that was monolithic but devoid of continuity to a Presidency 
that is lasting but multifaceted… 
It is doubtless too soon to be able to say whether this was the right choice. How-
ever, in the light of experience so far, there is reason to believe that the permanent 
presidency could prove to be better adapted to the requirements of the future, i.e. 
the need for longer-term management of Union aff airs as well as greater continu-
ity, for better linkage between internal policies and external action as well as more 
coherence in the latter.
However, these potential advantages will not materialise in the long term unless 
three conditions are met: 1) good practice must bed down quickly; the system will not 
work if the roles of the players are reinvented every six months; 2) bona fi de appli-
cation of the new rules; the system will not tolerate any constant vying for power 
or infl uence amongst the main actors; 3) regular consultation at the appropriate 
level between those in charge of the three presidencies. With the fi rst six months 
of 2010 considered to be a transitional period, the Belgian Presidency will have 
particular responsibility for putting the system defi nitively in place, within the 
letter and the spirit of the above.
ANNEX I
Practical Arrangements between President Van Rompuy and President Barroso 
regarding External Representation of the European Union at Presidential 
Level
(16 March 2010)
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Th e President of the European Council and the President of the European Com-
mission agree to the following principles to ensure coherence and effi  ciency in the 
EU’s external representation:
General principles:
At international meetings at the level of Heads of State or Government (EU • 
summits with third countries, G8 and G20 summits, etc.), the EU delegation 
will be composed of both Presidents in one single delegation. Th eir roles are 
complementary, in respect of their respective responsibilities.
On each subject, only one of the two Presidents will state the position of the • 
EU. Th e distribution of the interventions will be agreed between the two 
Presidents ahead of each meeting, taking into account Article 15 and 17 of 
the TEU.
G8/G20:
For the preparation of G8 and G20 summits, both Presidents will nominate • 
one personal representative each.
Th e personal representative of the President of the European Commission • 
will be the G20 sherpa, assisted by the personal representative of the Presi-
dent of the European Council. Conversely, the personal representative of 
the President of the European Council will be the G8 sherpa, assisted by the 
personal representative of the President of the European Commission. Th e 
sherpas will together defi ne their working methods and also be assisted by 
other offi  cials following existing practice, to be adapted if needed in agree-
ment between the two Presidents.
ANNEX II
European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 on the exercise of the 
Presidency of the Council (2009/881/EU)
THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 
Having regard to the Treaty on the European Union, and in particular Article 
16(9) thereof, 
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in 
particular Article 236(b) thereof, 
Whereas: 
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(1) Declaration (n o 9) annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence which has adopted the Treaty of Lisbon foresees that the European Council 
adopts, on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the Decision the text of which 
is contained in the said Declaration. (2) It is therefore appropriate to adopt that 
Decision,  
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Article 1
1. Th e Presidency of the Council, with the exception of the Foreign Aff airs con-
fi guration, shall be held by pre-established groups of three Member States for a 
period of 18 months. Th e groups shall be made up on a basis of equal rotation 
among the Member States, taking into account their diversity and geographical 
balance within the Union.
2. Each member of the group shall in turn chair for a six-month period all con-
fi gurations of the Council, with the exception of the Foreign Aff airs confi guration. 
Th e other members of the group shall assist the Chair in all its responsibilities on 
the basis of a common programme. Members of the team may decide alternative 
arrangements among themselves. 
Article 2
Th e Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States shall be chaired by a representative of the Member State chairing the General 
Aff airs Council. Th e Chair of the Political and Security Committee shall be held 
by a representative of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aff airs 
and Security Policy. Th e chair of the preparatory bodies of the various Council 
confi gurations, with the exception of the Foreign Aff airs confi guration, shall fall 
to the member of the group chairing the relevant confi guration, unless decided 
otherwise in accordance with Article 4.
Article 3
Th e General Aff airs Council shall ensure consistency and continuity in the work of 
the diff erent Council confi gurations in the framework of multiannual programmes 
in cooperation with the Commission. Th e Member States holding the Presidency 
shall take all necessary measures for the organisation and smooth operation of the 
Council’s work, with the assistance of the General Secretariat of the Council.
Article 4
Th e Council shall adopt a decision establishing the measures for the implementa-
tion of this decision. 
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Article 5
Th is Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption. It shall be published 
in the Offi  cial Journal of the European Union.
Done at Brussels,
1 December 2009. 
For the European Council
Th e President 
ANNEX III
Council Decision of 1 December 2009 laying down measures for the 
implementation of the European Council Decision on the exercise of the 
Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of preparatory bodies of 
the Council (2009/908/EU)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 16(9) 
thereof, 
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in 
particular Article 236(b) thereof, 
Having regard to the European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 on the 
exercise of the Presidency of the Council[1], and in particular Article 2, third sub-
paragraph, and Article 4 thereof, 
Whereas: 
(1) Measures should be laid down for the implementation of the European Council 
Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council (hereinafter referred to 
as “the European Council Decision”). 
(2) Th ose implementing measures include the order in which the pre-established 
groups of three Member States are to hold the Presidency in turn for consec-
utive periods of 18 months taking into account the fact that there exist since 
1 January 2007, in accordance with the Council’s Rules of Procedure, a system of 
Council 18-month programmes agreed between the three Presidencies which hold 
offi  ce during the period concerned. 
(3) In accordance with Article 1 of the European Council Decision, the composi-
tion of the groups must take account of the diversity of the Member States and 
geographical balance within the Union. 
[1] OJ L 315, 2.12.2009, p. 50.
82
The Treaty of Lisbon — A Second Look at the Institutional Innovations
(4) Th e division of responsibilities among the Member States within each group 
is determined by Article 1(2) of the European Council Decision. In either of the 
situations provided for in Article 2(1) of this Decision, the Member States within 
each group will by common accord determine the practical arrangements for their 
collaboration. 
(5) In addition, those implementing measures should include specifi c rules with 
regard to the chairing of preparatory bodies of the Foreign Aff airs Council as pro-
vided for in Article 2, third subparagraph, of the European Council Decision. 
(6) Most of those preparatory bodies should be chaired by a representative of the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy (hereinaf-
ter “the High Representative”) while the rest of them should continue to be chaired 
by the six-monthly Presidency. Where the chair of such bodies is a representative 
of the High Representative, a transitional period may apply. 
(7) Preparatory bodies which are not chaired by the six-monthly Presidency should 
also be listed in this Decision, as provided for in Article 2, third subparagraph, of 
the European Council Decision. 
(8) Th e chairmanship of preparatory bodies not listed in this Decision will be chaired 
in accordance with Article 2 of the European Council Decision, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article 1
Th e order in which the Member States shall hold the Presidency of the Council as 
from 1 January 2007 is set out in Council Decision of 1 January 2007 determining 
the order in which the offi  ce of President of the Council shall be held[1].
Th e division of this order of Presidencies into groups of three Member States, in 
accordance with Article 1(1) of the European Council Decision, is set out in Annex 
I to this Decision. 
Article 2
1. Each member of a group as referred to in Article 1, second subparagraph, shall 
in turn chair for a six-month period all confi gurations of the Council, with the 
exception of the Foreign Aff airs confi guration. Th e other members of the group 
shall assist the Chair in all its responsibilities on the basis of the Council’s 18-month 
programme. 
2. Th e members of a group as referred to in Article 1 may decide upon alternative 
arrangements among themselves. 
[1] OJ L 1, 4.1.2007, p. 11.
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3. In either of the situations provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Member States 
within each group shall by common accord determine the practical arrangements 
for their collaboration. 
Article 3
Th e order in which the Member States will hold the Presidency as from 1 July 2020 
shall be decided by the Council before 1 July 2017. 
Article 4
Th e preparatory bodies of the Foreign Aff airs Council shall be chaired in accord-
ance with the rules set out in Annex II. 
Article 5
Th e Council preparatory bodies listed in Annex III shall be chaired by fi xed chairs 
as set out in that Annex. 
Article 6
Th is Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption. 
It shall be published in the Offi  cial Journal of the European Union. 
Done at Brussels,
1 December 2009.
For the Council 
Th e President
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1. INTRODUCTION
Th e exercise and control of delegated authority[1] have proven to be an apple of 
discord in EU governance ever since the improvised inception of the comitology 
process in the 1960s. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the lack of a 
clear defi nition of the concept and the absence of Treaty-based procedures struc-
turing its application caused a signifi cant deal of ambiguity to become attached to 
its implementation in the Union’s institutional framework.
1.1. Brief Overview of the Development of Comitology
Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, ex Article 202 TEC allowed the 
Council to delegate “implementing powers” to the Commission so that the latter 
could provide for “implementation of the rules which the Council lays down”.
Ex Article 202 TEC, however, was silent as to the procedures that should govern 
the exercise of delegated authority. Th is lacuna allowed the Council to develop a 
myriad of committee-based procedures that advised, supervised and controlled the 
exercise of such authority by the European Commission; a process since referred 
to as “comitology”.[2]
Th e Council therefore held a monopoly over the elaboration and implementation 
of comitology; a privileged position that was challenged by both the Commission 
and the European Parliament.[3] Th e Commission argued against aspects of comi-
tology that it considered impinged upon its independence in the exercise of its 
executive functions, while the European Parliament (following the creation of the 
co-decision process in 1993) argued that as a co-legislator alongside the Council 
in legislation under which delegation was authorised, it should be entitled to play 
a role in the relevant comitology process. Th e European Court of Justice, however, 
successively upheld the legality of comitology as framed by the Council, provided 
the exercise of delegated authority be interpreted strictly in order to respect the 
interinstitutional balance.[4]
[1] Such authority was generally referred to as “implementing powers” prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
but shall be referred to as “delegated authority” for the purposes of this paper.
[2] JOERGES, C. and Vos, E. (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999); BERG-
STRÖM, C.F., Comitology: Delegation of Powers in the European Union and the Committee System (New York, OUP, 2005); see 
also Vos, E., 50 Years of European Integration, 45 Years of Comitology, Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2009-3, 
February 2009, retrievable at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345729.
[3] For details on the European Parliament’s challenges, see CORBETT, R., JACOBS, F. and SHACKLETON, M., The European 
Parliament, 7th edition (London, John Harper Publishing, 2007), pp. 293-303.
[4] ECJ, Case 23/75 Rey Soda v. Cassa Congualio Zucchero [1975] ECR 1279 at para. 9.
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Principal steps in the reform of delegated authority
1958: Article 155 of the Rome Treaty provides the relevant legal basis for delegated • 
powers
1960s: informal development of “comitology”• 
1970s: Legality of comitology confi rmed by the ECJ in cases such as • Köster and Rey 
Soda
1986: Single European Act provides a legal basis for delegated powers by amending Article • 
145 TEC (renumbered 202 by the Amsterdam Treaty)
1987: fi rst comitology decision adopted• 
1988: Plumb/Delors Agreement• 
1993: Maastricht Treaty introduces co-decision• 
1994: “Modus Vivendi” Agreement• 
1996: Samland/Williamson Agreement• 
1999: Amsterdam Treaty extends co-decision and commits to comitology reform• 
1999: second comitology decision• 
2001: Lamfalussy Process begins• 
2002-4: Convention on the Future of Europe proposes reform of delegated legislative • 
power; adopted as part of the Constitutional Treaty
2006: third comitology decision• 
2009: Lisbon Treaty enters into force; reforms drafted by the Convention become legally • 
binding in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU
2010: Commission proposes comitology regulation • 
1.2. Nature and Context of the Lisbon Treaty Reforms
Th e reforms contained in the Lisbon Treaty on delegated authority can trace their 
origins to the work of the Amato Group in the Convention on the Future of Europe, 
while the practical considerations relating to the implementation of this reform are 
infl uenced by the impact of the 2006 Comitology Decision.
1.2.1. Contribution of the Convention on the Future of Europe
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the exercise of delegated legislative 
authority via the comitology process could be grouped into two broad categories 
of acts:
 (1)  “quasi-legislative acts”, which are acts that would otherwise fall within the 
competence of the Union legislature in that they alter an existing basic 
legislative act, but operate only to amend or supplement its non-essential 
elements; and
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 (2)  “implementing acts”, which are acts that would otherwise fall within the 
competences of the Member States in that they relate to the implementation 
of existing Union law (ex Article 10 TEC), but operate where a harmonised 
implementation is needed.[1] 
Th e Lisbon Treaty formalises both categories in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU which 
respectively form the new legal bases for the fi rst category (called “delegated acts”, 
considered below in section 2) and the second (called “implementing acts”, con-
sidered below in section 3).
Formalising such a distinction into two categories was considered a “cardinal 
necessity” by the Amato Group in the Convention on the Future of Europe, which 
drafted the substantive text of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. Th e reasoning behind 
the creation of these Articles is well documented[2] and falls outside the scope of 
the present study. It is suffi  cient to note that the Working Group defi ned the two 
categories as follows:[3] 
2. “Delegated” acts: these acts would fl esh out the detail or amend certain elements of a 
legislative act, under some form of authorisation defi ned by the legislator. Th is would be 
in cases where the legislator felt that essential elements in an area, as defi ned by it, neces-
sitated legislative development which could be delegated, although such delegation would 
be subject to limits and to a control mechanism to be determined by the legislator itself in 
the legislative act.
3. Implementing acts: acts implementing legislative acts […]. [I]t would be for the legislator 
to determine whether and to what extent it was necessary to adopt at Union level acts imple-
menting legislative acts […], and, where appropriate, the committee procedure mechanism 
(Article 202 TEC) which should accompany the adoption of such acts.
Th e Working Group clearly foresaw a role for the continued use of comitology for 
implementing acts, but left the procedures for the supervision of delegated acts to 
be made subject to a form of “control mechanism” to be defi ned and controlled 
by the legislature.
[1] The European Court of Justice has elaborated on the two-part distinction in implementing powers: see for example 
ECJ, Case 41/69 Chemiefarma v. Commission [1970] ECR 661; ECJ, Case 23/75 Rey Soda v. Cassa Congualio Zucchero [1975] 
ECR 1279 and ECJ, Case 16/88 Commission v. Council [1989] ECR 3457.
[2] See in particular working documents of the Convention’s Working Group IX on Simplifi cation, including inter alia 
Working Document 07, How to simplify the instruments of the Union?, 17 October 2002; Working Document 11, Proposal 
for a “legislative/executive” delimitation within the institutional system of the European Union, 29 October 2002; Working 
Document 16, Proposal from the Commission’s representative in the Working group to distinguish legislative and executive 
functions in the institutional system of the European Union, 7 November 2002; and Final Report of Working Group IX, CONV 
424/02, 29 November 2002.
[3] Final Report of Working Group IX, CONV 424/02, 29 November 2002.
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1.2.2. The 2006 Comitology Decision
Infl uenced by the innovative use of delegated authority under the Lamfalussy proc-
ess on fi nancial services regulation and the proposed reform of delegated authority 
by the Amato Group in the Constitutional Treaty, the Council enacted a legisla-
tive reform of comitology in 2006.[1] Th e major change was the introduction of 
a regulatory procedure with scrutiny (commonly known by its French acronym, 
“PRAC”), thus introducing a fi fth form of comitology in addition to the pre-
existing advisory, management, regulatory and safeguard procedures. Th e PRAC 
bears many similarities to Article 290 TFEU delegated authority and is therefore 
considered in greater detail in section 2 below.[2]
1.2.3. Positions of the Institutions on Implementing Articles 290 and 291 TFEU
At the time of writing, the institutions had begun to set out their views on imple-
mentation of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. Th e Commission set out its position 
regarding the implementation of Article 290 TFEU in a Communication of 
9 December 2009,[3] which formed the basis of a unilateral Council declaration 
of 15 December 2009 and a draft report from the Legal Aff airs Committee of the 
European Parliament (Szájer Report) of 2 March 2010.[4] With regard to the imple-
mentation of Article 291 TFEU, a regulation of the Council and the European 
Parliament is required to frame the operating conditions for implementing acts. 
Th e Commission produced a draft regulation on 9 March 2010.[5] A draft report 
of the European Parliament in response to the Commission’s proposal is scheduled 
to be adopted in June 2010, with the regulation expected to be in place towards 
the end of 2010. In addition to these “prominent” documents, the implementa-
tion of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU have also been discussed in interinstitutional 
dialogue and in a number of documents of the institutions, some of which are 
mentioned below.
As an interim solution, the institutions agreed that the pre-Lisbon Treaty comitol-
ogy rules would continue to apply to the existing acquis and to acts adopted from 
1 December 2009 pending the enactment of the new comitology regulation under 
[1] Council Decision of 17 July 2006 amending Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, 2006/512/EC OJ L 200 p. 11, 22 July 2006.
[2] See also First Lisbon Study, pp. 9-10.
[3] COM(2009) 673 fi nal.
[4] Szájer Report on the power of legislative delegation (2010/2021(INI)).
[5] COM(2010) 83 fi nal.
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Article 291 TFEU. Article 290 TFEU became applicable on 1 December 2009 
and the existing acquis together with new legislative proposals are being adapted 
to its provisions on a case-by-case basis.
2. DELEGATED ACTS
Delegated acts are instruments adopted by the European Commission in the exercise 
of delegated authority that has been conferred upon it by the Union legislature. 
Th is means that authority stems from a basic legislative act rather than from the 
Council, which had been the situation under ex Article 202 TEC. Th e immediate 
change to note in this regard is therefore the increased authority of the European 
Parliament, which becomes an equal “co-delegator” with the Council where the 
ordinary legislative procedure applies, in which case it is equally responsible for 
determining the terms and conditions to which the exercise of delegated authority 
is subject.
2.1. Defi nition and Scope
A number of terms in Article 290 TFEU are not clearly defi ned, which leaves con-
siderable room for manoeuvre (and institutional disagreements) when it comes to 
implementation. For the purpose of evaluating how delegated acts will be imple-
mented in practice, it is worth examining aspects of Article 290 TFEU in closer 
detail.
2.1.1. “Non-Legislative Acts of General Application”
According to the terms of Article 290 (1) TFEU, delegated acts are classifi ed as 
“non-legislative acts of general application”. In the Constitutional Treaty however, 
delegated acts had been called “delegated regulations”. Th e diff erence in nomencla-
ture may be semantic, but in any case the qualifying term “non-legislative” in the 
Lisbon Treaty text of Article 290 does not per se exclude the likelihood that some 
delegated acts will be quasi-legislative in nature. Rather, it may be the case that 
“non-legislative” simply refers to the character of delegated acts as instruments not 
meeting the treaty defi nition of a legislative act [Article 289 (3) TFEU], i.e. instru-
ments that are not adopted through the ordinary or special legislative procedures.[1] 
[1] CRAIG, P., The European Parliament under the Lisbon Treaty, in GRILLER, S. and ZILLER, J. (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty: EU 
Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Vienna, Springer-Verlag, 2008), p. 113.
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Delegated acts are required to be “of general application”, which means they cannot 
be directed against any individual or single entity.
2.1.2. “Supplement or Amend Certain Non-Essential Elements”
Article 290(1) TFEU limits the scope of delegated acts to “non-essential elements 
of the legislative act”, which is a clause also found in Article 2(2) of the Comitology 
Decision regarding the situations in which the PRAC should be used.[1] Neither 
the Treaties nor the Comitology Decision provide a defi nition of such terms. Th e 
European Court of Justice has defi ned “essential elements” of legislation as entailing 
“provisions which are intended to give concrete shape to the fundamental guidelines of 
[Union] policy”,[2] although this formula does not provide any greater clarity.
Th e absence of any objective defi nition of “essential elements” is most likely a delib-
erate decision intended to provide the legislature with a wide room for manoeuvre 
should delegation be required. It may be the case that in the future a general trend 
emerges as to what constitutes essential elements of an act, but this may only be 
possible to discern once greater use has been made of Article 290 TFEU.
Th e defi nition of these two clauses — “supplement or amend” and “non-essential 
elements” — will likely form an initial ground of dispute between the Commission 
and the legislator, as the separation of delegated authority into either delegated acts 
or implementing acts will hinge on interpretation of these clauses. Th e Commis-
sion Communication on Article 290 TFEU considers that the means of separating 
the two categories of acts will be determined by a subjective appreciation of the 
act’s nature and scope of powers; with a delegated act “defi ned in terms of its scope 
and consequences” and an implementing act defi ned by its rationale, which is “the 
need for uniform conditions for implementation”.[3] In practice it is likely that the 
classifi cation of delegated authority as either delegated acts or implementing acts 
will be determined by the strength of arguments put forward by the Commission, 
Council or European Parliament, but the ultimate decision on whether an act is to 
be classifi ed as delegated or implementing will fall to the Council and the European 
Parliament. Indeed, the “ultimate power” of the legislature is a point borne out in 
the Szájer Report.[4]
[1] Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission (OJ L 184 of 17 July 1999, p. 23) as amended by Council Decision 2006/512/EC of 17 July 
2006 (OJ L 200 of 22 July 2006, p. 11), consolidated version of OJ C 255 of 21 October 2006, p. 4.
[2] ECJ, Case C-240/90, Germany v. Commission [1992] ECR I-5383 at para. 37.
[3] COM(2009) 673 fi nal, p. 3.
[4] See Szájer Report, op. cit., p. 7.
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2.2. Conditions on Delegated Acts
Once a delegated act is authorised by a basic legislative act, Article 290 TFEU 
provides that the Council and the Parliament may adopt methods of control that 
condition the Commission’s exercise of its delegated authority. Article 290 (2) 
TFEU requires that any such terms or conditions be “explicitly defi ned”, mean-
ing they must be included as part of each basic legislative act that allows for the 
adoption of delegated acts. Th e Sjázer Report has suggested that the terms and 
conditions meet four requirements: clarity; legal certainty; enable the Commission 
to exercise delegated authority eff ectively; and allow the legislator to scrutinise the 
use of such authority.[1] Th e Commission Communication states that any material 
or temporal limits on delegated acts should be clear, precise and detailed. Th e most 
important point to be stressed in this section is that the Council and the European 
Parliament are free to set the terms and conditions of Article 290 TFEU delegations 
on a case-by-case basis.
2.2.1. Methods of Control 
Although methods of control are to be adopted on a case-by-case basis by the 
legislature, Article 290 (2)TFEU provides two examples of conditions that the 
legislature can include, namely a power to revoke the delegation (right of revoca-
tion) or to object to a proposed delegated act or an aspect of that proposal (right 
of opposition); the exercise of which may be invoked either by the Council or the 
European Parliament. Th e Sjázer Report considers that these two “rights” do not 
constitute an exhaustive list of the powers of the legislator and that other “control 
mechanisms” are likely to be envisaged.[2] Th e European Commission’s Communi-
cation, however, seems to indicate that the list is an exhaustive one, stating that “the 
new Treaty specifi es the two conditions to which the legislator may subject the delegation 
of power”[3]. Th e Commission, as the institution responsible for drafting legislation, 
may choose only to include the two rights mentioned in Article 290 (2)TFEU in 
its legislative proposals for the basic legislative acts. However, the Council and the 
European Parliament are likely to include other variants and determine their own 
preferences as the system develops.
Furthermore, the Commission Communication on Article 290 TFEU states a 
preference for the use of a right of opposition over a right of revocation, consider-
[1] See Szájer Report, op. cit., p. 8.
[2] See Szájer Report, op. cit., p. 9.
[3] COM(2009) 673 fi nal at p.7.
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ing the latter as an option of last resort. Th e right of opposition itself is likely to 
be made subject to a time limit set by the legislative act and should therefore be 
invoked before the expiration of the relevant time period in order to be eff ective. 
Th e Commission has proposed a standard window of two months in which the 
Council or the European Parliament may exercise a right of opposition, extendable 
by one month if requested (although the Szájer Report recommends an extension 
period of two months, while the Council recommends a standard period of three 
months where there is no urgency). Th e Commission Communication also foresees 
an “urgency procedure” in which the Council and the European Parliament will 
have a much shorter time in which to exercise a right of opposition, or a situation in 
which a delegated act enters into force subject to an ex post right of opposition.
A crucial point regarding the implementation of Article 290 TFEU that is not 
mentioned in the Treaty text concerns the right of scrutiny (droit de regard) 
for the Council and the European Parliament during the exercise of delegated 
authority. Such a droit de regard is in essence a means of ex ante control on the 
Commission’s exercise of delegated authority. However, in their formal positions 
on implementation of Article 290 TFEU the institutions only foresee the use of 
ex post control, presumably as the use of a right of revocation is seen to be suf-
fi ciently powerful to prevent the entry into force of a delegated act, particularly 
if the right of revocation can be targeted at aspects of a delegated act rather than 
a general blanket veto. Even if such a droit de regard is not expressly provided for 
in a basic legislative act, a commitment to transparency nonetheless stems from 
Article 15 TFEU.
Where temporal limitations to Article 290 TFEU delegations are concerned, the 
Commission opposes the use of “sunset clauses” that had previously been used in 
the Lamfalussy process. Instead, the Commission foresees the introduction of a 
“system of short-term delegations” of “indefi nite duration” that are subject to the 
rights of revocation of the Council and the European Parliament. For instance, 
the de Brún Report (see below) recommends a short-term delegation of fi ve-year 
periods, to be automatically renewed unless the Council or the European Parlia-
ment revoke the delegation.
A draft regulation amending legislation on the non-commercial movement of pet 
animals contains the fi rst use of Article 290 TFEU since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. While the institutions explicitly exclude that its use constitutes a 
precedent as to how Article 290 TFEU may be used in the future, it nonetheless 
represents a tangible example as to how Article 290 TFEU delegations of authority 
are to operate in practice.
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Th e de Brún Report[1] on the draft regulation accords fi ve discernable categories 
of “rights” to the Council and the European Parliament that are to condition the 
Commission’s use of delegated acts. Aside from the incorporation of Article 290 (2) 
TFEU suggested rights (a right of revocation and a right of opposition), the de 
Brún report proposes a right to require the Commission to carry out “appropriate 
consultations during its preparatory work”; a right to time-limit the delegation of 
authority; and a right to receive notifi cation of each delegated act adopted by the 
Commission and a report from the Commission on its exercise of delegated author-
ity prior to the scheduled expiration of the delegated authority.
2.2.2. The Need for a Model Delegation?
While it is likely that a form of “standard delegation” will develop over time, leg-
islative freedom is a fundamental aspect of Article 290 TFEU delegations (a point 
stressed by both the Council and the European Parliament). Th e Commission, 
however, is in favour of establishing a “model method of delegation” as a means 
of providing a template for the use of Article 290 TFEU. Th is template contains 
four articles: (A) exercise of the delegation, which contains two options for either 
an indeterminate or time-limited delegation; (B) revocation of the delegation; (C) 
objections to a delegated act, which includes two options for either a two-month 
window extendable by a month or a three-month non-extendable window; and 
(D) urgency procedures.
Th e Council seems broadly in favour of a standard form of Article 290 TFEU del-
egation, which it considers would “facilitate a coherent implementation of Article 290 
during the initial phase of its application”.[2] Th e Szájer Report, on the other hand, 
tends to emphasise legislative freedom, while stating its preference for an informal 
“common understanding” between the institutions consisting of agreements in 
areas such as mutual exchanges of information; arrangements for the transmission 
of documents; and computation of time periods.[3]
2.2.3. PRAC and Article 290 TFEU Compared
Despite the terminological similarities between the PRAC and Article 290 TFEU 
delegated authority, it seems clear that past use of the PRAC is not to serve as a 
[1] 2009/0077(COD) of 9 March 2010.
[2] Report by the Presidency to COREPER on the implementation of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU (Delegated acts and 
implementing measures) of 2 December 2009; Annex of INST 209 at p. 4.
[3] See Szájer Report, op. cit., p. 5.
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precedent for application of Article 290 TFEU. Th e European Commission for 
example has stated that although the terminology may be the same, “the similarity 
of the criteria does not mean that they will be implemented in exactly the same way” and 
“[a]ny automatic duplication of precedents is therefore to be avoided”.[1] While there is 
little to be gained therefore in undertaking a subjective analysis of how the PRAC 
was used in practice,[2] the overall use of the PRAC is undoubtedly infl uential on 
the implementation of Article 290 TFEU.
Th ere are however several notable distinctions between Article 290 TFEU and 
the PRAC.
In terms of the “rights” accorded to the legislature under the PRAC, the 2006 
Comitology Decision only provided for a right of opposition (revocation was only 
available to the Council under the terms of ex Article 202 TEC). Under the 2006 
Decision, opposition was all or nothing — the European Parliament or the Council 
had to oppose the entire Commission proposal for delegated authority, even if 
only an aspect of the proposal was considered objectionable. Th is form of “blanket 
opposition” is set to continue under Article 290 TFEU delegations judging by the 
positions of the institutions. It is curious, however, as to why the institutions did 
not consider allowing for opposition to be targeted at aspects of proposed delegated 
acts, rather than having to defeat the entire proposal.
Furthermore, the right of opposition under the PRAC was also limited to three 
instances, where the Council or the European Parliament could oppose the Com-
mission proposal on the grounds that it: (1) exceeded the original scope of delegated 
authority; (2) infringed the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; and (3) 
was not consistent with the aim of delegation. 
In both the PRAC and Article 290 TFEU, the ability for the Council or the Euro-
pean Parliament to use a right of opposition is ex post. But in two cases under the 
PRAC, the Commission agreed to amend a proposed use of delegated authority 
at some point in the future based on a draft resolution of a European Parliament 
committee that had not yet been voted upon.[3] Although not quite an informal 
ex ante control on the use of delegated authority, should a similar practice emerge 
under Article 290 the effi  ciency of agreeing delegated acts could be improved. 
[1] COM(2009) 673 fi nal p. 3 and EU-note - E 33 of 19 April 2010, European Aff airs Committee, Folketing, http://www.
eu-oplysningen.dk/dokumenter/ft/euu/eunoter/2009_2010/33/ at p. 3
[2] For a subjective analysis of the PRAC, see HARDACRE, A. and DAMEN, M. The European Parliament and Comitology: PRAC in 
Practice, EIPAScope 2009/1, retrievable at: http://www.eipa.eu/fi les/repository/eipascope/20090709111448_Art2_Eipas-
coop2009_01.pdf, pp. 13-18.
[3] See HARDACRE, A. and DAMEN, M. op. cit. 
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A further distinction between the PRAC and Article 290 TFEU concerns the use 
of a PRAC Committee in Article 5a(1) of the Comitology Decision that would 
advise and assist the Commission in preparing proposals under delegated authority. 
Article 290 TFEU does not expressly allow for the creation of a similar mechanism 
(although see section 4 below on the future of comitology), meaning that unlike 
the situation under the PRAC where opposition to a Commission proposal from 
a PRAC Committee would trigger an “appeal” to the Council, no such system for 
appeals can exist under Article 290 TFEU.[1]
Although the Commission is likely to continue its standard practice of consult-
ing expert committees prior to making a formal proposal for a delegated act, such 
committees are unlikely to be required to take a formal vote on a Commission 
proposal, with agreement or opposition more likely to be reached by consensus or 
by a simple majority than in a vote by QMV. Th e informality of this new system 
raises questions as to how the expert committees will be composed in the future: 
will the Member States or the Commission nominate members of such commit-
tees, and will the European Parliament have any role in this regard? Declaration 
No 39 to the Lisbon Treaty indicated that where fi nancial services regulation is 
concerned, the expert committees are to continue to be composed of national 
experts (one per Member State), but standard practice in other areas of delegation 
may deviate from this example.
2.3. Impact on Current Acquis
Article 290 TFEU on delegated acts does not require any secondary legislation to 
give eff ect to its provisions and therefore became directly applicable with the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. While legislation adopted 
after this date can allow for the use of delegated acts under Article 290 TFEU, the 
existing acquis is to be adapted, where appropriate, on a case-by-case basis. Th is 
is especially the case for existing and proposed PRAC procedures. Th e Swedish 
Presidency of 2009 began the adaptation process, proposing the adjustment of four 
PRAC proposals in the areas of energy labelling; energy performance of buildings; 
intelligent transport systems; and animals used for scientifi c purposes. Existing 
Article 5a PRAC procedures are to be maintained pending a future alignment of 
the relevant basic legislative act to Article 290 TFEU.
[1] PONZANO, P., ‘Executive’ and ‘delegated’ acts: The situation after the Lisbon Treaty, in Griller, S. and ZILLER, J. (eds.), op. 
cit., p. 137.
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3. IMPLEMENTING ACTS
Article 291(3) TFEU most closely resembles the previous treaty basis for imple-
menting powers (ex Article 202 TEC) in that it allows for the continued use of 
comitology. Th e primary diff erence concerns the scope of Article 291 TFEU. 
Although not expressly stated, implementing acts are presumably intended for 
technical measures that are considered necessary for giving eff ect to “legally bind-
ing Union acts”. 
3.1. Defi nition and Scope
Article 291(1)TFEU states the general principle that Member States are primarily 
responsible for the implementation of Union law (as stated in Article 4 (3) TEU 
and as had been the case under ex Article 10 TEC). Where “uniform conditions” 
are required to harmonise implementation of “legally binding Union acts” however, 
the Commission is authorised to adopt implementing acts on the basis of Article 
291 TFEU, but subject to the overall control by the Member States.
As with the situation pre-Lisbon Treaty, Article 291 TFEU permits a situation 
where the Council may directly exercise implementing powers, but only in “duly 
justifi ed specifi c cases” and under Articles 24 and 26 TEU which relate to the 
implementation of the common foreign and security policy. Th is is slightly diff er-
ent from the situation under ex Article 202 TEC, which permitted the Council to 
reserve implementing powers to itself. Article 291(2) TFEU, however, contains 
a clause very similar to Article 290 (1) TFEU, in that authority for the adoption 
of implementing measures stems from a legal instrument as opposed to from an 
institution.
A further change to the pre-Lisbon Treaty form of comitology relates to where 
the responsibility for operating the comitology system is to lie. Under ex Article 
202 TEC, the Council was responsible for framing comitology, but Article 291(3) 
TFEU alters this and places the Member States in charge of controlling the 
Commission’s use of implementing acts. Th e change was presumably a neces-
sary one, as the traditional dominance of the Council could no longer justifi ably 
be maintained in a system where almost all legislative acts are adopted through 
co-decision with the European Parliament. Th erefore only national representa-
tives will remain in respect of Article 291 TFEU comitology thus excluding the 
possibility of “appeals” from comitology committees to the Council as had been 
the case under the Comitology Decision.
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3.2. The New Comitology Regulation
Th e current Comitology Decision (last amended in 2006) will be replaced by a comi-
tology regulation. Th e Commission released its draft regulation on 9 March 2010[1] 
and anticipates its adoption by October 2010. Th e major change from the previous 
comitology decisions is that under Article 291 TFEU, the European Parliament 
is equally responsible alongside the Council for shaping the overall framework 
that applies to comitology, whereas previously the Council held a monopoly over 
how comitology was structured, with the European Parliament’s role limited to 
delivering an opinion. Th e regulation will be adopted by a majority of votes cast 
in the European Parliament and by QMV in the Council (Article 291(3) TFEU 
removes national vetoes that had previously existed under ex Article 202 TEC, 
which required unanimity for the adoption of a comitology decision).
Th e draft comitology regulation proposes maintaining the advisory procedure from 
Article 3 of the Comitology Decision, while abolishing the management, regula-
tory and safeguard procedures (Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Comitology Decision). 
Th e regulatory procedure with scrutiny (Article 5a of the Comitology Decision) 
is replaced in substance by Article 290 TFEU, but its provisions continue in force 
until each basic legislative act that creates a PRAC has been adapted to Article 290 
TFEU (see section 2.3 above). In addition to maintaining the advisory procedure, 
the draft regulation adds a new “examination procedure” and an urgency procedure. 
As a result only three comitology systems will remain following the adoption of 
the Comitology Regulation.
3.2.1. Common Provisions
Article 3 of the draft regulation sets out common provisions to apply to all comitol-
ogy committees. As with the situation under the Comitology Decision, comitology 
committees will continue to be “composed of the representatives of the Member States 
and chaired by a representative of the Commission”. However, Article 3 (4) of the draft 
regulation expressly allows for an organic development of proposed implement-
ing acts within a comitology committee, to the extent that the Commission “may 
present amended versions of the draft measures in order to take into account the discus-
sions within the committee” until the committee has delivered its fi nal opinion. Th is 
represents a signifi cant increase in the powers of representatives of Member States 
in comitology committees, as representatives will now be in a position to directly 
seek amendments to Commission proposals for implementing measures.
[1] COM(2010) 83 fi nal.
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3.2.2. New Advisory Procedure
Th e advisory procedure (Article 4 of the draft regulation) is to be the standard 
procedure used in all situations where the examination or urgency procedures do 
not apply. It is identical to the advisory procedure from Article 3 of the Comitol-
ogy Decision, with the only diff erence being the ability of the Commission to 
amend its proposed implementing act during committee proceedings. As with the 
advisory procedure from Article 3 of the Comitology Decision, the new advisory 
procedure does not allow for a committee to “appeal” to the Council in case of a 
negative opinion on a proposed implementing act. Th is factor, coupled with the 
generalisation of the advisory procedure, represents a signifi cant gain in power for 
the European Commission, as the Commission will ultimately be free to decide 
whether to proceed with a proposed implementing act even in the event of a negative 
opinion from an advisory committee. In practice, the ability for representatives of 
Member States to seek changes to proposed implementing acts is likely to temper 
the Commission’s freedom.
3.2.3. Examination Procedure
Article 5 of the draft regulation creates a new comitology procedure called the 
“examination procedure”. According to Article 2 (2) of the draft regulation, an 
examination procedure may only be used for implementing measures of general 
scope or implementing measures relating to the common agricultural policy and 
the common fi sheries policy; environment, security and safety or protection of 
the health or safety of humans, animals or plants; and the common commercial 
policy. Th e defi nition of “implementing measures of general scope” is likely to cause 
diffi  culties, especially as the formula bears close similarities to Article 290’s “non-
legislative acts of general application”. 
In terms of practical functioning, the examination procedure operates as follows: the 
Commission proposes an implementing act to the examination committee, which 
then delivers its opinion to the Commission, if necessary by taking a vote by QMV; 
in the event of a positive opinion or should the committee deliver no opinion, the 
Commission is able to adopt the implementing act (unless exceptional or new 
circumstances make adoption unadvisable); in the event of a negative opinion, the 
Commission is unable to adopt the implementing act and must either resubmit 
the proposal to the committee for further deliberations, or propose an amended 
implementing act. As with the advisory procedure, the draft regulation does not 
provide for appeals to the Council from the committee in the event of a negative 
opinion, but in the examination procedure appeals arguably become redundant 
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since the committee’s negative opinion prevents the Commission from adopting 
a proposed implementing act. In exceptional circumstances where non-adoption 
of a proposed implementing measure “would create a signifi cant disruption of the 
markets or a risk for the security or safety of humans or for the fi nancial interests of the 
Union”, the Commission would be able to set aside a negative opinion from the 
examination committee and adopt the proposed implementing act, which then 
has a one-month “trial period” of operation, during which time the examination 
committee may oppose the continued application of the act. In this case the Com-
mission is required to repeal the act.
3.2.4. Urgency Procedure
A third and fi nal procedure — an urgency procedure — is provided for in Article 6 
of the draft regulation for implementing measures that the Commission believes 
should enter into force immediately on “imperative grounds of urgency”. In this 
case a comitology committee has an ability to oppose the adopted implementing 
act, in which case the Commission must repeal the act.
3.3. Comitology Decision and Draft Comitology Regulation Compared
Compared to the existing Comitology Decision, the draft comitology regulation 
aims to simplify the use of comitology by providing for a standard comitology 
system with two exceptions for implementing measures of general scope (and for 
implementing acts in a number of policy areas) and measures that require urgent 
application. While the regulation creates a form of comitology that is comparatively 
less complex than the system under the Comitology Decision, it is the institutional 
reform of comitology foreseen under Article 291 TFEU that is likely to require a 
culture change in the way in which the institutions approach comitology.
In this regard, the Council is likely to be the most aff ected by the changes. Article 291 
TFEU places comitology in the hands of the Member States, not the Council, which 
in practice means that national representatives will be responsible for operating the 
comitology system. But as the interests of the Member States and the Council evi-
dently align, it is unclear as to whether the Member States may informally use Council 
committees such as COREPER in the new comitology system. 
National representatives will be able to exert real power in comitology committees, 
for the fi rst time being able to block a proposed implementing act in the case of 
the examination procedure. In the interests of equality between the Council and 
the European Parliament, Article 291 TFEU has removed the Council’s privileged 
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position as an organ of appeal for decisions from certain classes of comitology 
committee. 
Th e Commission gains signifi cant powers of independent decision-making under 
Article 291 TFEU, being able to decide in the majority of cases (as a result of the 
generalisation of the advisory procedure) whether to proceed with an implement-
ing act.
Furthermore, the European Parliament loses its droit de regard provided for in 
Article 8 of the Comitology Decision, which the Commission correctly states to be 
“incompatible with Article 291”,[1] which provides for “control by the Member States of 
the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers”, with the role of the legislature left 
to framing the general conditions for comitology. Th e Commission does, however, 
state its intention to maintain a commitment to transparency by providing for the 
continued use of the existing Comitology Register[2] and by extending Article 15 
TFEU transparency rights to comitology proceedings.[3]
3.4. Impact on the Current Acquis
Unlike Article 290 TFEU, no implementing acts may be adopted on the basis of 
Article 291 TFEU until the new comitology regulation has entered into force. Until 
this date, the institutions have agreed an interim solution allowing a pro tempore 
continued application of the Comitology Decision.[4]
Once the Comitology Regulation enters into force, Article 10 of the draft regulation 
(should it be maintained in the fi nal version) proposes an automatic alignment of 
the acquis to its provisions, so that existing references in legislation to the Comi-
tology Decision (with the exception of Article 5a) will be interpreted as references 
to the relevant section of the Comitology Regulation. Th is process of alignment is 
planned to run for two months following the entry into force of the Comitology 
Regulation.
[1] COM(2010) 83 fi nal at p. 5. 
[2] Article 8 of the draft regulation. The Comitology Register is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomi-
tology/index.cfm.
[3] Article 7(2) of the draft regulation.
[4] Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the implementation of Article 
291 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.
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4. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE NEW SYSTEM
Th e rationale behind Articles 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU is to give eff ect to the 
previous de facto division of ex Article 202 TEC “implementing powers” into two 
distinct categories of acts, each with its own institutional rules and procedures, while 
at the same time reforming these institutional and procedural rules applicable to the 
quasi-legislative and implementing measures. While the Lisbon Treaty succeeded 
in providing distinct legal bases for each category in Articles 290 TFEU and 291 
TFEU, a number of issues remain open for interpretation.
4.1. What Separates “Delegated Acts” from “Implementing Acts”?
Article 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU are mutually exclusive in that an act of the Com-
mission in the exercise of powers conferred upon it by the legislature must either 
be a delegated or an implementing act. A basic legislative act, however, may only 
provide for conferral of such authority in general terms, leaving the choice as to 
whether to classify an act as delegated or implementing to the Commission when it 
makes its proposal. In theory, delegated acts are instruments that would normally 
lie in the domain of legislative power whereas implementing acts are instruments 
that would otherwise fall within the implementing powers of the Member States. 
However, the division between the two categories is not necessarily so clear-cut, 
and the institutions are likely to argue over undefi ned terms in Articles 290 TFEU 
and 291 TFEU.
Th e potential for interinstitutional disagreements in this regard has already been 
shown in the recast Industrial Emissions (Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control) draft directive. Here the Commission criticised the proposed legal basis 
for the use of delegated legislative authority according to the following formula: 
“the Commission does not share the views of the Council that Article 291 TFEU is 
the most appropriate legal basis for the adoption of the measures prescribed […]. Th ose 
measures are of general application and seek to supplement the basic act with certain 
new non-essential elements. As a result, their adoption should fall under the procedure 
of delegated acts (Article 290 TFEU)”.[1]
In the event of any serious diff erence of opinion between the institutions, it is 
foreseeable that the European Court of Justice will be called upon to adjudicate 
on the appropriate classifi cation of a proposed use of delegated authority. In such 
an eventuality it remains to be seen what criteria the Court will apply in order to 
[1] COM(2010) 67 fi nal of 23 February 2010 regarding 2007/0286 (COD).
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diff erentiate between delegated and implementing acts beyond the vague defi ni-
tions provided in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. A simple statement on its face that 
it is a delegated or an implementing act will not preclude a review of whether the 
proposed use of delegated legislative authority falls within the scope of Article 290 
TFEU or Article 291 TFEU.
This problem should ideally be resolved during the legislative process, as a 
basic legislative act is required to state whether (and on what conditions) it 
allows for delegated acts to be adopted and whether implementing powers 
are to be conferred on the Commission. A careful demarcation of such pow-
ers into Article 290 and 291 TFEU competences in a basic legislative act 
may avoid subsequent institutional spats when the Commission chooses to 
exercise this authority.
4.2. Interinstitutional Balance in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU
Th e comitology system under ex Article 202 TEC was often criticised for its 
perceived imbalances in power between the institutions. Th e Council held a 
privileged position in the old system, being able to set the terms and conditions 
in which delegated authority should be exercised. Despite a series of agree-
ments and comitology decisions that increased the role of the Commission 
and the European Parliament, the fact remained that the treaty rules foresaw a 
system led and shaped by the Council. Th e Lisbon Treaty instigates an entirely 
diff erent approach, one based on equality between the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament for the framing of comitology under Article 291 TFEU and 
for determining the conditions in which delegated acts may be adopted and 
policing their application under Article 290 TFEU. While the dominance 
of the Council has been superfi cially removed from the system, the fact that 
Member States gain a strong role under Article 291 TFEU means that the 
Council retains a de facto superiority over the European Parliament, despite 
the provisions of equality in the Treaty text. Th e European Commission also 
gains infl uence under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, which allow for greater 
autonomy in decision-making free from “appeals” to the Council or droits de 
regard from the European Parliament.
In addition to preparing to the new system, a number of committees of the 
European Parliament will have to adapt to their new powers under Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU. Th is is the case, for instance, concerning legislation adopted 
under the common agricultural policy, where delegated authority was author-
ised solely by the Council and which now must be adapted to take account 
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of the increased co-decision powers of the European Parliament.[1] Th e AGRI 
Committee has never had to deal with delegated authority in the fi eld of the 
CAP, but has already begun to prepare for its new role under Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU.
4.3. The Future of Comitology
In theory, nothing in Article 290 TFEU forbids the use of comitology as a form of 
control mechanism that could be created by the legislature in the context of policing 
the Commission’s use of delegated acts. Th e important point in this regard, how-
ever, is the opinion of the three key institutions — the Commission, the Council 
and the European Parliament — as to whether they consider a comitology should 
apply under Article 290 TFEU. Th e Swedish Presidency reported in December 
2009 that there was a consensus among Member States that the reintroduction 
of comitology would be “incompatible with the Treaty”.[2] But just as the original 
Rome Treaty did not expressly prohibit the use of the comitology system, nothing 
in the Lisbon Treaty expressly excludes its reintroduction as “method of control” 
under Article 290 (1) TFEU. However, the Member States have clearly made a 
decision not to use comitology under Article 290 TFEU delegations for the time 
being. Th e Council and the European Parliament stress the need for the Commis-
sion to make use of expert advisory committees (whose opinions are non-binding), 
a recommendation with which the Commission is almost certain to comply.[3] A 
special case is delegated acts in the fi eld of fi nancial services regulation (the Lam-
falussy process), where Declaration No 39 to the Lisbon Treaty requests that the 
Commission continue its practice of consulting national experts (i.e. individuals 
nominated by national governments and not the Commission). Th e Council, 
however, is of the view that expert committees should henceforth be composed of 
one representative per Member State, whereas normally the Commission selects 
the members of expert advisory committees. Th eir “nationalisation” may be a side 
eff ect of the removal of comitology for delegated acts. 
Article 291 TFEU on the other hand expressly provides for the continued use of 
comitology, but its scope will only reach to implementing acts. Th e Commission’s 
proposed regulation succeeds in simplifying the procedures used in comitology, but 
[1] Draft Opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (2010/0051(COD)) of 25 March 2010 by 
rapporteur Paolo DE CASTRO.
[2] Report by the Presidency to COREPER on the implementation of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU (Delegated acts and 
implementing measures) of 2 December 2009; Annex of INST 209 at p. 3.
[3] PONZANO, P. “‘Executive’ and ‘delegated’ acts: The situation after the Lisbon Treaty”, in GRILLER, S. and ZILLER, J. (eds.) 
The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Vienna, Springer-Verlag Wien, 2008), p. 136.
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the generalisation of the advisory committee has the eff ect of giving greater powers 
of decision-making to the European Commission without any checks and balances 
from the legislature or from the Member States. Th e examination and urgency 
procedures which allow for greater scrutiny by the Member States (but not by the 
legislature) have a limited scope of application, meaning that in most future cases 
under comitology, implementing measures will be adopted by the Commission. 
National representatives in advisory committees are able to voice an opinion (which 
may lead to amendment of the initial proposal by the European Commission), but 
lack a formal power of veto, which is a power reserved for examination committees 
only. Th e Commission’s proposed regulation is currently being considered by the 
Council and the European Parliament, which are expected to adopt the Comitol-
ogy Regulation before the end of 2010.
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Th e Treaty of Lisbon introduced a major innovation to the decision-making mecha-
nism of the European Union. Th e national parliaments collectively have been 
equipped with a de facto power to veto European Commission legislative proposals 
before they are subject to adoption by the two legislative bodies, i.e. the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Th e cooperation between the national 
parliaments has over twenty years of history. Th e new “yellow” and “orange” card 
procedure aims to ensure respect for the subsidiary principle. Depending on how 
it is used, it could become a major obstacle in the European decision-making, but 
at the same time it could strengthen the European Union’s democratic legitimacy. 
Th erefore, the main questions are: if the national parliaments will use this new 
instrument; and if so, how — technically, but mainly in what policy fi elds — will 
they use it?
1. INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION BEFORE 1 DECEMBER 2009
Th e cooperation between national parliaments was initiated in the 1980s in the 
aftermath of the fi rst direct elections to the European Parliament held in 1979. 
Initially the dialogue was conducted purely on an ad hoc basis. In 1989 the inter-
parliamentary “Conference of Community and European Aff airs Committees” 
(COSAC) was established. Its existence was confi rmed by the introduction of a 
Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). From 
the very fi rst meeting of national parliaments the issue has been how to increase 
national parliamentary control of EU aff airs.
COSAC enables a regular exchange of information, best practices and views on 
European Union matters between European Aff airs Committees of national par-
liaments and the European Parliament. It holds meetings twice a year, where each 
parliament is represented by six members. Th e presidency of COSAC is linked to 
the rotating Presidency of the Council. 
Apart from COSAC, the framework of the inter-parliamentary cooperation includes 
other formats, such as the Conference of Speakers of the European Union Parlia-
ments, which meets annually. Th e President of the European Parliament takes part 
in those meetings. Th e Conference adopts rules of procedure for inter-parliamentary 
cooperation. In addition there are the regular meetings of the representatives of 
national parliaments to the EU (Monday Morning Meetings, MMM), the Joint 
Parliamentary Meetings on topics of common interest between the national parlia-
mentarians and the members of the European Parliament, as well as the meetings 
of sectoral committees. Th e primary tool aimed at facilitating the cooperation is 
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the Inter-parliamentary EU Information Exchange (IPEX)[1]. It is a platform for 
the electronic exchange of EU-related information between national parliaments 
in the Union.
Th e Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union attached to 
the Treaty of Amsterdam provided for the establishment of an information exchange 
between the European institutions and national parliaments. Th e Commission 
was mandated to send all its consultation documents to the national parliaments 
(Article 1 of the Protocol) and its legislative documents could be forwarded to the 
national parliaments by the national governments — yet there was no obligation 
to do so (Article 2 of the Protocol). Th rough COSAC the national parliaments 
could scrutinize the subsidiarity principle and inform the Commission, Council 
and the Parliament about their position (Article 6 of the Protocol). Th ey could also 
examine any legislative proposal or initiative in the area of freedom, security and 
justice, which might have a direct impact on the rights and freedoms of individuals 
and send their comments to the Commission, Council and the Parliament (Article 
5 of the Protocol). 
Th e Amsterdam Treaty signifi ed a formal recognition of the right of national parlia-
ments to be engaged in the European process. National parliaments were not the 
only consultative body, as there were also the Committee of the Regions (CoR) or 
the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). If Amsterdam levelled the 
powers of national parliaments (through COSAC) with those of EESC or CoR, 
the Convention on the Future of Europe and the subsequent Inter-Governmental 
Conferences have changed this dynamics considerably. 
Th e composition of the Convention on the Future of Europe (2001-2003) was 
organised in an original way. Th e body included — as full members — representa-
tives of national parliaments alongside representatives of the European Commis-
sion, the European Parliament and the national governments. Th is has had an 
important consequence: the negotiated draft Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe created the “yellow” card procedure. It provided the national parlia-
ments with a possibility of initiating a procedure to withdraw a Commission’s 
legislative proposal before it is considered by the Parliament and the Council. 
Th e collapse of the draft Constitution and the emergence of the Treaty of Lisbon 
did not reverse the trend of strengthening the position of national parliaments 
vis-à-vis the existing treaties. It gave the national parliaments two more weeks 
[1] IPEX’s website is www.ipex.eu. 
111
National Parliaments & Subsidiarity Check: A New Actor in Town
to consider using the subsidiarity check. More importantly, it also established a 
stronger “orange” card procedure.
2. PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF LISBON
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the main task of the national parliaments’ 
engagement in the European decision-making process is to “contribute actively to 
the good functioning of the Union” (Art. 12 TEU). Th e main instrument to deliver 
on this is the new clause on the subsidiarity check. More specifi cally, the Treaty 
provides for the following forms of engagement of national parliaments:
Article 12 of the Treaty on the European Union ensures that the national • 
parliaments have access to all draft legislative acts of the Union. It establishes 
the subsidiarity checks and provides for specifi c engagement of national 
parliaments in the area of freedom, security and justice, such as the politi-
cal monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities. Th e 
national parliaments are also involved in the revision procedures of the Trea-
ties and are fully informed about the accession applications. It also confi rms 
the inter-parliamentary cooperation between national Parliaments and with 
the European Parliament.
Protocol No. 1 on the role of national parliaments establishes a procedure, • 
in which the Commission directly informs the national parliaments about 
its non-legislative and legislative proposals, including the annual legisla-
tive programme. Other actors with legislative powers also send their draft 
legislative proposals to the national parliaments. Th e national parliaments 
then have eight weeks to react to those proposals before the legislative 
process begins. 
Protocol No. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and propor-• 
tionality establishes the rules of the subsidiarity check by national parliaments. 
If there is a suspicion of a breach of the subsidiary principle, each national 
parliament, or each chamber of a national parliament, has eight weeks to 
communicate to the Presidents of the European Commission, European 
Council and the Council the reasons why it considers that a given draft does 
not respect the principle of subsidiarity. Regional parliaments with legislative 
powers can also be consulted. Th ere are two procedures which may follow 
such a subsidiarity objection:
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“Yellow” card [Art. 7 (2) of the Protocol]: if a third of European national  °
parliaments (2 votes per country, 1 vote per chamber in bicameral sys-
tems) considers there to be a breach of the subsidiarity principle, a given 
draft legislation needs to be reviewed (a fourth in the justice, freedom 
and security area). Th e Commission — or any other legislative initiator 
for that matter — does not have to formally withdraw its proposal and 
can keep the original proposal in place. However, it will need to explain 
its decision. It will do so in the form of a Communication. 
“Orange” card [Art. 7 (3) of the Protocol]: should there be more than  °
half of the national parliaments fi nding a breach of the subsidiary prin-
ciple (but only in policy areas subject to the ordinary legislative proce-
dure) and the Commission still wants to proceed with the unchanged 
text, then the national parliaments’ opinions (“why the proposal breaches 
the subsidiarity principle”) and the Commission’s reasoned opinion 
(“why the proposal respects the subsidiarity principle”) are transmitted 
to the Union legislators. Th e European Parliament and the Council 
will need to take a decision on the presence (or not) of a subsidiarity 
breach before dealing with the proposal itself. Th e Parliament decides 
by a majority of votes cast on the issue. Th e Council requires a 55% 
majority of votes to decide there is a subsidiary breach. If any of them 
shares the opinion of the national parliaments — then the legislative 
proposal shall not be processed. Th e Court of Justice of the European 
Union exercises a degree of oversight over the application of the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity (Art. 8 of the Protocol). 
Th e national parliaments also gained the power to veto the application of the • 
general passerelle clause [Art. 48 (7) TEU]. Th is clause can be used to change 
the decision-making mechanism in the Council from unanimity to majority 
voting or to change the special legislative procedure to an ordinary one (i.e. 
give greater oversight of a policy to the European Parliament). Such a deci-
sion can only be taken by a unanimous vote within the European Council. 
However, any national parliamentary chamber has an individual veto power 
within the six months following the proposal. Th e same procedure applies to 
the specifi c passerelle clause in Art. 81(3) TFEU which allows the Council to 
move from a special to the ordinary legislative procedure in respect of meas-
ures for judicial cooperation in civil matters concerning family law and with 
cross-border implications. Here as well any individual national parliamentary 
chamber can veto the decision within six months. 
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3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Before an overall estimation of the likely impact of this involvement of the national 
parliaments on the EU decision-making process can be made, a few elements await 
further clarifi cation. First, the Protocol does not include a precise defi nition of 
subsidiarity. Such a defi nition could be worked out by the national parliaments 
themselves and communicated to the Commission — so that it knows more pre-
cisely what to respect.
Second, there is a lack of clarity regarding the potential procedures for monitoring 
subsidiarity in the later stages of negotiations when the draft law enters the decision-
making process in the Parliament and the Council. Th is remains uncertain even 
in respect of the Commission’s own amendments. One monitoring device which 
will surely be available is the right to challenge EU laws in front of the European 
Court of Justice on the basis of a breach of the subsidiarity principle (Art. 8 of the 
Protocol No 2).
Th ird, the role of regional parliaments with legislative powers still needs to be clari-
fi ed. It may constitute a major challenge for some national parliaments to meet 
the eight week deadline, or even to be able to scrutinise the impact correctly. Th is 
seems particularly important for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
and the United Kingdom dealing with such regional actors.
Despite these unknowns, a couple of likely implications of this new procedure can 
already be identifi ed. For one, it seems that, the new procedure will have a limited 
impact on the length of the legislative procedure in the European Union. Th e time 
for the national parliaments to react to legislative proposals has been extended from 
the previous six weeks to eight weeks. Th e only potential major time delay would 
fl ow from the use of the passerelle clauses — where the decision would be delayed 
by six months before coming into force.
Secondly, the Treaty might in fact empower certain parliamentary chambers 
beyond what is laid down in their national constitution. Indeed, the Treaty does 
not foresee any diff erentiation between national parliamentary chambers (in 
the bicameral systems) and treats them as equal regardless of their functions or 
powers: “In the case of a bicameral Parliamentary system, each of the two chambers 
shall have one vote” (Article 7 of Protocol 2). In many countries, however, the 
second chamber has limited — often specifi c — functions. Th erefore, in some 
cases the Lisbon Treaty might in fact have empowered the chambers beyond the 
national constitutions. 
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4. THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
4.1. The Try-Outs
Th e Treaty says that the national parliaments have eight weeks — in case a sub-
sidiarity breach is suspected — to communicate this information to the EU insti-
tutions. Th e implementation question is thus how the national parliaments will 
organise themselves for this subsidiarity check. Unlike certain other preparations 
for the changes to be introduced upon the entry into force of the new Treaty, the 
national parliaments’s preparatory activities were not suspended after the fi rst Irish 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008.
Between 2005 and 2009 COSAC has conducted eight “subsidiarity checks” — try-
outs of the incoming system aimed at verifying the national parliaments’ capacity 
and dedication to make the new system work.[1] It also served as an occasion for 
exchange of ideas and to familiarise the national parliamentarians as well as national 
parliaments’ services with the “yellow” and “orange” card procedures. In short, 
twice a year during its meetings COSAC took decisions to carry out an exercise on 
the application of the subsidiarity clause. Th e national parliaments examined the 
Commission’s legislative programme and selected (“fl ag”) those elements in the 
legislative plan, which could potentially contradict the subsidiarity principle. Th e 
moment the Commission put forward a legislative proposal previously preselected 
as potentially breaching the principle, the COSAC secretariat would initiate the 
consultation process. For the purpose of the exercise only two legislative proposals 
were selected every year. Even if the offi  cial deadline was eight weeks, in reality 
the national parliaments had more time to act — it is the national parliaments’ 
interpretation that time starts running from the moment the offi  cial proposal is 
available in all EU offi  cial languages.[2] Th e checks are to be carried out by national 
Parliaments according to their own laws and procedures.
[1] More information on the exercise is available at http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/earlywarning/ [accessed on 
5 May 2010].
[2] The XXXVIII COSAC has asked in October 2007 in its Contribution to the EU Institutions for a clarifi cation of Article 6 
of Protocol No 2 to the Treaty on European Union (Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Pro-
portionality) to the eff ect that the timeframe of eight weeks for the subsidiarity check should begin only when a draft 
legislative act has been transmitted to national parliaments in all the offi  cial languages of the Union, Contribution of 
the XXXVIII COSAC, point 1.5; http://www.cosac.eu/en/meetings/Lisbon2007/plenary.
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Table 1. Subsidiarity Checks organised by COSAC 2005-2009[1]
T
ry-out
 (draft legislative proposal):
T
im
eline
N
o. of participating 
Parliam
entary C
ham
bers
N
o. of participating States
N
o. of breaches found 
(per cham
ber)
N
o. of V
otes
 (2 votes per cham
ber 
in unicam
eral parliam
ents)
1.  3rd Railway Package Mar-Apr 2005 31/37 22/25 14/37 15/50 
(EU-25)
2.  Regulation on the applicable 
law and jurisdiction in divorce 
matters
Jul-Sep 2006 10/37 9/25 4/37 5/50
3.  Directive on postal services Nov-Dec 2006 10/37 9/25 1/37 2/50
4.  Framework Decision on 
combating terrorism
Dec 2007-
Jan 2008
25/40 20/27 1/40 1/54
5.  Directive implementing the 
principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of 
religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation
Jul-Sep 2008 17/40 15/27 1/40 2/54
6.  Directive on on standards 
of quality and safety of 
human organs intended for 
transplantation
Dec 2008-
Feb 2009
27/40 20/27 1/40 1/54
7.  Framework Decision on the right 
to interpretation and translation 
in criminal proceedings
Jul-Sep 2009 21/40 17/27 3/40 5/54
8.  Regulation on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and 
authentic instruments in matters 
of succession and the creation 
of a European Certifi cate of 
Succession
Oct-Dec 2009 36/40 25/27 1/40 1/54
[1] More information on all subsidiarity checks is available at http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/earlywarning/. 
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Each of the national parliamentary chambers had the choice whether or not to 
participate in the try-outs. Th ey were asked to provide information only if they con-
sidered there to be a breach of the subsidiarity principle. Th ey were also instructed 
to scrutinize the proposals solely on the basis of the subsidiarity and not the propor-
tionality principle. Th e last check ended after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force; 
35 out of 40 national parliamentary chambers participated in the exercise within 
the deadline, three parliaments failed to meet the deadline. Clearly, the national 
parliaments have the capacity to trigger the subsidiarity control break should they 
consider it necessary. In these pilot projects, every participating chamber had to 
examine:
if it wanted to participate in the exercise;• 
how the legislative draft would be processed in the chamber :• 
what the role of the European committee was; °
what the role of the specialised committees was; °
whether the fi nal decision should be taken by the plenary or by a  °
committee;
if there was a need to consult regional parliaments;• 
if the breach existed.• 
4.2. Application of the Procedure
Following the pilot projects, the national parliaments are now organising them-
selves. If the meeting of the eight week deadline is to be taken seriously, some sort 
of organisation will be necessary. At its 43rd meeting in Madrid in May/June 2010, 
COSAC has decided to terminate the subsidiarity check try-outs, although these 
checks may be conducted on an ad hoc basis on the proposal of a rotating Presi-
dency.[1] Th e cooperation between national parliaments will not be harmonised 
top-down, but rather the Conference “urged national parliaments to intensify their 
use of IPEX and other forms of cooperation in order to provide mutual information 
concerning their respective activities and standpoints”.[2]
In practice this means that the coordination will be loose. Th e procedure will look 
as follows: each chamber of the national parliaments will receive a draft legislative 
proposal from the Commission and will initiate (or not) its own procedure. If it 
decides to scrutinise the draft law, it will transmit its opinion to the Commission. 
Th e Commission has proven to be open to cooperation with national parliaments 
[1] Conclusions of the XLIII COSAC, http://www.cosac.eu/en/meetings/Madrid2010/ordinary.doc/conclus.pdf. 
[2] Ibid., point 1.5.
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going beyond the subsidiarity checks and welcomes also non-subsidiarity related 
comments since the so-called Barroso Initiative in 2006.[1]
What is important is that each chamber will initiate the procedure individually. 
When doing so, it will inform other national chambers through IPEX. A problem 
might occur if the subsidiarity control were to be conducted on a constant basis by 
a few national chambers only, and the other chambers would look into the issue 
merely if a breach were to be found by the “initiators”. Here, a timing problem 
might arise — that is, if a chamber which regularly scrutinizes all proposals suddenly 
“discovers” a breach, there might simply be insuffi  cient time for other parliaments 
to complete their scrutiny before the expiration of the term. 
Other procedural factors will also impact upon the feasibility of the deadline. 
Th e deadline of eight weeks will be suspended for the month of August. In many 
parliaments the fi nal decision on a subsidiarity breach can be taken only by the 
full plenary or after many consultations with specialists committees. In some cases, 
however, the general European committees can take legally binding positions on 
behalf of the entire chamber. In certain Member States information on the posi-
tion of the government on the issue might be required. In bicameral systems the 
cooperation between parliamentary chambers is envisaged. Finally, in countries 
where regional parliaments have legislative powers — it is up to a given Member 
State to determine the domestic procedure in such a way that the opinion could 
be provided within eight weeks.
5. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW SYSTEM
Th e more signifi cant question concerns the impact of the new subsidiarity control 
mechanism on the decision-making of the European Union. Clearly, the primary 
function of the mechanism is to challenge the European Commission to improve 
its subsidiarity analysis. In the worst-case scenario, the Commission could become 
paralysed and all its proposals could be challenged by the national chambers. In 
the best case scenario, if the national parliaments initiate the procedure but do 
not fi nd any breach of the subsidiarity clause, the Commission’s position could 
be strengthened vis-à-vis the European Parliament and the Council. In any case, 
the national parliaments cannot stay ignorant and need to perform their task to 
scrutinize the draft European legislation. Th e already observable trend of increasing 
[1] In 2009 alone, the Commission received 250 opinions from national parliaments on draft legislative proposals, 
Annual Report 2009 on relations between the European Commission and National Parliaments, COM(2010)291 fi nal, Brus-
sels, 2 June 2010.
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communication between the Commission and national parliaments (200 opinions 
of national parliaments sent to the Commission in 2008 and 250 in 2009) might 
suggest a growing awareness in some of the national parliaments about the pos-
sibilities of infl uencing the EU decision-making process at an earlier stage.
Th is primary “negative” control function could have also other consequences. First, 
should the new mechanism become more centralized in the future (and, to a large 
extent, the ad hoc organization is left in the hands of rotating Presidencies), it could 
generate a Mr. or Ms. “NO” — speaker(s) of the parliament from the country 
holding the rotating EU Presidency (who normally leads the inter-parliamentary 
activities) to use the “shadow of the subsidiarity check” in the political debate. 
Second, the nature of the relationship between the national governments and their 
national parliaments varies greatly across the EU. Th ere might be cases where parlia-
ments are working in political unison with their governments; hence there would 
be a risk of governments using the new mechanism to achieve political objectives 
(or to delay or even derail the process). 
Th ird, most likely a new dynamic will arise and the much larger involvement of the 
national parliaments could contribute to enhancing the legitimacy of the adopted 
laws. Th ere would be less room for political anti-Brussels accusations, as politically 
the national parliaments would now be co-responsible for the European legislation 
not only in the transposition phase, but also in the drafting of the original laws. 
Th is might stimulate a genuine public debate on the Commission’s proposals in 
many member countries. 
6. CONCLUDING QUESTIONS
Th e role of national parliaments in the system is not an exclusively negative one. 
Th ey should also contribute constructively to the “good functioning” of the Union. 
Th eir negative empowerment gives the national parliaments a power-bargaining 
position. With time, when the mechanism settles in and, potentially, the feeling of 
co-responsibility becomes more widely shared among the national parliamentar-
ians — this instrument could in fact also contribute to the constructive engagement 
of the national parliaments.
Only time will tell whether the new instruments (subsidiarity check, but also the 
citizens’ initiative) will be employed as genuine new tools in the law-making process, 
or whether they will mainly serve as political instruments in the hands of political 
actors. In other words, will we witness national parliaments’ vetoes on European 
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draft legislations, or will we rather observe the use of the new mechanism as leverage 
in the political bargaining process (shadow of a subsidiarity check)? 
Th e appetite for engagement in the European decision-making process is reason-
ably high among at least some of the national parliaments. Th ey have the capacity 
to act and seem to have the political motivation to remain alert in looking for 
subsidiarity breaches. Th ere seems to be a feeling among the national parliaments 
that the subsidiarity check does not suffi  ce and that they should be able to scrutinize 
draft legislation beyond those confi nes. Th e problem is, however, that their greater 
negative empowerment could further complicate the already complex European 
decision-making mechanisms. One idea fl oated among the national parliamentar-
ians is to provide for greater involvement of national parliaments in the European 
foreign policy making. Th ere are, however, very diff erent traditions among the 
Member States with regard to the role accorded to national parliaments in this 
fi eld. Another idea is to require the Commission to substantiate its responses to 
the opinions sent by national parliaments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Th e uneasy relationship between the EU and its citizens has informed the debates 
on European integration since at least the early 1990s. For many citizens, the Union 
is a distant, bureaucratic apparatus that lacks appropriate institutional structures for 
democratic input. Bemoaning their inability to participate in and infl uence the EU’s 
decision-making process, people feel like objects rather than sovereign subjects of 
European politics. Th e negative outcomes of successive referenda on EU Treaties, 
and the decline in support for European integration and trust in EU institutions 
documented by opinion polls and voter turnout at European Parliament elections, 
are all seen as signs of public apathy and growing estrangement.
Th ese trends have increased awareness that the gap between the EU and its public 
challenges the success of the European project. Th e Laeken Declaration of 2001 
refl ected this idea by stating that “within the Union, the European institutions must 
be brought closer to its citizens.”[1] To this end, the Lisbon Treaty, which came into 
force on 1 December 2009, introduces inter alia the opportunity for greater inter-
action between the EU and its people by means of the so-called citizens’ initiative. 
Th is instrument allows more than one million citizens from a “signifi cant” number 
of Member States to invite the European Commission to submit a legislative pro-
posal within the “framework of its powers” and “for the purpose of implementing the 
Treaties” (Art. 11 TEU).
Th e vague formulation of the Treaty’s provisions on the citizens’ initiative left many 
issues unsettled with regard to the actual implementation of the new instrument. 
Seeking to clarify how it should work in practice, the European Parliament adopted 
on 9 May 2009 a resolution calling upon the Commission to submit a proposal for 
a regulation on the citizens’ initiative, as soon as the Treaty of Lisbon had entered 
into force.[2] On 11 November 2009, the Commission launched a public consulta-
tion to accompany its Green Paper[3] on the European citizens’ initiative. Bearing 
in mind the signifi cance of the new instrument and the complexities surrounding 
its implementation, the consultation elicited hundreds of replies from a wide range 
of stakeholders across Europe and ended with a public hearing on 22 February 
2010 in Brussels. Drawing on the suggestions made by civil society, the Commis-
sion eventually presented on 31 March 2010 its proposal for a regulation of the 
[1] European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001: Annex I: Laeken declaration on the 
future of the European Union, in Bulletin of the European Union, No. 12, 2001, p. 20.
[2] European Parliament resolution of 7 May 2009 requesting the Commission to submit a proposal for a regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the citizens’ initiative, P6_TA(2009)0389.
[3] Green Paper on a European Citizens’ Initiative, COM(2009)622.
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European Parliament and the Council on the citizens’ initiative.[1] In June 2010 
the Council agreed on its general approach proposing certain amendments to the 
Commission’s original draft. At the time of writing (July 2010) the ball was in 
the European Parliament’s court, and a fi nal decision was expected till the end of 
2010 or early 2011.
Th e present paper scrutinises in the fi rst section the Commission’s draft regulation 
on the implementation of the citizens’ initiative as well as the Council’s proposed 
changes to it, and refl ects in the second part on a number of more substantial 
implications that the new instrument is likely to have in practice.
2. SCRUTINISING THE TECHNICAL DETAILS
In laying down the ground rules of operation, the Commission’s proposal for a 
regulation on the citizens’ initiative seeks to incorporate the suggestions and requests 
made during the public consultation procedure following two guiding principles. 
First, the conditions should ensure that citizens’ initiatives are “representative of 
a Union interest”. Second, the procedures should be “simple” and “user-friendly”, 
whilst “preventing fraud or abuse” and avoiding “unnecessary administrative bur-
dens”. In other words, the Commission’s draft regulation looks to balance the 
accessibility of the citizens’ initiative against the need to ensure the integrity of 
the new system.
Th e Commission’s proposal specifi es inter alia the minimum number of Member 
States, the minimum number of signatories per State, the registration and admis-
sibility rules, the rules for the collection of support statements, the rules for the 
verifi cation and authentication of signatories, the guidelines for the Commission’s 
response, and introduces a review clause.
2.1. Minimum Number of Member States
Th e EU Treaty requires that a citizens’ initiative be supported in a “signifi cant 
number” of Member States but fails to specify the concrete number. Th e Commis-
sion’s draft regulation stipulates that the one million signatories must come from 
one third of the European Union’s members — i.e. 9 countries in the present EU 
composition of 27 States. Th is threshold is consistent with other provisions of the 
Lisbon Treaty, insofar as one third of EU members is also required to trigger the 
[1] Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Citizens’ Initiative, COM(2010)119. 
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fl exibility instrument of enhanced cooperation or the subsidiarity procedure (in the 
latter case, one third of the votes of national parliaments is required).
As such, the Commission has disregarded suggestions put forward by some stake-
holders during the public consultation procedure to lower the threshold to the 
level of, for instance, one quarter of Member States. Th e Commission’s choice 
refl ects its intention to guarantee that citizens’ initiatives are supported in a large 
number of EU countries and that the new instrument fosters transnational debate 
and interaction.
2.2. Minimum Number of Signatories per Member State
“Successful” citizens’ initiatives need to be backed by a minimum number of 
signatories in at least one third of Member States. To relax concerns that a fi xed 
percentage for all Member States, independent of the size of their population, 
would not be equitable, the Commission proposes that the number of signato-
ries be “degressively proportional” to the population of every EU country. More 
precisely, the minimum number of citizens from each country is calculated by 
multiplying the number of MEPs per EU member with the constant 750, which 
refl ects the composition of the European Parliament agreed in the context of the 
2007 Intergovernmental Conference. Th us, for example, the minimum number of 
signatories in Luxembourg is set at 4.500 — i.e. 6 x 750 — whereas in Germany 
at 72.000, i.e. 96 x 750. Th e exact numbers per EU country are listed in an Annex 
of the draft regulation.
Th is formula grants larger States a lower and smaller EU countries a higher threshold 
in terms of their population percentage. In the four biggest EU Member States — 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy — the minimum number of 
signatories comes to about 0.09 per cent of each country’s total population. In the 
case of the three smallest EU members — Malta, Luxembourg, and Cyprus — the 
minimum number amounts to 1.1 per cent (Malta), 0.9 per cent (Luxembourg), 
and 0.5 per cent (Cyprus) of their national population respectively.
Th e system of degressive proportionality is deemed more equitable because it 
encourages the organisers of citizens’ initiatives to give consideration to both big 
and small States in their eff orts to meet the required thresholds. In a proportional 
or fi xed percentage mechanism, which would apply the same percentage in every 
EU country, organisers would have had to collect substantially more signatories in 
larger and much less statements of support in smaller States. Th erefore, organisers 
could have been tempted to concentrate their eff orts in a very limited number of 
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big EU countries in order to secure a high percentage of the required one million 
statements of support from there. To arrive then at the minimum number of 
Member States needed (i.e. nine in the EU27), they would have had to gather less 
signatories in smaller countries on the basis of a proportional or fi xed percentage 
mechanism. Conversely, the system of degressive proportionality proposed by the 
Commission’s draft regulation discourages such cunning use of the citizens’ initia-
tive, because it raises the threshold in terms of percentage for small(er) countries 
well above the one for big(ger) EU States.
2.3. Rules for the Registration and Admissibility of Citizens’ Initiatives
At the start of the process, organisers need to register a citizens’ initiative. As widely 
requested, the draft regulation provides for the online registration of any proposed 
initiative on a website made available by the Commission. Th e registration of initia-
tives can be done in any of the EU’s offi  cial languages and before any evidence of 
support from citizens has been gathered. Th e organisers of an initiative will have 
to provide information about the title of the proposed initiative (100 characters), 
the subject matter (200 characters), the objectives of their proposal (500 charac-
ters), the legal base of the Treaties which would allow the Commission to act, and 
information about the sources of funding and support for the proposed initiative 
at the time of registration (Annex II).
In addition, the Commission specifi es two registration criteria. Th e fi rst seeks to 
ensure that proposals, which are “abusive or devoid of seriousness”, are immediately 
removed. Th e draft regulation does not clarify the exact procedure for evaluating 
a proposal against this condition. However, it seems likely that this check would 
not require a high-level political decision in the Commission but could rather be 
done in a straightforward manner. Th e second criterion indicates that the Com-
mission, which is explicitly mentioned in this context, shall reject initiatives that 
are “manifestly against the values of the Union”. In this case, the decision on the 
appropriateness or exclusion of certain citizens’ initiatives will have to be taken 
either by the College of Commissioners or some delegated authority acting on its 
behalf. If an initiative is rejected, the organisers arguably have the right to challenge 
the Commission’s decision in an appeal to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or 
appeal to the European Ombudsman, albeit this option is not explicitly specifi ed 
in the draft regulation.
Th e Commission’s proposal introduces also an admissibility check, which is not 
mentioned in the EU Treaty. After having collected 300.000 signatories in at 
least three Member States, the organisers of a citizens’ initiative shall submit to 
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the Commission a request for a decision on the admissibility of their initiative. 
Th e Commission must decide then within 2 months (a) whether the proposed 
initiative concerns a matter where “a legal act of the Union can be adopted for the 
purpose of implementing the Treaties”; and (b) if it “falls within the framework of the 
powers of the Commission to make a proposal”. Th e Council has proposed lowering 
this threshold from 300.000 to 100.000 signatories, and giving the Commission 
three months instead of two to complete the check.
One could argue that 300.000 or even 100.000 signatories are rather high thresholds 
in absolute terms. But the introduction of the admissibility check, whatever its fi nal 
level, has two practical advantages. On the one hand, it can help reduce the bureau-
cratic burden of the Commission, as it releases it from the obligation to “check” 
every single initiative registered. On the other hand, it provides the organisers with 
the opportunity of receiving a timely answer on the admissibility of their initiative, 
thereby avoiding the frustration that would have likely accompanied a potential 
rejection after at least one million statements of support had been gathered.
2.4. Rules for the Collection of Support Statements
Th e Commission proposal lays down a number of rules concerning the collection 
of signatories. Although civil society representatives asked for at least 18 months, 
the Commission’s proposal gives organisers 12 months after the date of registra-
tion to arrive at a minimum of one million supporters. In line with respective 
demands from civil society, the Commission sets no restrictions on how statements 
of support should be collected and explicitly allows online endorsement from the 
outset — presumably on websites set-up and operated by the initiators of the 
proposals. Adding to the Commission’s draft, the Council compels organisers to 
certify the online collection system used before they can start collecting statements 
of support electronically.
Th e online collection of support statements will certainly facilitate the accumulation 
of signatories to meet the required thresholds. However, it might prove sensible 
in the future, especially after users have gained some experience with the new 
instrument, to cap the collection of signatories in “cyberspace” to a certain maxi-
mum number of support statements in order to promote active deliberation and 
campaigning within Member States and throughout the EU concerning any of the 
issues at hand. Cultivating a pan-European exchange of ideas and views in the “real 
world” about EU issues was after all part of the rationale behind the introduction 
of the citizens’ initiative as well as an important prerequisite for promoting in the 
long-run the emergence of a European public sphere.
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2.5. Rules for the Verifi cation and Authentication of Signatories
Th e Commission does not propose any specifi c and collective rules concerning 
the verifi cation and authentication of statements of support. Th e draft regula-
tion merely specifi es that each Member State must check their own national 
signatories within 3 months — even if the statements of support were dispensed 
in a diff erent country. Deviating from the Commission’s proposal, the Council 
has suggested that the country of residence of the signatories should also be 
allowed to verify statements of support, unless the identifi cation document 
provided by the supporter was issued in a diff erent Member State (non-EU 
residents are not considered as the Lisbon Treaty explicitly refers to citizens 
who are “nationals”).
Both proposals might reduce the administrative burden for Member States that 
already have a system in place for such instruments. However, the absence of clear 
and standard rules for all EU countries could prove problematic for three reasons. 
First, without specifi c and collective rules, discrepancies in national practices stand 
to exacerbate the operation of a citizens’ initiative from the organiser’s perspec-
tive. Th e coordinator(s) of any initiative will have to submit the collected state-
ments of support for verifi cation in the Member States from where the signatories 
originate — either by virtue of citizenship or residence. As a consequence, the 
organiser(s) will have to become familiar with the diff erent national procedures and 
authentication bureaus. While such credentials may not pose major problems to 
experienced and well-organised actors, they could discourage ordinary citizens or 
small national NGOs from attempting to use the instrument. Second, the lack of 
standard rules for all Member States might make the verifi cation and authentica-
tion of signatories more susceptible to manipulation. Th ird, the fact that the draft 
regulation does not indicate a specifi c timeframe for submitting the statements of 
support for verifi cation and authentication might prolong the actual submission of 
the initiative well beyond the 12-month period available for the actual collection 
of signatures. Th is would extend the entire process much beyond the minimum 
19 months needed from the registration of an initiative to a potential response 
from the Commission (see timeline). Such a delay could test both the relevance 
of the issue in question as well as the patience of the organisers and signatories of 
a citizens’ initiative.
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Citizens’ Initiative Timeline   
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2.6. Guidelines for the Commission’s Response
Finally, the draft regulation sets a 4-month deadline for the Commission to exam-
ine a citizens’ initiative that has been successfully submitted. Within this period, 
the Commission has to make its conclusions public in a Communication for the 
organiser(s), the European Parliament, and the Council, laying down the “action 
it intends to take, if any, and its reasons for doing so”. By adding the words “if any” 
to the draft regulation, the Commission already indicates the possibility that it 
may decide to take no action whatsoever, even if a citizens’ initiative has fulfi lled 
all administrative criteria. Th e proposal does not lay down any specifi c criteria 
guiding the Commission’s response, neither in terms of choosing among various 
legal instruments available for diff erent issues nor in regard to drafting a suitable 
but potentially negative reply.
2.7. The Review Clause
Fully aware of the fact that the EU is entering uncharted territories with the citizens’ 
initiative, the Commission has included into the proposal two provisions allowing 
for changes to the original regulation.
Firstly, the draft proposal introduces a review clause that obliges the Commission 
to present a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implemen-
tation of the citizens’ initiative fi ve years after the entry into force of the regula-
tion. Th e Council has suggested reducing this to three years from the date of the 
regulation’s application. Indeed, a review might prove quite necessary once EU 
institutions, Member States, and (organised) citizens have gained experience with 
the new instrument in practice.
Secondly, the Commission has foreseen the possibility to amend the Annexes of 
the regulation by means of delegated acts. Th is option would allow for quicker 
and easier amendments, as the changes deemed necessary would not require the 
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adoption of a completely new regulation. Most pertinent in this regard is probably 
Annex 1 listing the minimum number of signatories per Member State.
Th e opportunity to make revisions might also open up the possibility to address 
and incorporate some of the issues that were raised during the public consultation 
procedure but in the end were omitted in the Commission’s draft proposal. Th ese 
include, for example, the introduction of compulsory hearings for the organisers 
of initiatives, which have successfully passed all hurdles, in order to allow them to 
properly state their case or the Commission to ask for clarifi cations. In a similar 
vein, the Commission might wish to go back on earlier suggestions to formally 
off er legal advice as a useful fi rst fi lter of admissibility. Th e right to appeal to the 
European Court of Justice was also previously mentioned and could fi nd its way 
into future amendments as a means to better specify options in case of rejection or 
unsatisfactory outcomes. Finally, the reimbursement issue might haunt the pro-
cedure and eventually compel the Commission to devise clearer fi nancial require-
ments, including a potential compensation for the costs caused by a “successful” 
citizens’ initiative.
3. ANALYSING THE SUBSTANTIAL IMPLICATIONS
Th e Commission’s proposal has settled some of the more “technical” issues related 
to the implementation of the citizens’ initiative. If the guidelines provided by the 
Commission’s draft regulation lead to the smooth functioning of the new instru-
ment in practice, then the European Union and its citizens stand to benefi t in at 
least four ways:
First, the introduction of the citizens’ initiative adds an unprecedented • 
dimension of public participation encouraging people from across Europe 
to mobilise in order to push the EU’s “legislative button”. Th e possibility 
to infl uence the Union’s agenda by fl agging and supporting concrete policy 
proposals can help counter public disengagement with EU aff airs. Even if in 
the end the new instrument does not lead to the adoption of legislative acts, 
the citizens’ initiative could still be a valuable tool for actors at the EU and 
national level to foster certain policy debates.
Second, the new instrument can stimulate transnational dialogue and debate • 
over concrete public concerns, as any successful citizens’ initiative must gather 
support in nine or more Member States. Citizens or organised interest groups 
will have to cooperate with counterparts in other EU countries or even set-
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up transnational networks, which could gradually evolve from an ad hoc to 
a more permanent status.[1]
Th ird, the citizens’ initiative can promote the Europeanisation of national • 
public discourses, as the pros and cons of specifi c proposals might be discussed 
in national political arenas. Most notably, political parties could employ 
the new instrument in order to mobilise public interest and support for a 
specifi c cause.
Last but not least, the new instrument might help citizens to get better • 
acquainted with European policy-making. Th is latent “educational function” 
of the citizens’ initiative could raise public awareness about the role and added 
value of the EU, and in particular, of the European Commission. A better 
understanding of the potentials and limits of the EU could benefi t the ability 
of citizens to judge the Union’s failures and successes more objectively and 
independently of their national media and political actors.
Th ese potential benefi ts of the citizens’ initiative can strengthen the link between 
the EU and its citizens, and thus increase the Union’s public legitimacy. However, 
a number of unanswered but critical questions deserve special consideration.
3.1. Who Will Make Use of the Citizens’ Initiative and Why?
Given the scale and resource-savvy nature of the citizens’ initiative, it seems rather 
unlikely that “ordinary citizens” will make use of the new instrument. Europe-
ans will instead have to rely on intermediaries, such as NGOs, interest groups, 
associations, trade unions, or lobby groups in order to articulate and drive their 
interests via citizens’ initiatives. Th e new instrument provides these groups with the 
opportunity to directly infl uence the European policy process. It is expected that 
larger NGOs, which are represented in many EU Member States, will be able to 
conduct campaigns on their own. Smaller and national organisations, on the other 
hand, will probably have to establish networks with their counterparts in order to 
organise a Europe-wide citizens’ initiative.
A plethora of citizens’ initiatives are therefore likely to mirror a segmental inter-
est pushed by a well-organised minority rather than the more general will of the 
European public. Policy-making could thus fall prey to a “tyranny of minorities” 
backed by resourceful interest groups, which are more easily able to collect the 
[1] See MAURER, A. and VOGEL, S., Die Europäische Bürgerinitiative — Chancen, Grenzen und Umsetzungsempfehlungen, 
SWP-Studie, No. S 28, October 2009, pp. 10-11, retrievable at http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.
php?asset_id=6431.
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required one million statements of support.[1] At fi rst glance, one million signatories 
might sound impressive, but this fi gure accounts for a mere 0.2 per cent of the 
entire EU population or 0.3 per cent of all citizens eligible to vote. Th is represents 
a low threshold even compared to similar instruments in a number of Member 
States, where the average lies at around 0.89 per cent of the national population.[2] 
As a potentially valuable safeguard, it seems appropriate that the submission of a 
“successful” citizens’ initiative be followed by public consultation with other inter-
est groups and stakeholders before the Commission comes up with a legislative 
proposal or decides not to take up the initiative.
Likewise, it seems important to monitor who exactly supports a certain citizens’ 
initiative in order to make sure that the instrument is not (mis)used to infl u-
ence EU decision-making for commercial purposes. Th e Commission’s draft 
regulation does not go far enough to avoid a potential abuse of the instrument 
by resourceful interest groups seeking to realise their narrow concerns. Th e 
draft proposal compels organisers to provide information about the “sources 
of funding and support” at the time of the registration of a citizens’ initia-
tive. However, as the Council recommends, the Commission should oblige 
organisers to supply well-documented evidence about the sponsors of a suc-
cessful campaign prior to the Commission’s decision on the admissibility of 
an initiative (i.e. after 300.000/100.000 statements of support in at least three 
Member States have been collected) as well as when the citizens’ initiative is 
actually submitted.
Regarding the policy fi elds which are likely to breed citizens’ initiatives, past and 
current campaigns (e.g. “Say no to genetic engineering”, “Union citizenship for 
all residents”, “For an effi  cient emergency number all over Europe”, “European 
civil service”, “Save our social Europe”, “1million4disability”, “For life quality 
and cultural variety in Europe”, “Animal welfare initiative”, “Europeans against 
nuclear power”, “Help Africa”, “One seat”) suggest that the new instrument 
might prove especially attractive in the fi elds of health and consumer policy, 
justice, fundamental rights and citizenship, employment and social policy, edu-
cation and culture, or foreign aff airs.[3] However, any predictions on the basis of 
these campaigns are at best tentative since the records on their performance are 
often incomplete and the legal toolkit of rules and incentives provided by the 
[1] See EMMANOUILIDIS, J. A. and STRATULAT, C., Implementing Lisbon: Narrowing the EU’s ‘Democratic Defi cit’?, EPC Policy 
Brief, March 2010.
[2] See MAURER, A. and VOGEL, S, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
[3] See FISCHER, C. and LICHTBLAU, T., Europäische Bürgerinitiativen — Eine Zwischenbilanz, in Pichler, J. W. (ed.), Verändern 
wir Europa! (Vienna/Graz, Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2008), pp. 361-381.
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Lisbon Treaty and the draft regulation for such initiatives did not exist at the 
time of their launch. Noteworthy post-Lisbon exceptions include the ongoing 
“Work-free Sunday” campaign, started by the German MEP Martin Kastler 
in March 2010, and the “Financial Transaction Tax” campaign initiated by 
the German Social Democrats and supported by their Austrian counterparts in 
May 2010, but it is still quite early to forecast their success. Finally, the Treaties 
and the draft regulation do not explicitly specify whether citizens’ initiatives 
could be used to change the EU’s primary law. Yet, it seems rather clear that 
the new instrument will not be able to serve this purpose as it falls well outside 
the envisioned scope of implementing the Treaties.
3.2.  The Response to Citizens’ Initiatives — 
a Potential Source of Frustration?
Uncertainty hangs over the nature and quality of the Commission’s response to 
successful citizens’ initiatives. Th e EU Treaty states that an initiative merely “invites” 
the Commission to submit an “appropriate proposal” on a topic that falls within 
the framework of its powers. In the draft regulation, the Commission categorises 
the instrument as an agenda-setting device that shall oblige the Commission to 
give “serious consideration” to any submitted citizens’ initiative. At the same time, 
the draft regulation underlines that the new instrument does not aff ect the Com-
mission’s formal right of initiative. In addition, neither the Treaties nor the draft 
regulation specify the “quality” of the Commission’s response, which can vary 
from a concrete legislative proposal to a mere recommendation or opinion without 
any binding force. In the end, the Commission is free to command the outcome 
of the process, but the eff ects of its choice can vary considerably.[1] It therefore 
seems particularly important that the Commission strikes the right balance when 
it responds to a citizens’ initiative. A “failure to deliver” would not only aff ect the 
image of the Commission, but it could also increase people’s dissatisfaction and 
further alienate citizens from the European Union.
A simple adoption of an initiative would undermine the Commission’s role in the 
legislative process. Th is scenario could be appealing in situations where the Com-
mission might wish to avoid public disappointment and criticism. In those cases, 
it would seem easiest to just drop off  proposals with the Council and the European 
Parliament, which as co-legislators have the fi nal word at any rate. However, such 
[1] See also AUER, A., European citizens’ initiative, European Constitutional Law review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, pp. 81-82.
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a conduct would be inappropriate as it would challenge the Commission’s formal 
right of initiative and its authority vis-à-vis other institutions.
Th e instrument might become a source of misunderstandings and frustration if 
organisers and signatories of a “successful” citizens’ initiative come to believe that 
the Commission did not (adequately) respond to their proposal. Th is scenario is 
most likely if the Commission does not put forward any concrete proposal. Th e 
Brussels authority could then be accused of having turned a tin ear to initiatives even 
though they have met all formal requirements. But organisers and signatories might 
also grow impatient if the Commission off ers a proposal that does not match their 
expectations in substance. Media or national political elites can exacerbate such a 
situation if they have stimulated unrealistic public expectations about the results of 
a citizens’ initiative. After all, one cannot actually assume that the European public 
will be aware of the fact that the Commission is not the apex but a mediator and 
activator in the EU’s decision-making process. As part of a complex negotiating 
system, the Commission is essentially obliged to consider and reconcile competing 
interests while pushing for common European policies.
To address the risk of public disenchantment with the Commission/EU, two things 
seem necessary. First, more concrete and objective criteria to guide the Commis-
sion’s response to any given initiative should be devised after some initial experience 
with the new instrument in practice. Second, in case a citizens’ initiative is discarded, 
the negative answer should include the precise reasons for the rejection as well as 
suggestions of alternative bodies and tools to consult thereafter.[1] Without proper 
explanations and instructions, refusals could actually widen the gap between citi-
zens and EU institutions even further. Conversely, if the Commission is successful 
in its new capacity as “interlocutor” of the people, the Brussels authority might 
be able to sway more legitimacy in the eyes of European citizens. In certain cases, 
the Commission could even take advantage of the new instrument and encourage 
particular initiatives as a means of persuading Member States and/or the European 
Parliament to side with the public opinion on the respective proposal.
Th ere are two other potential sources of frustration, which go beyond the role of 
the Commission. First, even if the nature and quality of the Commission’s response 
matches the expectations of the organisers and signatories of a citizens’ initiative, 
the proposed legislative act might be amended or rejected by the EU’s two legisla-
tors, i.e. the European Parliament and/or the Council. Second, time could prove 
[1] See also KACZYNSKI, P. M., The European Citizens’ Initiative: a Proper Response from the Commission, CEPS Commentary, 
8 January 2010, retrievable at: http://www.ceps.eu/book/european-citizens%E2%80%99-initiative-proper-response-
commission.
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problematic, as it would take years before a successful citizens’ initiative will be 
implemented in practice (if ever). Th e entire application cycle of a “successful” 
citizens’ initiative will require at least 19 months, i.e. 12 months to collect one 
million statements of support, 3 months for the verifi cation and authentication 
of signatories, and 4 months for the Commission to come up with a response (see 
timeline). Adding to that, the Treaties and the draft regulation do not indicate a 
timeframe in which the Commission “must” come up with a concrete legislative 
proposal, nor can one specify how long it will take the co-legislators to decide on the 
issue in question. Ultimately, it will probably take a minimum of 3 to 5 years in most 
cases, and sometimes even longer, from the time of the registration of an initiative 
until the actual implementation of a legislative act proposed by the Commission. 
Such a long timeframe could challenge the importance of the issue in question as 
well as discourage the organisers and signatories of a citizens’ initiative. 
3.3. Will the Instrument Aff ect the Effi  ciency of the System?
Th e degree to which the new instrument will aff ect the work of the Commission 
and the effi  ciency of the EU as a whole will largely depend on how many citizens’ 
initiatives will be put forward and successfully complete the entire application cycle. 
Th e formal requirements for any citizens’ initiative, i.e. one million signatories in 
nine Member States seem rather accessible. However, it is somewhat diffi  cult to 
predict at this point the likely popularity and accessibility of the new instrument. 
Many initiatives might surpass the threshold of 300.000/100.000 signatories in 
three Member States required by the admissibility check, but then fail to arrive at 
the mandatory one million statements of support within the one-year timeframe. 
Some organisers might not even be interested in bringing about a legislative pro-
posal, but more concerned with signalling and politicising certain issues. It is also 
hard to anticipate if potential organisers will in the beginning shy away and decide 
to monitor the experience of others with the new instrument or whether they will 
anxiously seek to be among the fi rst to exercise the new right, thus fl ooding the 
Commission with proposals. Th e positive/negative opinions formed during the 
fi rst initiative(s) are also likely to determine the extent to which citizens will feel 
encouraged or discouraged to use the new instrument, with obvious implications 
for the amount of proposals subsequently directed to the Commission.
In case of a signifi cant number of “successful” citizens’ initiatives, the sheer vol-
ume could infl uence the workload of the Commission, as it will have to properly 
consider all proposals and to assess every initiative at least twice — once for the 
admissibility check and then to decide on the suitable reaction. Th is could distract 
the Commission from other commitments or cause it to approach a stricter course 
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of action, i.e. directly pass proposals through to the legislator or not to take any 
(adequate) action.
Deadlock may emerge if citizens’ initiatives confront the Commission with dia-
metrically opposed or contradictory requests in diff erent policy fi elds. In principle, 
it is possible to imagine citizens’ initiatives that simultaneously argue in favour or 
against a more ambitious reduction of CO2 emissions; in favour or against a more 
liberal immigration policy; in favour or against the use of GMOs; in favour or 
against banning the burqa throughout the Union; etc. Neither the Treaties nor the 
draft regulation provide specifi c guidelines on how to assess and handle opposing 
initiatives. In such controversial situations, the European Parliament, as the only 
EU organ with a direct popular mandate, could become a guardian of the new 
instrument. Th e European Parliament could provide information and a legal help 
desk, become an arena for debate on certain issues and/or function as a “fi lter” by 
coming up with a proposal of its own supporting a certain initiative on the basis 
of Article 225 TFEU, which allows the Parliament to request the Commission to 
submit a certain legislative proposal. In more general terms, other EU institutions 
but also civil society organisations could support the Commission in all phases of 
a citizens’ initiative from registration to the actual submission and response to a 
successful initiative.
Th e increased pressure on the Commission to come up with specifi c legislative 
proposals could also prove inauspicious in two other respects. First, the potential 
expansion of legislative activity might run counter to the tendency witnessed in 
recent years towards “less regulation”. Second, some initiatives could force issues 
on the agenda, which the Commission might have preferred not to take a stance 
on (e.g. limiting salaries of bank executives or opening accession negotiations).
Th e above examples illustrate that the new instrument can under certain circum-
stances encroach on the eff ectiveness and quality of EU decision-making. As a 
consequence, increasing popular democracy at European level might in some cases 
negatively aff ect the EU’s output legitimacy. Th is is not to suggest that citizen 
participation must be at the expense of policy-making effi  ciency. However, failing 
to consider the potential risks of a trade-off  between the two would be an equally 
ill-advised option.
3.4. Implications for the Quality of Democracy in the EU
Th e citizens’ initiative is not likely to drastically transform the EU’s democratic 
quality. While the new instrument may add an element of participatory or rather 
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advocacy democracy, the Union will continue to operate within the unconventional 
scheme of representative democracy in which it was already embedded.
Th e new instrument stands to enrich people’s conventional participatory repertoire 
with a new style of advocacy democracy, whereby citizens can indirectly infl uence 
rather than outright determine the EU’s policy process. Th is is due to the fact that 
the interests of citizens will not gain a “direct voice” at the European level but will 
depend on non-elected intermediary actors — e.g. organised interest groups, social 
movements, advocacy coalitions or other NGOs. Yet, the EU was already opened 
to and accessed by such actors, which seek to provide specialised and particularised 
alternatives to the classical modes of representation. But with the citizens’ initia-
tive in place, organised interest groups might claim more legitimacy as “delegates” 
of the people’s interest. However, they will by no means substitute partisan or 
electoral channels at national and/or European level. At the same time, one must 
be aware of the risk that populists and nationalists could employ the citizens’ 
initiative to advance their demagogic message in the national and/or European 
political arena.
In more general terms, the citizens’ initiative will neither alter the model nor sub-
stantially improve the quality of representative democracy on which the European 
Union is founded and has functioned hitherto. Put more bluntly: the new instru-
ment will in itself not substantially contribute to overcoming the EU’s “democratic 
defi cit”. Th e citizens’ initiative will not lead to a more democratically accountable 
system compared to national standards of partisan democracy. Th e degree of politi-
cisation in the EU will not be aff ected by the introduction of the citizens’ initiative. 
Th e new instrument will not fundamentally revise the fact that European political 
life (still) lacks the lifeblood of a thriving democracy, which prospers from the clash 
of colliding arguments and the personalisation of political confl icts as the essence of 
politics. As regards the European Commission, the citizens’ initiative itself will not 
change the fact that the Commission is a “non-majoritarian” actor removed from 
the electoral or partisan process and largely driven by the notion of expert rule. Th e 
citizens’ initiative will neither increase the political legitimacy nor the accountability 
of the Commission according to traditional democratic standards at national level. 
Instead, the Commission will be free to choose what initiatives to take up and how 
to react to the diff erent proposals without concern that people could vote it “out 
of offi  ce” if they were unsatisfi ed with its performance. Yet, the citizens’ initiative 
could raise public awareness about the role of the European Commission and even 
trigger a public or media-driven opinion-forming process about certain European 
issues on which the Commission will be compelled to take a position.
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4. CONCLUSION
As the citizens’ initiative has not yet been put into practice, it is too early to deliver 
a verdict on whether the new instrument will actually contribute to bringing people 
across Europe closer to the EU and to each other. Th ere is real potential that the 
citizens’ initiative will counter public apathy, stimulate transnational debate, and 
enhance people’s awareness about the potentials and limits of the European Union. 
Th ese virtues could increase the legitimacy of both the EU and the Commission, 
with the latter playing a key role in the implementation of the new instrument. Th e 
Commission’s draft regulation on the citizens’ initiative and the Council’s general 
approach sought to facilitate the applicability of the new instrument by specifying 
user-friendly ground rules. However, some civil-society organizations still ques-
tion the practicability of the instrument and the danger of abuse and frustration 
has not been fully dispersed by the technical clarifi cations provided in the draft 
regulation. Most notably, uncertainty still looms over the criteria that will guide 
the Commission’s response to specifi c initiatives.
Ultimately, the success of the new instrument will very much depend on the results 
it will produce, in terms of how it will infl uence the performance and image of 
the Commission/EU and if it will benefi t citizens in their everyday lives. It seems 
likely that the citizens’ initiative will in many cases be employed as a political tool 
to infl uence debates at national and European level, and less as a legal instrument 
that changes or generates new legislative acts. In the end, the likelihood of disap-
pointment could be high, especially if media and national actors infl ate people’s 
expectations about the results of certain initiatives or about the overall democratic 
merits of the new instrument, which in itself will not contribute signifi cantly to 
overcoming the EU’s “democratic defi cit”.
Bearing in mind the risks as well as the potential positive eff ects of the citizens’ 
initiative, the implementation of the new instrument should be welcomed with a 
healthy dose of realism and with a readiness to fi nd creative solutions for improve-
ment, if they are deemed necessary.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With justice and home aff airs, the domain of external relations and foreign policy 
is, arguably, among the most aff ected by the new Treaty. But it defi nitely is the 
most aff ected one considering the administrative changes. It can also be said that 
the Treaty’s actual implementation in this domain — inasmuch as it requires 
additional negotiations and trade-off s both among the Member States and between 
all EU institutions — could be as important as the original drafting of the Treaty 
text. Th e eventual shape of the new “system” — unlikely to become fully visible 
until 2013 — will defi ne the Lisbon Treaty’s ambition to make the EU a more 
coherent and eff ective international actor.
Th is said, a preliminary overview of the main innovations enshrined in the Treaty 
may be useful in order to understand where grey areas may lie and what outcomes 
may be expected following the implementation period. Th is applies to the main 
players, the institutions (old and new), and the provisions themselves. Such overview 
and related analysis will be followed by a broader assessment of the issues involved 
beyond the strictly legal and institutional dimension.
2. THE PRESIDENTS
To start with, the Treaty envisages a role in this domain for the newly created 
President of the European Council. Th e role, however, is not spelt out in detail in 
the text (probably intentionally, given the lack of consensus on the actual scope of 
the President’s future mandate). Indeed, the formulation of Art. 15 TEU is rather 
vague and leaves plenty of room for confl ict with other EU players, in terms of 
both “representation” of the EU in international fora and strategic orientation in 
matters of common foreign and security policy (CFSP). 
Th is helped fuel the controversy which erupted in the aftermath of the eventual 
ratifi cation of the Treaty in the autumn of 2009, over whether the appointee should 
be a “President” or rather a “Chairman” of the European Council. Both the choice 
of Herman Van Rompuy and the fi rst steps he has taken in this particular domain 
seem to point to an intermediate option, which will be further tested in the months 
to come also in light of other developments.
Interestingly, Van Rompuy has tried so far to articulate an autonomous and origi-
nal analysis of the new international environment in which the Union operates, 
especially highlighting the political eff ects of globalization and the challenges they 
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pose to Europe[1]; he has also sought to fi nd his own role on the diplomatic scene, 
in particular at summit meetings, and to spur the Member States into discussing 
openly and at the highest level the current state and future of EU relations with 
the other big global players, starting with a special European Council meeting 
convened for 16 September 2010.
His role clearly eats into what once belonged to the rotating EU Presidency, to which 
the Lisbon Treaty now assigns virtually no role in the domain of external action. 
What looks legally neat, however, is likely to prove politically hard to implement. 
President Van Rompuy may have to combine — at least in his fi rst years at the 
helm — greed and generosity: greed when it comes to claiming and asserting his 
powers where they exist; and generosity in exercising them.
Last, but certainly not least, the President of the Commission will continue to play 
a crucial role in external relations, especially if the widening range of policy issues 
coming under that heading is considered. Th e realities of the 21st century make 
the traditional notion of “foreign policy” — that of just being a combination of 
skillful diplomacy and military might — rather obsolete. By contrast, such issues as 
climate action, fi nancial regulation, border and migration control, and international 
justice have climbed ever further up the global agenda. Th ese shifting priorities are 
conferring on the Commission new functions in the wider realm of external poli-
cies, and on its President a key coordinating function — potentially also in terms 
of a role to play in international bodies. 
Th is means that the external dimension of hitherto primarily internal common 
policies (single market, JHA, environment, energy, and of course trade) may well 
come to represent simultaneously an enrichment and/or a complication for the 
new institutional “system” created by the Lisbon Treaty.
3. THE HIGH-RERESENTATIVE/VICE-PRESIDENT (HR/VP)
Still, the cornerstone of the new EU system in the domain of external action is 
the creation of the position of High Representative (HR) of the Union for For-
eign Aff airs and Security Policy. Th is is a hybrid institutional fi gure combining: 
a) the pioneering role previously played by Javier Solana as High Representative 
for CFSP (1999-2009); b) that of a Vice-President (VP) of the Commission in 
[1] See, for example, his speeches at the College of Europe (Bruges, 25 February 2010) and at the Brussels Forum of the 
German Marshall Fund (Brussels, 26 March 2010), available at http://www.consilium.europa/eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/ec/113067.pdf, and http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/csm_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/113630.
pdf respectively. 
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charge of external relations and coordinating other relevant portfolios; and c) the 
role hitherto played by the Foreign Minister of the country holding the rotating 
EU Presidency — which includes chairing the Council formation dealing with 
Foreign Aff airs at large (Arts.17-18 TEU i.a.). 
To these various responsibilities in the CFSP/ESDP (now CSDP) area should be 
added the chairing of the Boards of domain-relevant agencies such as the European 
Defence Agency (EDA), the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC), the EU Institute for Secu-
rity Studies (EUISS) and the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). 
Th e new HR/VP, however, is no longer also the Secretary-General of the Council 
of the EU. Indeed this is a function that Solana hardly carried out himself in prac-
tice during his ten-year mandate, preferring to leave this to his longtime deputy, 
Pierre de Boissieu[1]. 
Nor is the new HR/VP — contrary to Solana — also the Secretary-General of the 
Western European Union (WEU), if anything because the new Commission “hat” 
makes that impossible[2]. 
Finally, the new HR/VP has a legal right of initiative both as HR only (in strictly 
CFSP matters) and as double-hatted VP [Art. 22 (2) TEU]. Similarly, the HR/VP 
has also dual loyalties and accountabilities, as she is appointed fi rst by the European 
Council (as HR) and then by the European Parliament as a member (and VP) of 
the new Commission.
Such a multi-hatted position represents a unique opportunity to bring coherence to 
the Union’s “foreign policy” — but also a daunting challenge for the post holder, 
especially the fi rst one. When Baroness Catherine Ashton accepted the European 
Council’s nomination to the HR/VP post on 19 November 2009[3], she probably 
did not realize how intractable the job description was. A few months into it, she 
[1] de Boissieu was indeed appointed Council Secretary-General in November 2009 and will stay in offi  ce until June 
2011. He will be succeeded by Uwe Corsepius, a close aide to German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
[2] For WEU a pragmatic solution was adopted, whereby the Head of the residual Secretariat in Brussels, Arnaud Jacomet, 
has been appointed Acting Secretary-General, while the Ambassadors to the EU Political and Security Committee from 
the ten WEU full members (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain) have kept their second “hat” as Ambassadors to WEU.
[3] After UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband refused the post, in late October 2009, the British government came up 
with three names: Business Secretary Peter Mandelson (also former European Commissioner for Trade), former Defence 
Secretary Geoff  Hoon, and notably Baroness Ashton, who had replaced Mandelson in the Commission a year earlier 
and, therefore, was already a member of the College. Art. 18 TUE would have allowed a ballot by QMV, but the appoint-
ment — which included Van Rompuy’s — was consensual. Ashton started right away as HR but had to wait until the 
parliamentary confi rmation of the whole new Commission to exercise fully her VP function, although she “switched” 
her Commission portfolio with that of the outgoing Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero Waldner almost 
immediately. See i.a. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/csm_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111343.pdf. 
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must now be aware of the urgent need to put in place a structure that would allow 
her to delegate administrative, operational and even representational tasks to a 
number of deputies (de facto if not de jure), leaving her more free to concentrate 
on policy coordination and strategic leadership. 
Her beginnings in the new job have indeed been a bit shaky, due to a combina-
tion of factors: her own (and her old cabinet’s) lack of experience in diplomatic 
aff airs and CFSP matters; the institutional and procedural vacuum into which she 
was catapulted after Solana’s departure; and the impossible agenda she has been 
confronted with from the start. A certain lack of strategic orientation and political 
compass has also been mentioned as contributing to the diffi  cult “baptism of fi re” 
of the new HR/VP. Th is is also why the establishment of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) has taken centre stage since and has become the bedrock of 
the new “system” — as well as the quintessential catalyst of all the issues that have 
haunted European “foreign policy” for its fi rst two decades. 
Incidentally, following arrangements made after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the service is also expected — at least in principle — to support both Presi-
dent Van Rompuy and President Barroso (along with the whole Commission) in 
their external functions. Still, it cannot be ruled out that both Presidents develop 
their own structures — albeit on a much smaller scale and much less visibly — to 
meet their own specifi c needs in this domain.
Inside the College 
Th e HR/VP is a full member of the European Commission and is expected to gene-
rate policy coordination and coherence not only within the College — albeit under 
the control of President Barroso — but also at Directorate-General (DG) level. 
When the new Commission was nominated by the President (27 November 2009) 
and later appointed by the European Parliament (9 February 2010), Catherine 
Ashton was conferred a role of a “prima inter pares” — if anything, by virtue of her 
double “investiture” — among her fellow College members dealing with external 
policies proper.
Interestingly, she was called upon to “coordinate” the Commissioners for Enlarge-
ment and Neighbourhood Policy (Stefan Fuele), for Development (Andris Pie-
balgs), and for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
(Kristalina Georgieva)[1]. Th e EU Treaties do not allow for a formal hierarchy 
[1] http://europa/eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1837. 
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among Commissioners (bar the President), but Ashton’s special place has to some 
extent been acknowledged. For his part, Commissioner Piebalgs (the only one 
among those to have already served a full mandate in the Barroso I College) was 
designated to represent the Commission proper on the Foreign Aff airs Council 
now chaired by the HR/VP.
Further details as to exactly how such “coordination” could work in practice were 
left to subsequent decisions, including those regarding the EEAS. It is worth men-
tioning here that the new Trade Commissioner (Karel De Gucht) was explicitly 
exempted from such coordination, thus leaving the President of the Commission 
(and the College as a whole) the ultimate task of bringing about coherence across 
the entire range of EU common policies with external ramifi cations. 
Catherine Ashton is not the only VP of the new Commission: there are six others. 
However, she stands out as the most senior one, in part also thanks to her participa-
tion in the meetings of the European Council [Art. 15 (2) TEU] which, in turn, 
puts her also above the 27 Foreign Ministers, who are no longer entitled to attend 
them on a regular basis.
It is nevertheless worth noting that on 16 April 2010 the College approved the 
creation of a series of “Groups of Commissioners”, starting notably with one on 
external relations chaired by Ashton and encompassing not only Piebalgs, Fuele, 
Georgieva, but also De Gucht and the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary 
Aff airs Olli Rehn, with the possible association of others at a later stage[1].
3. THE EEAS
Th e establishment of the EEAS — as foreseen by the Treaty (Art. 27 TEU) — and 
its precise nature, status, scope and set-up were to (and have indeed) become the 
object of additional negotiations. Th eir outcome will inevitably mark the direction 
the EU will take in its external action in the next decade. Th ree paradoxes deserve 
therefore to be highlighted in this respect.
Firstly, while the broad elements of the EEAS had already been agreed upon in 
early 2003 (within the framework of the Convention on the Future of Europe), 
concrete talks over its actual implementation started only in early 2010. Th us 
[1] The Groups of Commissioners are established to ensure an eff ective preparation of certain key initiatives. Each 
Group is chaired by a lead Commissioner and meant to work on the basis of a mandate from the President setting out 
its purpose and the “products” to be delivered. Groups are not to take decisions but to prepare for collegiate delibera-
tions, and they will include the President’s Cabinet and the Commission’s Secretariat-General (Note d’information de M. 
le President, SEC (2010) 475, 16 avril 2010 — revised on 21 April). 
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many years were lost without engaging in serious discussion. Th e few preparatory 
meetings devoted to the EEAS in early 2005 (right before the failed referenda on 
the then Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands brought them to a 
halt) produced very little indeed[1]. 
Similarly, the further paralysis generated by the fi rst Irish referendum on Lisbon 
in June 2008 put all relevant talks on ice until the autumn of 2009. As a result, by 
early 2010 all players were under huge pressure to deliver quickly on an issue that 
raises intricate and at times intractable problems. Th e main institutional players, 
however, had used those fi ve “wasted” years to consolidate, even reinvigorate their 
bureaucratic (red) lines of defence and resistance to change.
Secondly, the relevant provisions in the Treaty have proved to be at the same time 
too specifi c and too vague: too specifi c when the one-third rule of thumb was laid 
down whereby the EEAS should come to incorporate, in roughly equal shares, 
staff  from the relevant Commission DGs, the Council General Secretariat (CGS), 
and the Member States’ Foreign Ministries; and too vague regarding the possible 
nature and location of the EEAS in the EU “system”. 
On top of that, the array of players involved in making the relevant decision(s) is 
unusually wide, encompassing not only the EU-27 and the Commission (through 
the COREPER, the Council, and the entire College in its own right) but also the 
European Parliament — in particular regarding staff  regulations and budgetary 
procedures (both subject to co-decision) — thus generating potholes and roadblocks 
rather than paving the way for progress.
Th irdly, and the fi nal paradox: in late October 2009 a somewhat artifi cial deadline 
(30 April 2010) was set for the “founding” Decision on the EEAS. However, while 
it is expected that the EEAS be launched as soon as possible, its actual implemen-
tation and development will inevitably require constant monitoring, review and, 
quite possibly, further legislative and organizational adjustments in a few years. 
In other words, while the EEAS can only take shape gradually and as part of work 
in progress, its foundations must be laid down in a hurried and one-off  legislative 
procedure. Th e sheer complexity of the issues to be addressed to make the service 
work properly demands time and adequate preparation. But, paradoxically, any 
major delay to its launch and implementation is likely to be (and has already been) 
seen — both inside and outside the Union — as evidence of infi ghting, disarray 
and lack of strategic vision.
[1] The resulting papers can be consulted in the Annex to AVERY, G. and MISSIROLI, A. (eds.) The EU Foreign Service: How to 
Build a More Eff ective Common Policy, EPC Working Paper No. 28 (Brussels, EPC, November 2007), pp. 82 ff . 
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3.1. The Making 
Th e main steps in the establishment of the EEAS since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty (or, more precisely, since the “Yes” vote in the second Irish refer-
endum, on 2 October 2009, that paved the way for its eventual ratifi cation) have 
been the following:
on 20 October 2009, MEP Elmar Brok presented the fi rst draft Report on • 
the institutional aspects of the creation of the EEAS. Th e main emphasis in 
both the Report and the ensuing discussion was on the (desirable) proximity 
of the new service to the Commission — with some MEPs arguing for its 
full inclusion in it — and on tight parliamentary control over its personnel 
and budget, especially regarding development aid policy. Slightly diff ering 
views were also expressed on the possible full incorporation of the existing 
politico-military structures in the EEAS. Th e report was eventually adopted 
in the EP Plenary Session on 22 October 2009 by 424 votes to 94;
on 23 October 2009, in turn, the Swedish EU Presidency came up with its • 
own Report, as broadly agreed upon in the COREPER (after preliminary 
talks at Antici Counselors’ level). Although not strictly binding for the HR/
VP and future deliberations, the Presidency Report set the stage for the ensu-
ing debate by addressing the scope of the EEAS’ activities, its legal status, 
staffi  ng, fi nancing, and the organization of EU Delegations abroad. It also 
mentioned 30 April 2010 as a tentative deadline for fi nalizing the relevant 
decision at General Aff airs Council level, building on a draft proposal to be 
put forward by the new HR/VP[1]; 
to this end, once Catherine Ashton was appointed and later confi rmed by • 
the European Parliament as a member of the new College of Commission-
ers, a dedicated “High Level Group” was formed to support the HR/VP in 
her initial task[2]. Shortly afterwards, a Special Adviser was also appointed 
to assist the HR/VP in her preparatory work, namely the former Danish 
Permanent Representative (and former Commission offi  cial) Poul Skytte 
Christoff ersen;
[1] The full text is available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14930.en09.pdf . The April deadline 
was probably dictated also by concerns about a possible change of government in the UK (following parliamentary elec-
tions due in May 2010) and its repercussions on the whole Lisbon foreign policy “package” — although Conservative 
leaders later gave assurances as to their compliance with EU decisions in this domain.
[2] Chaired by Ashton, the group encompassed the two Secretaries-General, Catherine Day and Pierre de Boissieu; the 
two relevant Directors-General, Joao Vale de Almeida (DG Relex) and Robert Cooper (DG E); the Heads of the respective 
Legal Services; Patrick Child (Head of all EC/EU Delegations in third countries) and Helga Schmid (Director of the Council’s 
Policy Unit); James Morrison, Ashton’s Head of Cabinet; and representatives of the “trio” presidencies involved in the 
Council negotiations (Spain, Belgium and, from January 2011, Hungary) — that is, all the key players but the EP, whose 
formal role in shaping the decision was not on the same footing as Council and Commission.
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the following phase, from early February 2010 onwards, was characterized • 
by the circulation of a number of draft documents (from the HR/VP-led 
steering group)[1], position papers and statements (mostly from MEPs) and 
media articles that conveyed an impression of lingering confusion and ongo-
ing turf battles[2]. Th e general climate was hardly helped by the Commission’s 
unilateral appointment, on 17 February 2010, of Joao Vale de Almeida (a 
close aide to President Barroso) as new Head of the EU Delegation to Wash-
ington DC. Th e appointment, although legally legitimate at that stage, was 
in fact seen as a sort of preemptive strike and raised loud political criticism 
from Member States;
next, on the occasion of the 25 March General Aff airs Council, the HR/• 
VP tabled a “proposal for a Council Decision”[3], subsequently followed on 
26 April 2010 by some amendments that refl ected the outcome of further 
negotiations between EU bodies and among Member States. On the basis 
of this blueprint, formal consultations were opened with the European Par-
liament in the context of the so-called “quadrilogue” involving Ashton’s 
aides, the Commission proper, the Spanish EU Presidency, and an informal 
delegation from the European Parliament including MEPs from the three 
main party groups (Elmar Brok for EPP, Roberto Gualtieri for S&D, and 
Guy Verhofstadt for ALDE);
fi nally, on 21 June 2010 in Madrid, an agreement was reached between • 
the four parties that included a number of amendments to the previous 
proposal as well as two separate Declarations by the HR/VP: one on politi-
cal accountability and another on the basic structure of the EEAS central 
administration[4]. Th e agreement was then submitted for approval — as a 
joint report by Brok and Verhofstadt — to the EP plenary on 8 July 2010. 
An overwhelming majority of MEPs supported it — with 549 votes in favor, 
78 against, and 17 abstentions — and everyone hailed the Madrid agreement 
as “historic”. 
[1] In mid-late February, for instance, separate drafts were circulated on the “vision”, the functioning and the organi-
zational structure of the EEAS: they still presented alternative options for the most controversial points in the ongoing 
talks.
[2] In particular, MEPs Elmar Brok (Foreign Aff airs Committee) and Guy Verhofstadt (Constitutional Aff airs Committee) 
co-signed on 18 March 2010 a “non-paper” demanding i.a. a status for the EEAS that would still make its link with and 
eventual integration into the Commission possible, and the creation of three “political” deputies for the HR/VP alongside 
the three Commissioners Fuele, Piebalgs and Georgieva. Other MEPs demanded at some stage the separation between 
ACP countries (to remain with the Commission) and the other geographical desks (to be moved to the EEAS). Extensive 
reporting on these developments can be found in www.europeanvoice.com; www.euobserver.com; www.europolitics.
info; www.euractiv.fr.
[3] http://eeas.europa.eu/docs/eeas_draft_decision_250310_en.pdf 
[4] The relevant offi  cial joint statement (IP/10/771) can be found in the EU RAPID system.
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Th e very last stage in this process includes the request by the Council (13 July) to 
the Commission to give its consent; the subsequent unanimous act by the Col-
lege of Commissioners (20 July); and the formal approval of the Decision by the 
General Aff airs Council (26 July). Th e adoption of the Financial Regulation and 
the Staff  Regulations is expected to follow after the summer break, according to the 
co-decision procedure — but the groundwork has already been laid down during 
the “quadrilogue” talks.
3.2. The Design
After the inter-institutional deal of late June 2010, the likely chassis of the EEAS — 
defi ned in the draft Decision as “a functionally autonomous body” — would consist 
of a sui generis stand-alone structure, separate from both the Commission and the 
Council, i.e. a “service” in its own right whose status and modus operandi will be 
original and distinct from existing models, and whose budget would be comparable 
to that of an “autonomous institution”.
As the tentative chart reproduced below tries to explain, such a structure will have 
an organizational “cockpit” encompassing the HR/VP as the “appointing author-
ity” and a sort of “quadrumvirate” including: 
a) an Executive Secretary-General (following the example of most national 
Foreign Ministries), in charge of key “horizontal” and management func-
tions[1], fl anked by two main deputies: 
b) two deputy Secretary-Generals, whose precise and respective tasks are not 
spelt out in the Decision, although some options were discussed inside the 
“High Level Group”[2];
c) at the insistence of the Parliamentary delegation, a Director-General for 
Budget and Administration, who will oversee all fi nancial, budgetary and 
auditing procedures in close cooperation with the relevant bodies and under 
European Parliament scrutiny. 
Of all the members of the “quadrumvirate” (initially only a “triumvirate”), the 
fourth is the one that is most likely to come from the top ranks of the Commission. 
[1] The 25 March proposal mentioned simply a “Secretary-General” “assisted” by two deputies, but especially MEPs 
objected that only institutions (such as the Council and the Commission, but also e.g. NATO) have a proper SG. Some 
Member States also disliked such a pyramidal structure — typical for instance of the Quai d’Orsay — with an all-powerful 
administrative fi gure at the top.
[2] One of these entailed a distinction between a sort of Political Director and a Director of Operations, another one 
a separation between the geographical and the operational desks. In all likelihood, the division of labor will stem also 
from the specifi c profi les of the candidates for each job and the resulting balance between nationalities as well as 
institutions.
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In the business language chosen by Catherine Ashton, this would be the EEAS 
Chief Operating Offi  cer, whereas the Executive Secretary-General would be its 
Chief Executive Offi  cer. Still, within such “cockpit” no formal hierarchy would 
be established, although the Executive Secretary-General would act as a “primus 
inter pares” (for instance, by deputizing for Ashton in her absence). With them, 
the HR/VP would form a sort of “corporate board” including also her Head of 
Cabinet. It remains to be seen exactly where the PSC Chairperson (who, accord-
ing to Art. 38 TEU, must be a representative of the HR) and the Head of the new 
Strategic Planning Team (that will incorporate inter alia the Council’s Policy Unit) 
might be placed.
Underneath them, a sort of “policy board” would encompass a number of special-
ized Directorates-General: geographic ones (three to fi ve, depending on the criteria), 
a thematic one, another devoted notably to budgetary and administrative matters, 
and a number of horizontal “departments”: for strategic planning and analysis, 
information and public diplomacy, and (yet again at the MEPs’ insistence) inter-
institutional relations and coordination.
Th e array of structures and bodies operating in the domain of crisis management 
and civil-military planning are also all expected to be brought within a dedicated 
Directorate-General, but the Decision does not specify what chain of command 
and what reporting lines may be established — especially with reference to the 
“corporate board” and its members.
In terms of staffi  ng, offi  cials from the Council Secretariat (especially DG E) and the 
Commission (mostly DG RELEX, plus some from DG DEV), will maintain their 
status and privileges, although some issues related to the mobility of Commission 
offi  cials remain open. Interestingly, the one-third share laid down in the Treaty 
will be implemented more fl exibly, in the wake also of the negotiations with the 
European Parliament. In fact, once the service is up to full speed (by 2013), EU 
offi  cials proper “should represent at least 60 % of all EEAS staff  at AD level” (includ-
ing those diplomats from the Member States who will have become EU offi  cials), 
while national diplomats should amount, in turn, to “at least 33 %”. 
Th e remaining gap between the two targets is probably meant to help manage the 
transition and deal with current temporary agents and especially with Seconded 
National Experts (SNEs), who were initially expected to play a bigger role in the 
overall set-up of the service yet are now being considered, instead, only for “specifi c 
cases” and in “a limited number”. 
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All EEAS offi  cials, however, will serve under the same rules and obligations. Espe-
cially those from the Member States, who are not to be transferred en bloc to the 
service, will be selected on the basis of “merit whilst ensuring adequate geographical 
and gender balance”, as the HR/VP Report reads. Th is means that “the staff  of the 
EEAS shall comprise a meaningful presence of nationals from all Member States” — a 
formulation that is now also included in the Decision, after lengthy and detailed 
negotiations within the “quadrilogue”[1]. For them, tours of duty in the service 
should in principle not exceed two four-year terms although, in exceptional cases, 
an extra two years can be granted. Yet mobility and rotation will be also ensured 
within the EEAS, in particular between the Brussels “headquarters” and the EU 
Delegations abroad.
In the initial phase, recruitment for the service will take place only from within the 
ranks of the three “founding” components, whereas after this date other offi  cials 
and experts (including from the European Parliament) will also be entitled to apply. 
In terms of timing, the EEAS is expected to start with an immediate block transfer 
of some 800 AD offi  cials from the Commission (three quarters) and the General 
Secretariat of the Council (one quarter, including the current Policy Unit). Some 
100 new posts (20 in Brussels and 80 in the Delegations) may be added shortly — 
for a draft 2010 amending budget of roughly EUR 9.5 million, as agreed with the 
European Parliament[2] — and some 300 more from 2011. 
Th e actual start of the EEAS — and the termination of DG RELEX as we know 
it — is therefore foreseen on 1 January 2011, namely one year (and one month) 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Included in the EEAS will be also the 135-plus EU (formerly EC) Delegations in 
third countries and international organizations — although the Lisbon Treaty was 
hardly explicit about this. Th e Heads of such Delegations will be directly account-
able to the HR/VP (Arts. 32 & 35 TEU) and her “corporate board”. While a single 
chain of command is expected to be in place in each Delegation, further arrange-
ments have been hammered out regarding the position of those offi  cials belonging 
[1] The initial wording in the draft Decision referred in fact to “the broadest possible geographical balance” among the 
Member States, which is also the wording enshrined in the staff  rules of both the Commission and the Council. The term 
“adequate” implies a less strict adherence to the principle of equality among the EU-27 and that no formal country quotas 
will be discussed or negotiated. The HR/VP, on the other hand, is committed to reporting every year on “the occupation 
of posts in the EEAS” to the Council and, now, also to the European Parliament. A comprehensive review is foreseen in 
2013, including “suggestions for additional specifi c measures to correct possible imbalances” — as requested in particular 
by the new Member States (EU-12).
[2] In the initial stages of the drafting of the Decision, much emphasis had been put on the principle of “budgetary 
neutrality” (no new/extra expenditure in the EU budget). This soon proved unrealistic in light of the need to bring on 
board diplomats from the Member States and create new temporary EU posts for them.
152
The Treaty of Lisbon — A Second Look at the Institutional Innovations
to Commission Directorates-General (such as trade or development) that are not 
under Ashton’s coordinating authority, and who have (and may wish) to receive 
separate instructions fl owing down from their direct Brussels hierarchy. A similar 
procedure has been agreed for expenditure, combining the preservation of the 
Commission’s own primary responsibility for its execution with the possibility of 
special transfers of power to Heads of Delegation whenever required.
Th e Council Decision on the establishment of the EEAS also includes an Annex 
with a detailed list of the existing departments and functions to be transferred 
directly to the service, including the Council’s Policy Unit, most of the Commis-
sion’s DG RELEX, the ACP-related geographic directorates of DG DEV — but 
not those in charge of budget execution, which remains a Commission prerogative, 
and neither Europaid or ECHO. 
Indeed, the European Parliament has extracted some important concessions from 
the Council in this domain: the annual spending programs in the development and 
humanitarian aid sectors will be mainly drafted by the relevant DGs in the Com-
mission, for instance, and the Commissioners themselves will have a substantial 
say at all stages (this, in turn, may have repercussions within the Commission and 
impinge upon Ashton’s role). Furthermore, the Parliament has obtained scrutiny 
not only (as expected) over the EEAS’ operational budget but also — albeit to a 
lesser extent — over its administrative budget proper.
Finally (and once again at the insistence of the European Parliament, broadly 
favorable to a “big” EEAS), the “support staff ” in the Delegations will also be part, 
eventually, of the external service. Th is may be the reason why media reports in the 
wake of the Madrid agreement went as far as to mention an eventual overall size of 
up to 8,000 offi  cials for the service. Size and fi gures, however, will inevitably depend 
on both the initial implementation of the EEAS and, above all, the direction that 
future negotiations over the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) for the 
EU budget — due to start in late 2011 and be concluded by 2012 — will take.
3.3. The Questions
Th e “design” which has emerged from the “quadrilogue” negotiations will have to 
be tested — and probably adjusted — over time in light of its gradual implemen-
tation. As was to be expected, in fact, it does not solve all the potential functional 
problems generated by the creation of the EEAS. In some cases, it even creates 
some that did not exist in the previous “dual” structure. 
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To start with, the bureaucratic separation between geographic and operational 
Directorates-General will facilitate the transfer of staff  from the Council and the 
Commission and also help reduce duplication and competition, but it risks setting 
up new barriers that go against the logic — inherent to the very concept of the 
EEAS — of an integrated and comprehensive policy approach. In other words, 
such compartments should not become silos, and ad hoc horizontal joint task forces 
may have to be established to fi ll possible gaps. 
Th is is, incidentally, an area where a specifi c role could be found for the Special 
Representatives (Art. 33 TEU) and/or dedicated Special/Personal Advisors. Yet 
neither the Treaty nor the Decision clarifi es what their status and role should resem-
ble. Over the past decade, in particular, these have varied enormously in terms of 
profi le, mandate, resources and timelines. In a couple of recent cases, interestingly, 
EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) were “double-hatted”[1], but it remains unclear 
where they could be placed (and what for) in the new “system”. 
Similarly, the functioning of the Council Working Groups that have existed so 
far has not been addressed (yet): exactly who is going to chair them is an unsolved 
issue at this stage — although the HR/VP is confi rmed as the “appointing author-
ity” — as is their precise number and scope in the new post-Lisbon “comitology” 
framework[2]. 
Moreover, some of the budgetary and auditing procedures inserted into the fi nal 
version of the Decision on the basis of the “quadrilogue” deal appear cumbersome 
and potentially intricate. Hailed by the MEPs as a victory, they may turn out to 
be a complicating factor in terms of decision- and policy-making (and a source of 
turf wars inside Brussels).
Finally, it is not fully clear what balance will eventually emerge between eff ectiveness 
and accountability. It is certainly true that the European Parliament has scored some 
important points in this domain. For one, Catherine Ashton will have to submit a 
fi rst report on the functioning of the EEAS — by the end of 2011 — not only to 
the Council, as initially foreseen, but also to the Commission and the European 
Parliament. Th is will further consolidate a de facto practice of co-decision for all 
things “architecturally” related to the service.
[1] On the EUSRs see GREVI, G., Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU Special Representatives, Chaillot Paper No. 106, (Paris, 
EUISS, October 2007).
[2] The formats of such Working Groups/Parties (currently more than 20) have varied a lot over time — some were 
chaired by the rotating Presidency, others by EU offi  cials — and some reorganization may prove necessary anyway. 
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It is also true that the European Parliament has forced the HR/VP to make it 
explicit that, when addressing the plenary in Strasbourg, she can be “deputized” 
only by fellow Commissioners or, when the agenda is CFSP/CSDP-related, by a 
serving Foreign Minister, either from the current Presidency or from the so-called 
“trio” of rotating Presidencies[1]. Indeed, MEPs had spoken out fi rmly against the 
possibility that, were the HR/VP unable to attend, “unelected offi  cials” would fi ll 
in for her.
Regarding top appointments in the EEAS (and other posts in the CSDP domain), 
however, the wording of the HR/VP Declaration on “political accountability” 
is much less fi rm. Hearings at and briefi ngs to the European Parliament and its 
relevant Committees by appointed representatives in the EU Delegations and/or 
CSDP operations can be requested and, arguably, granted. Still, the text (whose legal 
value is hardly comparable to that of the Decision proper) stops short of defi ning 
the level at which an obligation to do so may begin or end. 
Once again, in the months and years to come, concrete practice will probably 
establish quasi-legal precedents to this eff ect. It is also desirable that it generates on 
all sides an adequate “etiquette” for such sensitive inter-institutional relations. Both 
EU institutions and Member States should indeed bear in mind that, when all is 
said and done, the strategic rationale and ultimate ambition behind the establish-
ment of the EEAS was (and still is) the creation of a common culture and practice 
among European offi  cials and diplomats. In other words, beyond the current turf 
battles and bureaucratic politicking, the service is meant to become an instrument 
for the cross-fertilization of foreign policy-making across the EU and the inter-
changeability between national and European administrations.
Th e adjustments that the Decision on the EEAS introduces with respect to the 
strict “one-third” rule of thumb enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty refl ect the sheer 
fact that, if one looks at the rough fi gures on the relative size of the three main 
components of the service, DG RELEX and the Delegations far outnumber the 
relevant staff  from the Council General Secretariat (the ratio is in the region of 5:1 
or higher) — with the arrival of a signifi cant number of diplomats from the EU-27 
inevitably putting additional pressure on the EEAS budget. 
Th ere are, however, huge imbalances also among the Member States, in terms of 
both quantity and quality of eligible personnel. Th e pool of available offi  cials varies 
[1] This formulation is meant to leave some fl exibility for those cases in which the country holding the rotating EU 
Presidency may fi nd itself in an awkward legal and political situation: in 2012, for instance, the EU Council will be chaired 
by Denmark (which has an opt-out clause on defence policy) and Cyprus. 
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enormously between, say, Germany and Malta, and so does their level of experience 
and expertise. As a result, the procedure of selecting national diplomats “fi t for the 
service” is likely to be subject to innumerable factors and variables. Th is will prove 
particularly tricky especially in the start-up phase, when diff erences in background, 
culture, approach and also benefi ts — not only amongst the EU-27 but also between 
them and EU offi  cials — will be biggest. Over time, as the EEAS develops and 
grows, such imbalances and diff erences are bound to narrow. Common training[1] 
and rotation on the job should contribute to reducing them further.
Th is is why it is certainly wise to plan — as has already been done — a fi rst Report 
on the implementation of the EEAS already in 2011 (and not in 2012, as originally 
stated), and a more substantial and stringent review (possibly leading to a new 
Decision) by the end of 2013 — which would also fall within the context of the 
new MFF for the post-2013 budget.
Furthermore, any initial decision cannot possibly enshrine all the “evolutionary” 
aspects of the service — regarding inter alia recruitment and training requirements, 
career patterns inside and outside the EEAS proper, rotation between the Brus-
sels “headquarters” and the Delegations — which are likely to trigger additional 
attempts to modify the overall structure in the months ahead. 
In other words, the launch and development of the EEAS will probably occupy the 
entire term of all post-Lisbon institutions and possibly turn into one of the most 
important tests of their successful action and interaction.
4. THE NEW SYSTEM
Apart from and beyond the EEAS set-up, a number of political and functional 
unknowns still linger over the new external action “system” created by the Lisbon 
Treaty.
As already mentioned, some have to do with the internal functioning of the Com-
mission and the overall scope of the Union’s external action. Some others have to 
do with personalities, i.e. whether Van Rompuy, Barroso and Ashton will get along 
[1] Here, too, the European Parliament has been pushing for the creation of a sort of single European Diplomatic Acad-
emy — but has encountered strong opposition from both the Commission and the Member States, especially those 
keen on preserving or even enhancing their national “champions” in this domain. It seems therefore more likely that, at 
least initially, the example set by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) be followed, with specifi c modules 
being off ered by diff erent national and also EU centers (such as the College of Europe in Bruges/Natolin and the EUI in 
Florence) on a rotational and “virtual” basis. 
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(or not), and especially whether they will achieve a modus vivendi that is sustainable 
and, above all, benefi cial for the EU as a whole. 
Th ere are unknowns regarding the Foreign Ministries of the Member States, who 
will be confronted with new challenges in terms of both infl uence and staffi  ng. 
Some of them will face up to painful dilemmas: should they send “the best and the 
brightest” to the EEAS or keep them, and with what incentives in either case? 
All of them will have to be off ered terms of engagement conducive to making them 
responsible stakeholders in the new system. Th is will of course not apply only to 
the institutional set-up. In and of themselves, the HR/VP and the EEAS will not 
generate a common EU policy vis-à-vis, say, Russia or China: at best, they will 
facilitate its shaping and implementation. It is the Member States who must “buy” 
into the new system politically. Incidentally, this issue could become evident also 
in the fi eld, notably in those third countries where some EU countries have strong 
interests while others do not (and may not even be represented diplomatically), 
and it could end up aff ecting signifi cantly the way in which the local Heads of 
Delegation operate.
Some additional problems may still lie with the residual role and competences of the 
rotating EU Presidency. While the new system, once fully in place, will be entirely 
“Brussels-ised”, in terms of both location and impulse, individual Member States 
will still be chairing on a six-month rotational basis both the COREPER and some 
Council formations that may be relevant for the Union’s external action. Th is will 
demand the highest degree of inter-institutional coordination.
Politically also, as already mentioned at the beginning, some “niche” roles will 
maybe have to be studied — whether on an ad hoc basis or more systematically — 
for the rotating Presidency, once again, to keep them on board without reneging 
on the political rationale that led to the new Treaty provisions in this domain[1]. 
For its part, the European Parliament has already become a much more important 
institutional player in external action and foreign policy at large. Not only is it set-
ting conditions on the establishment and further development of the EEAS proper, 
but it is also trying to have an ever bigger say on expenditure, appointments and 
policy guidelines. Its clout in adjacent policy areas has also increased, be it internal 
security (as the dispute over SWIFT has proven), trade (the European Parliament 
[1] The Foreign Minister could for instance — the possibility has already been fl oated and partially tested during the 
Spanish Presidency — deputize for the HR/VP whenever her agenda makes attending a given event impossible. If turned 
into a formal rule, however, this could give the impression that the “old” system is still in place. 
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has acquired the right to approve or reject agreements), energy and even agriculture 
(now subject to co-decision).
Only time will tell whether all of this is suffi  cient to transform the European Parlia-
ment into a sort of “EU Congress”, with all the repercussions that this could have 
in terms of inter-institutional relations and policy-making. In any case, it would be 
counterproductive for the European Parliament to begin micro-managing foreign 
policy, especially considering its high heterogeneity. An adequate balance will thus 
have to be found. 
Tests and Trends
In terms of policy, it is still uncertain how the CSDP (formerly ESDP) dimension 
of the Union’s external action may develop. Th e Lisbon Treaty creates a more 
“permissive” framework in this domain, where a number of enabling clauses would 
permit new arrangements and initiatives to be put in place. 
Interestingly, the only case so far in which the new provisions have already had 
an impact is the decision, taken through a unanimous Declaration by the ten 
Ambassadors sitting on the WEU Council on 31 March 2010, to “terminate” the 
organization as an indirect consequence of the entry into force of Art. 42 TEU, 
which enshrines a qualifi ed mutual defence clause[1]. 
Apart from this, most new Treaty articles basically envisage actions and devel-
opments that have already been launched well ahead of the entry into force of 
the Treaty, be it the expansion of the scope of the so-called “Petersberg tasks” 
(Art. 43), the conduct of EU peace-building operations by only some Member 
States (Art. 44), or the establishment of the European Defence Agency (Art. 45), 
already created in 2004. For its part, the scheme envisaging “permanent structured 
cooperation” (PESCO) in defence matters [Arts 42 (6) - 46 TEU and related Pro-
tocol] represents a novelty that will put the willingness of the Member States to 
cooperate and integrate further in this domain to a decisive test. In all likelihood, 
much will depend on the views that will prevail next in Great Britain — without 
whose full engagement and commitment CSDP would be hard to pursue eff ectively, 
both politically and functionally. 
[1] The decision had already been fl oated by the Dutch government in 2003 (when it chaired both the EU and WEU 
Councils) in anticipation of the expected entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty, then put on ice until late 2009. 
Its actual implementation, however, may still take until late 2011, due especially to the complications related to the 
dismantling of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly based in Paris.
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Th is said, the Lisbon Treaty does off er a unique opportunity to generate not only 
better coordination and coherence, but even synergy between all the diff erent 
aspects of the Union’s external action: within CSDP, between its civilian and 
military spheres; in the wider domain of “security”, inter alia through the new so-
called “solidarity clause” (Art. 222 TFEU), which establishes an operational link 
between its internal and the external dimensions; within CFSP, between diplomacy 
and crisis management proper; and, more broadly, between all the various levers 
and instruments of external action and “foreign” policy that the Union has, in 
principle, at its disposal.
A key test of the post-Lisbon system will indeed be the actual functioning of these 
new “hybrid” structures and fi gures, starting with the HR/VP and the EEAS. Th ey 
represent the biggest innovation in the Treaty and, arguably, also its toughest 
challenge. Failure to produce signifi cant added value or, worse still, an increase in 
personal and bureaucratic infi ghting would cast a gloomy shadow over the Union’s 
international image and action, and it would also have negative repercussions on 
the broader EU internal political climate. Conversely, if the new system proves 
capable (over time) of improving on the eff ectiveness and also legitimacy of the 
Union on the international stage, the “hybrid” model could even be extended, both 
downstream and upstream.
Moreover, it is already apparent that both international relations at large and EU 
policy-making are becoming increasingly “presidential”: the key decisions are taken 
by the Heads of State or Government, in line also with domestic developments. Th is 
is why another big test for the Lisbon Treaty will be the interplay between the two 
Presidents, Van Rompuy and Barroso; the way in which they will cooperate and/or 
compete; the way in which their role(s) will be perceived both internally and externally; 
and the extent to which they will rely (or not) upon the EEAS structures.
5. THE NEW ENVIRONMENT
Th is said, the ultimate test will probably come from outside the Union. Th e new 
Treaty and the resulting structures are only a necessary but still insuffi  cient condi-
tion for a more eff ective external action of the EU. Th eir impact on the system 
remains diffi  cult to assess in full, yet their implementation will not occur in a 
vacuum: it will be signifi cantly infl uenced and shaped by external challenges.
Paradoxically, after fostering interdependence as a peace project (such was the 
essence of European integration over the past half century), the EU now feels vul-
nerable to interdependence at the global level. Interdependence, however, exists 
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not only between diff erent areas of the world: it is growing also between policy 
issues, both within and across regions. Action against climate change cannot be 
eff ectively coordinated worldwide without addressing also energy- and trade-related 
problems. Regulation of fi nancial markets in only one country (or continent) is 
virtually impossible and, at any rate, it requires tightly coordinated intervention on 
a large scale. Migration fl ows cannot be governed without adequate development 
and human security-related actions. Nuclear non-proliferation initiatives need to 
be credibly linked to shared global approaches to energy security. And durable 
peace cannot be secured without justice and reconciliation.
In other words, external and “foreign” policies are no longer what they used to be. 
For their part, the existing international institutions seem incapable of connecting 
all the dots: multilateral bodies are too specialized and too fragmented. Th e EU 
could make such connections, at least in theory, as it does have both tested and 
fresh mechanisms to do precisely that. However, in virtually all these bodies and 
fora, Europeans are largely over-represented, making for up to one third of UN 
Security Council and G-20 seats as well as voting weights in the IMF and World 
Bank. Th ey are also, more often than not, under-performing, at least as a Union. 
And this contributes to weakening the multilateral system, as most emerging powers 
no longer accept the credibility of the current set-up. 
Too Many Europeans, Too Little EU
A more eff ective “Europe” in the world needs the Lisbon Treaty as its starting point. 
Yet a more eff ective multilateral system needs fewer Europeans and more EU: in 
order to retain (or regain) its infl uence, Europe must streamline its presence. Th is 
is not simply a matter of quantity but also of quality, and it requires sensitive and 
sensible trade-off s both inside and outside the EU. It also becomes a very strong 
demand from most EU partners. 
Th e Lisbon Treaty provides some building blocks, and the HR/VP and the EEAS 
are important cornerstones of the new edifi ce. Th e arrangement between Barroso 
and Van Rompuy on G-8/G-20 summits — whereby the EU as such will be rep-
resented by a single delegation[1] — is a small constructive inter-institutional step 
in that direction, although it leaves some grey areas that could lead to new frictions 
sooner rather than later and gives a good fl avour of the high complexity of the new 
[1] Each will speak on matters pertaining to his own legal and political competence. In principle, therefore, Van Rompuy 
is expected to be “fi rst” President in the G-8, while Barroso continues to be spokesperson for issues falling under Com-
mission competence (and “fi rst” President) in the G-20. 
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institutional setting. Still, it may help pave the way for bigger and bolder ones in 
other international bodies.
In terms of protocol proper, the fact that the EU has at long last acquired full legal per-
sonality in its own right (Art. 47 TEU) has changed little so far in terms of substance. 
Before Lisbon, for example, Ambassadors seeking accreditation to the EU presented 
letters of credence both to the President of the Commission (EC and Euratom) and 
to the rotating Presidency (EU proper), while only the Commission President signed 
the letters of credence and recall for Heads of EC Delegations abroad. Now Ambas-
sadors continue to present their letters of credence to Barroso — accrediting them 
to the EU (into which the EC has been subsumed) and Euratom — but do the same 
also with Van Rompuy instead of the rotating Presidency.
Th e situation is much less clear and automatic when it comes to the Union’s rep-
resentation in international organizations and conventions. True, the nameplate 
“European Union” is now replacing that of “European Community” in various fora. 
Beyond the symbolism, however, a maze of very diff erent arrangements governs 
the international presence of the EU proper. 
In most multilateral bodies, all Member States are represented and the EC/EU has 
only observer status[1]; in the WTO and the FAO, the Commission has full status 
alongside the Member States; in a few highly specialized international agreements 
(on agricultural goods or metals), the EC/EU is a full contracting party on behalf 
of all the Member States: in the World Bank or the IMF, fi nally, the EU has no 
status whatsoever, while some member States are “clustered” in ad hoc groups. 
Such a “patchwork Europe” is the combined result of pre-existing legal compe-
tences, political constraints, simple precedents, special agreements, administrative 
inertia as well as widespread reluctance to overhaul this state of aff airs. Addressing 
it requires both pressure from outside and determination from inside. Th e external 
pressure already exists in abundance. On the other hand, a gradual upgrading and 
streamlining of the international presence of the Union (which often languishes 
[1] The way in which the Member States coordinate (or not) within such bodies varies a lot already among those — like 
the OSCE or the Council of Europe — where the EU-27 alone make for nearly half of the overall membership. The most 
intricate case in point is arguably that of the United Nations, where the Union is considered an international organization 
in its own right. As a result, any possible enhancement of its status is seen as a precedent for others (e.g. the Arab League), 
and thus blocked. Recently, the previous EC Delegation to the UNO was merged with the Offi  ce of the CGS created a few 
years ago and put under a single “double-hatted” Head. Moreover, an ad hoc arrangement with the Spanish EU Presidency 
and the other EU members sitting on the Security Council allowed Catherine Ashton to take the fl oor there on behalf of 
the Union in early May 2010: perhaps not an absolute premiere (Javier Solana had done that on a number of occasions 
in the past), but certainly one for the HR/VP and the new EU. Finally, in late summer 2010 the EU-27 submitted to the UN 
General Assembly proposals to enhance the observer status of the EU by giving its representatives the opportunity to 
take the fl oor, circulate papers, and table amendments.
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with the rank of observer even where its competences may be substantial) should 
be on the agenda of European policy-makers and diplomats in the years to come. 
Yet again, the Lisbon Treaty does off er a much better basis for this. Even with it, 
however, the EU will probably still have no single telephone number, nor will it 
speak with one voice. Still, a common, well-functioning, Brussels-based switchboard 
(connecting also Catherine Ashton and the EEAS) may prove crucial in helping the 
Europeans get their act together and may possibly contribute to shaping a better 
international system in line with the realities of the 21st century.
163
 
DEFENCE: 
PERMANENT STRUCTURED 
COOPERATION

165
Defence: Permanent Structured Cooperation
1. THE ESDP’S FIRST DECADE: PROMISE UNFULFILLED
Th e fi rst 10 years of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have been a 
disappointment. 
ESDP was conceived at the Franco-British summit at Saint-Malo in 1998, and born 
the following year at the European Council meeting in Helsinki, where EU leaders 
set an ambitious “Headline Goal” — that, by 2003, Europe should be able to fi eld 
within 60 days a force of 60.000 and sustain it for a year of deployment. 
By 2003, the European Council was also ready to endorse an equally ambitious 
European Security Strategy (ESS). Acknowledging that security for Europeans 
today lies not in manning the ramparts or preparing to resist invasion, but in 
tackling crises abroad before they become breeding-grounds for terrorism, inter-
national traffi  cking, and unmanageable immigration fl ows, Europe’s leaders called 
for a Europe which is “more active, more capable, more coherent” in its approach to 
international crisis management.
Measured against these ambitions, ESDP’s fi rst 10 years have been a disappoint-
ment. A fl urry of crisis-management operations have duly been undertaken — 
but were generally of limited scope and duration. Th e big intervention force 
promised by 2003 was not achieved — and the Helsinki Headline Goal has 
been quietly forgotten. Th e sustained eff ort of reform that would have been 
required to re-tool Europe’s militaries for expeditionary operations has largely 
gone unmade.
In synthesis, ESDP’s fi rst decade has been characterised by a persistent gulf between 
rhetoric and behaviour. Member States and Brussels institutions have ignored the 
need for coherent strategies, improvised important operations, and taken refuge 
in process as an easier option than delivering real-world change. A lack of real 
resolve to pool resources, modernise armed forces and deploy them has hobbled 
ESDP’s progress, whether in operations, crisis-management capabilities, or indus-
trial capacities. 
Operations. 24 operations to date (of which 7 military) demonstrate activity. And 
they have generally succeeded — in their own terms. But they have been limited 
and cautious, with equivalent impact — and almost all have been a nightmare to 
initiate, as Member States compete to avoid contributing. No strategy is discernible 
in the pattern of operations — so fi ve operations over 5 years in Congo were fol-
lowed by blunt rejection of the UN Secretary General’s request for help in Eastern 
Congo in 2008. No serious retrospective evaluation has been attempted.
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Capabilities. One reason for Member States’ reluctance to contribute is incapac-
ity. Europe’s collective defence spending has run at around 200 billion euros per 
annum for a number of years up to the fi nancial crisis — signifi cantly more than 
the spending of Russia and China combined.
But it is largely wasted on static Cold War militaries. Everyone agrees that budgets 
should be directed away from heavy metal and high explosives towards mobile, well-
protected and well-networked forces able to operate with precision and restraint, 
and in distant theatres. But conservatism and vested interests continue to favour 
tanks and fi ghter jets over helicopters and satellites. Th ree-quarters of Europe’s 1.8 
million military personnel cannot operate outside national territory. Europeans 
can routinely keep only 4% (some 80.000) deployed — the equivalent US fi gure 
is 210.000, or 15% of their 1.4 million uniforms. 
Taken together, Europeans badly need to reduce their numbers in uniform and 
shift resources into equipment and research spend. An imperfect but indicative 
measure of progress in this regard is investment per soldier. 
Only six Member States — Luxembourg, Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, France 
and Germany — exceed the EU average of 24.000 euros per soldier. Th is sum is 
less than one-fi fth of what the US invests in equipping each member of its fi ghting 
forces, present and future. 
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It is often thought that Europe can make up for military feebleness by its civilian 
capabilities — the ability to send police, government experts, etc., to crisis-hit 
countries. Such elements of the so-called “comprehensive approach” to crisis man-
agement may indeed be as important as military force. But the belief that Europe 
is well-endowed with civilian capabilities is an illusion. With some 2000 personnel 
deployed on EULEX Kosovo, the cupboard is bare. Th e 400-post police training 
mission in Afghanistan remains chronically undermanned.
Industrial capacities. Th e picture is no happier here either. As European Defence 
Ministers have acknowledged, persistent underfunding of research and technology 
means that Europe is living of past investment. “We recognize that a point has now 
been reached when we need fundamental change in how we manage the business of 
defence in Europe — and that time is not on our side”[1]. Th e change they prescribe is 
the creation of a truly European defence technological and industrial base, which is 
more than the sum of its national parts — with Member States increasingly pool-
ing their requirements, and satisfying them from an integrated European market. 
Th ey also stress the need to “spend more, spend better, and spend more together” on 
defence research.
Some useful steps to integrate the defence market have been taken. Modest progress 
is being made, notably in the European Defence Agency (EDA), on promoting 
joint investment. But Europeans invest only one-sixth of what the US spends on 
Research and Development — and spend a trivial 1.25% of their total defence 
expenditure on Research and Technology. Unless this trend is rapidly corrected, 
the terminal decline of the European defence industry can be foreseen.
Meanwhile, the defence industry consolidation of the 1990s has stalled. Promotion 
of national industries especially in land- and sea-systems persists with the inevitable 
duplication and dissipation of eff ort and resources. In some ways we are moving 
backwards: if EADS (the Franco-German-Spanish conglomerate) did not exist, 
few believe it would be possible to create it today.
As a result of all this, much of Europe’s defence spending is wasted. In terms of 
real, useful military (or indeed civilian) capability, Europe punches greatly below 
its weight — with the impact of continent-wide fi scal austerity still to work its way 
through into the inevitable further defence cuts.
[1] A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (Brussels, EDA, 14 May 2007), retrievable at: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=30&id=211.
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2. THE GROWING TEMPTATION OF THE “BIG SWITZERLAND” OPTION
But, does this really matter? In the eyes of US Defence Secretary Gates, it certainly 
does: refl ecting in early 2010 on what he saw as a growing pacifi sm in Europe, he 
declared that “Th e demilitarisation of Europe, where large swaths of the general public 
and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it, has gone from 
a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting 
peace in the 21st”[1]. So are European publics and elites essentially decadent? Or are 
they perhaps just smart enough to understand how the security environment is 
changing around them?
Th e passing of the occidental millenarian dream. It is hard now to recall the 
sense of optimism with which the old millennium closed. Liberal democracy had 
triumphed across the globe: the victors of the Cold War — predominantly Amer-
ica — seemed to have both the right and the duty to fare forth, right the world’s 
wrongs, and generally make it a better place. Milosevic was humbled in Kosovo; 
NATO and the EU were enlarging, to establish a vast new swathe of stability and 
security in Eastern Europe. Tyrants everywhere were in retreat. Now, of course, 
most of this millenarian zeal has simply run into the sands of two debilitating Mid-
dle Eastern wars. Today public opinion increasingly feels that Afghanistan is not 
working; teaching the rest of the world to elect good men, in Woodrow Wilson’s 
phrase, turns out to be a good deal harder than advertised. Th e policy of heroic 
interventionism has run its course.
Furthermore, not all Member States amongst the EU 15 were equally enthusiastic 
about the activist European Security Strategy when it was endorsed. Now the 
Union has 12 more members, none with a colonial history, and few with much 
appetite for foreign adventures. Th e practical experience of recent years, notably 
under NATO’s fl ag in Afghanistan, has also dampened support for expeditionary 
operations. 
Th e absence of any serious classical military threat. Yet, if not interventionism, 
what? For the reality is that Europe has become quite a safe place. War in Europe 
seems, for the foreseeable future, simply inconceivable. Russia, diffi  cult neighbour 
though it may be, is no sort of conventional military threat. As Secretary Gates 
wrote in Foreign Aff airs in 2009: “Russia’s conventional military, although vastly 
improved since its nadir in the late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. 
[1] Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defence Robert M. GATES at NATO Strategic Concept Seminar Future of NATO, 
National Defence University, Washington, D.C., Tuesday, February 23, 2010, retrievable at: http://www.defence.gov/
speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1423.
169
Defence: Permanent Structured Cooperation
And adverse demographic trends in Russia will likely keep those conventional forces in 
check”[1]. Only jihadist terrorism poses a direct risk — but we now know that the 
idea of rooting it out by military means is self-defeating. Of course, new threats 
(such as cyber warfare) can be conjured. 
Th e coming budget onslaught. Furthermore, the defence sector will obviously 
be a primary target in the mother of all budget consolidations that Europe is now 
entering into. Squeezed between the enormous weight of their rapidly increasing 
debt and the proximate threat of aging on their future budgets, the Member States 
can be expected to contemplate ruthless cuts in defence orders and personnel. 
All these factors might very reasonably argue for a less ambitious, and expensive, 
approach to European defence and security — an approach which took a leaf from 
the Swiss book and adopted the principles of stay home, keep your guard up as 
necessary, but mind your own business.
Such a conclusion would, however, fail to take account of the extraordinary, and 
extraordinarily rapid, changes in the wider geostrategic landscape which globalisa-
tion has triggered. America, so recently the “hyperpower”, now fi nds itself primus 
inter pares in a genuinely multipolar world. Th e West, whether understood to 
mean free-market capitalism or democratic values, is no longer the unchallenged 
arbiter of global norms. A massive redistribution of global power to the south and 
east is underway, with the fi nancial crisis acting as an accelerator. Th e full infl u-
ence of the rising powers, most prominently China, India and Brazil, is only just 
beginning to be felt.
Th e point is not that the old demonology of the Soviet Union and Islamic jihadists 
should now be re-peopled with emerging powers. Th e point is that Europeans’ almost 
eff ortless ability to shape global aff airs to suit their own preferences, as junior partners 
of the US, is now slipping away from them. Th e real threat to European security, 
looking a decade or two ahead, is more insidious than any overt military menace — it 
is the threat of irrelevance, of being shoved to the margins of world aff airs whilst the 
global future, and the rules by which it runs, are made by others.
Th us, keeping an effi  cient though limited military instrument is one essential way 
to retain a measure of infl uence in a world where the US is turning away from the 
Atlantic and “emerging powers” — led by China — are increasingly calling the 
shots. Th is is not just a matter of defending European interests, such as continued 
access to natural resources at a time of growing scarcity. It is also a matter of val-
[1] GATES, R. M., A Balanced Strategy, Foreign Aff airs, Vol. 88, No. 1, Jan/Febr 2009.
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ues — of continued projection of support for human rights and for the restraint 
of power by law in which Europeans continue to believe. Even “demilitarised” 
European publics continue persistently to confi rm to pollsters their support for 
an active European role in international peacekeeping.
It is hard to say it better than former US Ambassador to NATO Victoria Nuland: 
“Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs — a 
stronger, more capable European defence capacity. An ESDP with only ‘soft power’ is 
not enough”[1]. 
3. THE BIG INNOVATION OF THE LISBON TREATY: THE PIONEER GROUP
Th e Lisbon Treaty could help signifi cantly in diff erent respects. It can strengthen 
Europe’s appetite, and ability, to conduct a common foreign policy — because 
common external security and defence eff orts need that context and framework. Th e 
Treaty also strongly emphasises the need for joint endeavours such as multinational 
formations, European equipment programmes, and other EDA activities. Th e 
ultimate aim, of course, is to improve defence capabilities across the board and to 
provide more operational forces, whether for rapid deployment (Battlegroups) or for 
longer-term advisory and local capacity-building work. Th e Petersberg Tasks have 
been extended to “include joint disarmament operations […] military advice and 
assistance tasks” and counter-terrorism actions. Finally, the Treaty provides for two 
other interesting (but not very impressive as far as their concrete eff ect!) amend-
ments to the CFSP including the “mutual defence clause” — which obliges Member 
States to protect any other Member State under military attack — and a “mutual 
solidarity clause” — which urges greater cooperation between national diplomatic 
missions vis-à-vis EU delegations, and the protection of any Member State subject 
to terrorist attacks or natural disasters.
However, the fundamental progress comes from the recognition of the need for 
diff erentiation in the fi eld of defence — the recognition that not all Member States 
will be either willing or able to move ahead at the same pace, and that means must 
therefore be found to permit a pioneer group, or groups, to push ahead with forms 
of cooperation which others may not wish or be able to join. Th is is the essence 
of the Treaty’s provisions on “permanent structured cooperation” — PESCO — 
essentially Title V, Art. 42 para. 6 TEU, Art. 46 TEU and Protocol No 10.
[1] Speech to the Paris Press Club on 22 February 2008.
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Th e PESCO concept acknowledges two fundamental truths about European defence 
which, in the absence of more fl exible arrangements, will inevitably slow progress to 
a crawl. First, no Member State will allow itself to be forced to enter into a confl ict, 
or to change how it spends its defence budget, by “Brussels” — whether an EU insti-
tution, or a majority of its partners. And second, a signifi cant minority of Member 
States demonstrates, by their reluctance to make any serious investment in defence, 
or by their tendency to sit on their hands when the call goes out for contributions to 
crisis-management operations, that they really do not want to play. 
Such sovereign decisions should be respected. But there is a corollary: non-players 
should not insist on a seat at the table, and on holding the enterprise back to the pace 
of the slowest. So, in defence, it is time to move on from the traditional “convoy” 
approach — to accept the reality of a “multi-speed” Europe, and to allow “pioneer 
groups” of the willing to move things forward when not all are ready to join in.
Th e debates taking place since the pioneer group concept fi rst appeared in the “Con-
stitution” have helped to clarify four key principles for the approach. First, just as 
no one should be forced to do what he does not want in defence, so no one should 
be allowed to hold back others who do. Second, the formation of pioneer groups 
needs to take account of the political willingness of diff erent Member States; but it 
should be based on transparent and objective criteria, and specifi c commitments. 
Th ird, the formation of groups and the corresponding distribution of infl uence need 
to refl ect the multi-faceted nature of European defence and security eff orts, and 
the diversity of the Member States; the aim should be to include as many countries 
as possible, in any area where they have something worthwhile to off er. Fourth, 
inclusivity should nonetheless have its limits: non-contributing passengers should 
not be allowed to slow the caravan down, and infl uence should be proportional to 
the stake each Member State holds in the enterprise.
Th e Lisbon Treaty establishes a clear legal basis for that. It allows for a self-selecting 
group of Member States “whose military capabilities fulfi l higher criteria” and which 
“have made more binding commitments to one another in this area” to establish PESCO 
(Art. 42 para. 6 TEU). Th e attraction is obvious: a vanguard will not be held back with 
the less competent or less committed. It remains to be seen whether this vanguard 
can be a small one, since non-participating countries take part in the launching vote. 
Member States will compete to avoid exclusion (a continuing eff ect, since promotion 
and relegation are envisaged).
Th e texts are relatively general but Protocol No. 10 establishes a few constraints. 
Th e PESCO is conditionally open to the Member States. Any State which wants 
to participate must undertake to “(a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence 
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capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where 
appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, 
and in the activity of the EDA” and “(b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the 
latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted 
combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group”. 
Point (a) suggests that commitments may be considered as satisfactory. Point (b) 
is more cut-and-dried, but in practice all Member States except Malta have found 
a place in the battlegroups initiative.
Essentially, structured cooperation in defence is thus more fl exible than “enhanced 
cooperation”. It is not conditioned by a minimal quorum of participants. No 
threshold is imposed to entrants: achievement of admission criteria can be deferred 
provided that the Member State concerned commits to achieve them over time. 
Th e construction of a multi-speed ESDP should be based less on past performance 
than on new commitments Member States are prepared to take on, as consensus 
develops on what criteria should be agreed, and what targets set for those who 
wish to be part of pioneer groups. So no-one is necessarily excluded. However, 
members which do not respect their commitments face suspension by qualifi ed 
majority vote of the other participating Member States. Structured cooperation is 
launched by qualifi ed majority vote. All implementation decisions are submitted 
to the unanimity rule amongst the participants. 
To a signifi cant extent, the PESCO concept is simply a development of approaches 
already implemented in the context of the European Defence Agency (EDA). 
Belonging to the Agency is a matter of choice for each Member State (though 
all except Denmark have chosen to do so). And under the EDA’s “big tent”, dif-
ferent groups of Member States are able to form cooperations as they wish, with 
transparency for all but no obligation on the initiators of specifi c projects to accept 
additional members if they do not want to. 
Indeed, following the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force some Member States — 
unsurprisingly, mainly the relatively weaker defence performers who could fi nd 
themselves embarrassed by having to choose between raising their game and fi nding 
themselves excluded from PESCO — have argued that PESCO is unnecessary, and 
that all the fl exibility needed for small-group cooperation and diff erential speeds 
of advance is already available within the Agency. Th is, however, ignores three 
key points. First, the prospect of a degree of political exposure which these poorer 
performers fi nd uncomfortable will by the same token be a useful incentive to dis-
courage free-riding on the eff orts of others. Second, as we discuss below, PESCO 
off ers the opportunity to aff ord the relatively stronger performers a relatively bigger 
voice in the direction of the EDA, which will strengthen that organisation. And 
173
Defence: Permanent Structured Cooperation
third and most important, PESCO will encourage cooperation between Member 
States at the wholesale level, whereas the Agency operates at the retail level. Th at 
is to say, the EDA helps Member States to work together on a project-by-project 
basis; PESCO will enable them to cooperate programme-by-programme. On that 
basis, initial political decisions and fi nancial commitments will allow cooperations 
to stride forward by the metre rather than shuffl  e ahead centimetre-by-centimetre 
as tends to be the case today.
4. THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS
Th ree main steps are needed for the implementation of PESCO. 
Selection. Some basic qualifying criteria should be set for securing a seat at the 
table. Th ree criteria seem fundamental: to spend enough on defence (measured by 
percentage of GDP); to take defence modernisation seriously, so as to produce use-
able armed forces (measured by investment per soldier); and to be prepared to use 
them (percentage deployed on operations). Th e two Figures beneath set out the data 
for levels of spending and deployment record, based on three-year averages.[1]
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[1] An obstacle on the selection road remains the lack of proper information. Objective criteria and standards require 
reliable data and this is in short supply. The 2008 dossier of the International Institute for Strategic Studies on European 
Military Capabilities, the product of three years’ research, is an important new source.; but it is already losing currency. 
There is, for example, no central record of who has contributed what to the 24 ESDP operations undertaken so far. The 
EDA has gathered some of the best data from Member States on the basis of collectively-agreed defi nitions, which the 
Agency, however, cannot verify independently. Some Member States refuse to release part of their data, but estimates 
are usually possible; Denmark, not being an EDA member, does not provide any. 
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Fig. 3
Percentage of Active Forces Deployed (Average 2005-2007)
Source: IISS (European Military Capabilities, June 2008)
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Against this background, the next decision is on “how high to set the bar”. As 
noted above, pioneer groups do not need to be too exclusive. Th ey are usually 
thought of as relatively small — maybe 6 or 8 — but would it really be sensible to 
discourage the majority of Member States by excluding them? Would not many 
take this as permission to give up? Would it not make better sense to reverse the 
proportions, excluding from PESCO only a minority of the worst performing 
Member States? For example, setting base criteria of 1% of GDP spent and 2% 
of troops deployed would, on the evidence of Figures 2 and 3 above, exclude only 
10 Member States — Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta for spending too 
little, and Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Portugal and Spain for staying 
home. And ideally of course the number would be lower still, when at least some 
reacted by improving their performance.
Defi nition of objectives. Specialist pioneer groups should be set up for each of 
the main arenas for boosting Europe’s defence capabilities — military capability 
development, mutualisation of defence infrastructure, research and technology, 
armaments, and perhaps others. Each such group would have its own qualifying 
criteria, such as spending a minimum percentage of the national defence budget 
on R&D, and qualifying commitments, quantifi ed where possible (to cooperate 
more closely, pooling eff orts and resources). 
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Determination of a hard core. From these specialist groups, a core group could 
be established, embracing those Member States who contribute most to most areas 
of activity.
To put it more poetically, European defence would turn into a fl ower, composed 
of diff erent petals. Th ese would represent diff erent areas of defence cooperation (for 
example, research and technology; or joint training; or shared capability planning). 
At the heart of the fl ower centre will be found the Member States who contribute 
most to most. 
A key reason for troubling to identify such a core group lies in the relationship 
between PESCO and the EDA. Th e Treaty makes plain that this is to be close: 
participation in EDA projects is noted in the Treaty as a potential criterion (or 
commitment), and would certainly seem germane to several of the specialist groups 
suggested above. And it is the EDA which, under the Treaty, is to provide the objec-
tive assessments of Member State performance against criteria and commitments. 
Th e principle of strongest voice for strongest performers could therefore be given 
eff ective substance by aff ording each specialist group a privileged role in setting 
the EDA’s agendas and preparing business for the Agency’s Steering Board. Th e 
“core” group (the centre of the fl ower) would help prepare business for the Defence 
Ministers’ Steering Board — and thus have privileged voices in setting the whole 
agenda and direction of the Agency.
To conclude, in this framework, three options may be contemplated. A restrictive 
approach will limit strongly the number of participating Member States. Th is 
would of course simplify the management of the cooperation. On the other side, 
PESCO will become less representative. Th is could also be interpreted as a tentative 
to dominate CFSP through the military instrument. An extensive approach will 
try to incorporate all Member States in PESCO. Th is huge heterogeneity would 
complicate the management of the cooperation and reduce the investment incen-
tives. An intermediate approach, as suggested above, could gather a majority of 
Member States, with a minimal level of defence investment and commitment. It 
would be, hopefully, suffi  ciently representative and suffi  ciently effi  cient. 
Th is is important, including for other realms than defence. Th e European Union 
has become quite diffi  cult to manage with 27 Member States (and possibly 29 in a 
few years). Enhanced cooperation off ers a path to smoothen this problem. PESCO 
could be seen, in that light, as an institutional laboratory for other projects. Its 
success would have a real impact. 
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Whatever approach is chosen, the coming years are going to be very challenging 
for the defence sector in Europe. Th e heavy pressure of public fi nances’ consolida-
tion in all Members States combined with the absence of a direct military threat 
could provoke quite a drastic reduction of the defence outlays. In that context, 
the Lisbon Treaty off ers a very important opportunity to get more defence for less 
bucks. However, this will not happen without a strong political will to surmount 
the numerous bureaucratic and business obstacles that have been quite visible 
during the last 10 years. Th e ESDP’s fi rst decade has been disappointing, but if its 
lessons are correctly understood by the Heads of State or Government, the second 
one could still become more impressive.
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Simplifi ed Treaty Revision Possibilities within the Lisbon Treaty
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e long and painful process of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty illustrated, once again, 
the need - especially in an enlarged EU - for more fl exible mechanisms to adapt 
the EU institutional framework and substantive policy options to the rapidly 
changing reality. Indeed, only six months into the Lisbon Treaty’s existence, there 
have already been at least two debates in which talk of potential amendments to 
the Treaty fi gured prominently. Admittedly, the amendment of Protocol No 36 
on the number of MEPs which was approved on the 23rd of June 2010 during 
a “fi fteen minutes Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)”[1] was more due to the 
late entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty than to its substantive inadequacy.[2] 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the adoption of an aid package for Greece on the 
basis of Art. 122 TFEU[3] as a provisional solution[4], Germany, supported to some 
extent by a proposal from the ECB[5], continues to propagate the need for a Treaty 
change to avoid future Eurozone crises by establishing the indispensible economic 
policy coordination and surveillance (possibly including a “European Monetary 
Fund”[6]).[7] 
Th ese examples indicate the illusionary character of any attempt to adopt “a Treaty 
revision which would end all Treaty revisions”. Hence, the diffi  culty of obtaining 
unanimous agreement at an Intergovernmental Conference and subsequent rati-
fi cation by all Member States according to their constitutional procedures (which 
includes referenda in some countries) seriously challenges the Union’s adaptability, 
and is clearly exacerbated by its growing membership. Th e participants to the Con-
vention were strongly aware of this problem and attempted to introduce alternative 
revision strategies to facilitate this process. Unfortunately, these simplifi ed revision 
routes were already seriously crippled during the IGC adopting the Constitutional 
[1] Which then still needed to be ratifi ed by the national parliaments.
[2] See the Spanish proposal for amendment which was adopted as such, at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/
en/09/st17/st17196.en09.pdf.
[3] http://www.euractiv.com/en/fi nancial-services/eu-sealed-plan-shield-euro-speculators-news-493956.
[4] See however the statements made in the Financial Times of 28 May 2010 by Pierre LELLOUCHE claiming that this fi nancial 
stabilisation mechanism does in fact amount to a Treaty amendment to the “no bail-out clause”, retrievable at: http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d6299cae-69b5-11df-8432-00144feab49a.html.
[5] ECB, Reinforcing Economic Governance in the Euro Area, 10 June 2010, retrievable at: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/
pub/pdf/other/reinforcingeconomicgovernanceintheeuroareaen.pdf; note also the suggestion to include such Treaty 
change in the accession Treaty for Croatia.
[6] http://www.euractiv.com/en/euro/eu-odds-treaty-change-european-monetary-fund-news-352202.
[7] http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/nn_704284/Content/EN/Artikel/2010/03/2010-03-10-merkel-fi llon__en.html; Both 
Commission President Barroso and European Council President Van Rompuy have, however, rejected the idea of Treaty 
revision at this stage: http://euobserver.com/843/30129; http://euobserver.com/18/30132.
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Treaty. Yet, although highly insuffi  cient, these simplifi ed revision procedures and 
passerelles, in combination with the improved enhanced cooperation mechanism[1], 
might still provide some opening to make adaptations to the Lisbon Treaty and 
are thus worth taking a closer look at.[2]
2. “GENERAL” SIMPLIFIED REVISION PROCEDURE IN ART. 48 TEU
Aside from reforming the ordinary revision procedure to incorporate the Conven-
tion-method [Art. 48 (3) TEU], the Lisbon Treaty also introduces two general 
simplifi ed revision procedures [Art. 48 (6)-(7) TEU].
2.1.  In Respect of Part III of TFEU “Union Policies and Internal Actions” 
[Art. 48 (6) TEU]
A Member State, the European Parliament and the Commission can request the 
European Council for an amendment to all or part of the provisions of Part III 
of TFEU relating to Union Policies and Internal Actions. Such amendments are, 
however, subject to strict conditions. Indeed, the European Council has to adopt 
its amendment decision by unanimity and in doing so it cannot “increase the 
competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties”. Even more importantly, these 
amendments will still need to be ratifi ed by all Member States according to their 
constitutional procedures.
2.2. “General Passerelle” [Art. 48 (7) TEU]
An additional mechanism is the so-called “general passerelle” clause allowing the 
European Council to adapt, on its own initiative, the voting requirements or 
decision-making procedure laid down in a Treaty provision from unanimity to 
qualifi ed majority voting (QMV) and from the special legislative procedure to the 
ordinary legislative procedure.
Again, however, this possibility is subject to important restrictions. For one, its 
application is limited to the provisions of the TFEU and Title V of the TEU.[3] 
Secondly, aside from the need for the European Council to adopt such a decision 
[1] See First Lisbon Study, for an analysis of the improvements made to the enhanced cooperation mechanism, pp. 
97-114.
[2] See also in that sense the Conclusion of the First Lisbon Study, pp. 145-147.
[3] Note that a move from a special to an ordinary legislative procedure logically does not apply to the CFSP (Title V 
TEU) since no legislative acts can be adopted in this area (see Art. 24 TEU).
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by unanimity and obtain the consent of the European Parliament, the national 
parliaments de facto obtain the right to “veto” this decision within a six-month 
period.[1] Moreover, in respect of decisions with military implications or in the area 
of defence, no such adaptation from unanimity to QMV is permitted. 
It should be noted that Art. 353 TFEU explicitly excludes the application of this 
“general passerelle” in respect of the voting and decision-making procedures laid 
down in the following articles: Art. 311 paras 1 & 4 TFEU relating to the decisions 
on the “own resources”, Art. 312 (2), para. 2 TFEU on the adoption of Multiannual 
Financial Frameworks[2], Art. 352 TFEU incorporating the “fl exibility clause” and 
Art. 354 TFEU on the suspension of membership rights.
3. ADDITIONAL PASSERELLES AND PASSERELLE-TYPE PROVISIONS 
THROUGHOUT THE LISBON TREATY
In addition to these general simplifi ed revision procedures, the Lisbon Treaty also 
contains various specifi c provisions providing for the possibility to amend their 
content without the need to pass by the ordinary revision procedure.
3.1. Various Domains
Art. 31 (3) TEU• : Whereas, in principle, action within the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy remains subject to unanimity, the European Council is 
given the power to bring additional matters of this area under a QMV-rule.[3] 
Again, however, it cannot do so in respect of decisions with military implica-
tions or in the area of defence. 
Art. 153 (2), para. 4 TFEU• : In line with the current Art. 137 (2) of the EC-
Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty allows the Council to move from unanimity and 
[1] See also Art. 6 of Protocol No 1 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union. This requirement was 
added at the 2003-2004 IGC and seriously reduced the potential added value of this general passerelle.
[2] As will be discussed below, this provision contains its own passerelle allowing the European Council to change the 
voting requirements in the Council to QMV, without the risk of this decision being vetoed by any national parliament.
[3] It should be noted that the relationship of Art. 31 (3) TEU with Art. 48 (7) TEU, which prescribes the involvement 
of the European Parliament and the national parliaments, is all but clear. Indeed if Art. 31 (3) TEU is considered the lex 
specialis this would render the general passerelle’s reference to Title V superfl uous since this Title V does not contain any 
provisions where unanimous voting in the Council is stipulated which are not already caught by the specifi c passerelle of 
Art. 31 (3) TEU. In addition, it would mean that no parliamentary supervision, be it European or national, on the amend-
ment of the decision-making procedure in the sensitive area of CFSP would be present. Conversely, if primacy is given 
to Art. 47 (8) TEU, this would lead to the somewhat awkward situation that the EP obtains signifi cant power in an area 
where it traditionally has little to say.
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consultation procedure to co-decision procedure in respect of certain fi elds 
of social policy.[1] Th e decision to do so should be adopted by unanimity.
Art. 192 (2) TFEU• : Also in respect of certain environmental measures[2], the 
Council can adopt by unanimity a decision amending the decision-making 
procedure from the specifi c legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative 
procedure.
Art. 312 (2) TFEU• : In line with established practice, the Lisbon Treaty 
mandates the Council to adopt, in accordance with the special legislative 
procedure and by unanimity, a regulation laying down a Multiannual Finan-
cial Framework. However, the European Council may adapt these voting 
requirements within the Council to QMV. It is worth noting that Art. 353 
TFEU explicitly excludes the use of the general passerelle of Art. 48 (7) TEU 
to move to the ordinary legislative procedure.
Art. 333 TFEU• : As part of the attempt to increase the attractiveness of the 
mechanism for enhanced cooperation, the Lisbon Treaty provides that the 
Council can adapt either the voting requirements from unanimity to QMV, 
or the decision-making procedure from a special to an ordinary legislative 
procedure. Although such an amendment to the Treaty provision to which 
the enhanced cooperation relates still requires unanimity within the Council, 
it will only be necessary to reach such unanimity among those Member States 
that participate in the enhanced co-operation.[3] Again, the Council cannot 
modify the procedures in respect of decisions with military implications or 
in the area of defence. 
3.2. Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Among the most infl uential changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty is probably 
the merging of the remaining Th ird Pillar domain of Police and Judicial Coopera-
tion in Criminal Matters with the First Pillar areas of “policies on border checks, 
asylum and integration” and “judicial cooperation in civil matters” into an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice under Title V of the TFEU. As a consequence, most 
of the residual “intergovernmental” processes in these domains will be replaced by 
the ordinary legislative procedure. 
[1] Such as employment protection, employee participation, third country nationals’ employment.
[2] Such as fi scal measures, town and country planning, etc.
[3] Declaration 40.
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Art. 81 (3) TFEU• : Given the particular national sensitivity to any inter-
ference with family law, measures for judicial cooperation in civil matters 
concerning family law and with cross-border implications are in principle to 
be established by the Council acting in accordance with the special legislative 
procedure. However, a passerelle allows the Council to modify this to the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Aside from unanimity within the Council, the 
decision to make use of this passerelle will also be subject to a “veto-right” of 
the national parliaments to be exercised within a six month period.[1] 
Art. 82 (2)(d) TFEU• : In the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
the Council is granted the power to add further aspects of criminal proce-
dure to the list of matters for which the European Parliament and Council 
can establish minimum rules in order to facilitate the mutual recognition of 
judgments. Once again, the Council will need to decide by unanimity and 
obtain the consent of the European Parliament.
Art. 83 (1) TFEU• : Likewise, the Council can supplement the list of areas of 
particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension, by reason of either 
their eff ects or their need for common action, for which it is deemed useful 
to adopt minimum rules on the defi nition of the criminal off ences and on 
their sanctions. It will need to decide by unanimity and obtain the consent 
of the European Parliament.
Art. 86 (4) TFEU• : In order to combat “crimes aff ecting the fi nancial interests 
of the Union” the Council has the possibility to establish a European Public 
Prosecutor’s Offi  ce [Art. 86 (1) TFEU]. After obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, the European Council can, acting by unanimity, 
extend the powers of any future European Public Prosecutor from “crimes 
aff ecting the fi nancial interests of the Union” to include “serious crime having 
cross-border dimensions”.
4. CONCLUSION 
Th e simplifi ed modifi cation procedures of the Treaties did not catch a lot of atten-
tion during the ratifi cation debates of the Lisbon Treaty, with the exception of the 
[1] This involvement of the national parliaments was not yet provided for in the corresponding provision of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe [Art. III-269 (3)].
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extensive analysis of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its Karlsruhe ruling[1]. Th ey 
might however prove important in the long term, even if they represent only a 
limited simplifi cation.
Although any defi nitive assessment as to the usefulness of these provisions will 
depend on the precedents created as well as the particular circumstances which 
could trigger a more “fl exible” interpretation, there seems to be a rather broad 
consensus that the general simplifi ed revision procedures do not add much in 
terms of facilitating the revision process given that the “double veto” is maintained. 
Indeed, any amendment will still require unanimity within the European Council 
and thus agreement among all governments, as well as ratifi cation by all Mem-
ber States according to their constitutional procedure [Art. 48 (6) TEU], or the 
forbearance on the side of all national parliaments to exercise their “veto-power” 
[Art. 48 (7) TEU]. Still, it could be hoped that the abandonment of the cumber-
some IGC-process would facilitate matters to some extent.
Similarly, the specifi c passerelle clauses spread throughout the Lisbon Treaty 
suff er from a need for unanimity within the European Council or the Council. 
However, with the exception of Art. 81(3) TFEU on measures for judicial coop-
eration in civil matters concerning family law and with cross-border implications, 
no genuine ratifi cation or unanimous approval by the national parliaments will be 
required. Moreover, within the context of enhanced cooperation, the application 
of the passerelle might be easier given that within the Council only the participating 
Member States will have to reach unanimity on the proposed amendments to the 
decision-making modalities. Hence, although limited in scope, these passerelles do 
provide some potential for more fl exible adaptation.
In conclusion, although the general simplifi ed revision procedure, with its require-
ment of either a ratifi cation by the Member States according to their constitutional 
procedure [Art. 48 (6) TEU] or the absence of a “veto” imposed by any national 
parliament [Art. 48 (7) TEU], is unlikely to greatly facilitate the adoption of future 
amendments to the Treaties, the specifi c passerelle clauses seem somewhat more 
promising for adaptations in particular fi elds like cross-border criminal legal issues 
as well as the voting and/or decision-making requirements in the framework of 
enhanced cooperation. Indeed, although unanimity within the European Council 
[1] BverfG, 2 BvE 2/08 from 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1-421), to be found at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/
es20090630_2bve000208en.html.
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or Council remains a conditio sine qua non for any amendment[1], the evasion of a 
rigid IGC-process as well as of the need to involve the national parliaments (with 
the exception of matters concerning family law) could be expected to render those 
provisions more amenable to revision. 
However, the reluctance towards such simplifi ed revision possibilities exhibited by 
the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in the Karlsruhe ruling[2], where it held that 
the German government may not agree to the application of a passerelle or other 
simplifi ed revision (as well as the fl exibility clause, etc.) unless this has beforehand 
been approved by the Bundestag and, if necessary[3], the Bundesrat[4], would seem 
to undermine even this limited leeway for fl exible Treaty adaptation.[5]
Still, the calls for amending the only 6-month-old Lisbon Treaty, be it to allow 
for a temporary increase in the number of MEPs or to introduce new economic 
governance instruments, show that there is a permanent need for fl exibility. From 
this point of view, the fi nancial crisis should be seen as a wake up call. Hence, if 
an IGC is convened, a genuine simplifi cation of Treaty revisions and fl exibility 
should be on the agenda.[6]
[1] See DOUGAN, M., who notes that “it remains true that in no case can the Union’s fundamental constitutional arrangements 
be amended without the unanimous agreement of its Member States.” (DOUGAN, M., The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning 
Minds, not Hearts, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2008, p. 690).
[2] See BverfG., op. cit.
[3] I.e. when it concerns a Länder competence or when a de facto Treaty amendment is at hand.
[4] Thus requiring an amendment of the German statute which regulated the involvement of the two chambers in the 
adoption of EU decision-making before the Lisbon Treaty could be ratifi ed. 
[5] See KIIVER, P., German Participation in EU Decision-Making after the Lisbon Case: A Comparative view on Domestic 
Parliamentary Clearance Procedures, German Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 8, 2009, p. 1296. Note that in the United Kingdom 
the European Union (Amendment) Bill obliges the government to obtain the approval by the House of Commons and 
the House of Lords before it can agree to any use of passerelles or simplifi ed revision procedures.
[6] Note however that the proposal for convening an IGC to amend Protocol No 36 clearly limited the scope for altera-
tion to the question of the number of MEPs. 
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Treaties have a way of surprising their drafters. Th is will most likely also happen 
with the Lisbon Treaty. Not only is it a very complex Treaty introducing a huge 
number of changes simultaneously, but it moreover enters into force in a period of 
sizable and manifold challenges (fi nancial crisis, climate threat, energy independ-
ence challenges, major changes in geopolitical balance…). For some changes it will 
most likely take years before their eff ects become fully apparent. Still, some general 
conclusions can already be drawn and some possible scenarios sketched out. 
1. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
Th e institutional system has become more complex. • 
Th ere are diff erent elements of simplifi cation in the Treaty: the generalization 
of the ordinary legislative procedure (former co-decision); the extension of the 
“community method” to all matters of internal security; the change in the Coun-
cil’s voting system. However, all this must not hide — and cannot compensate 
for — the introduction of a multitude of new actors in the process: the President 
of the European Council, the multi-hatted High Representative, the national par-
liaments, and the citizens themselves. “Too many Europeans, too little Europe” 
could be a valid general evaluation of this new institutional setting. Furthermore, 
the boundaries between the powers of the Union and those of the Member States, 
and between intergovernmental procedures and the Community method, have 
sometimes been blurred. Joint powers and shared competences are clearly on the 
rise. Opt-out clauses, emergency brakes, and passerelles increase complexity. When 
one tries to explain to third parties — not always with success — the functioning 
of the European Union in the domain of economic governance or foreign policy, 
the example of Byzantium quickly comes to mind. 
Th e institutional balance has changed. • 
Two institutions have clearly been reinforced by the Treaty: the European Parlia-
ment and the European Council. Th e Parliament has received many new powers. 
Th e European Council has received a few new powers and a new President. One 
institution seems to have been weakened: the Commission — at least in its politi-
cal role. Th is can be attributed both to structural factors (the strengthening of the 
Parliament and the European Council, the growing number of commissioners, 
the increased technicality of its core business) and to conjunctural factors (a very 
cautious approach by its President). 
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In a lot of commentaries on the European Union, it was customary to evoke the 
image of an “institutional triangle”. It seems, however, that we have now entered the 
period of an institutional “quadrangle” (or, even more worryingly, an “institutional 
pentagon”, if the European External Action Service develops into some kind of 
autonomous structure). Its precise shape may keep changing in the years to come 
while remaining fundamentally irregular. It is thus fair to argue that the Lisbon 
Treaty introduces the most signifi cant institutional changes since the 1950s’. 
Also some other actors have been weakened. Th is is true of the rotating Presidency 
(diminished by the stronger role of the European Council, which is now presided 
by someone else, and by the reinforced role of the High Representative in the 
fi eld of foreign policy). Th e same can be said, more generally, of the Ministers of 
Foreign Aff airs. 
Joint management is everywhere• 
Th e Lisbon Treaty reinforces and accelerates an evolution towards increased joint 
management which was already observable before. Shared competences between the 
Union and the Member States abound. In addition, the sharing of powers between 
the diff erent institutions/organs has been strongly increased. Th e Presidency of 
the Council(s) provides a fi rst forceful example of this. It is now divided between 
the President of the European Council, the High Representative and the rotating 
Presidency (associating three diff erent Member States). Th e external representa-
tion of the Union is another case in point. Shared between the President of the 
Commission, the President of the European Council, the High Representative, 
the president of the Euro Group, and the rotating Presidency, it no doubt obliges 
Henri Kissinger’s successors to substantially expand their telephone directory. 
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF EVENTS
Meanwhile, the Union has to deal with multiple and growing challenges. Since 
2005, the growth of its external energy dependency has become obvious. Next came 
the rise of commodity, and especially agricultural, prices. Since 2008, the EU has 
been confronted with its most brutal fi nancial and economic crisis ever. Meanwhile, 
climate change and global warming have come to aff ect our daily lives, our environ-
ment and our societies. On top of all this, Europe is aging rapidly, which in itself 
would be suffi  cient to destabilize the Member States’ public fi nances. 
Revealingly, most of these pressures have strong external causes, and most of them 
concern the Union’s external economic policies. Th is domain was not a priority of 
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the Lisbon Treaty and could land at the juncture of the potential problems created 
by the trend towards joint policy-making (presidencies + external representation). 
In any case it seems clear that the management of globalization is steadily rising to 
the top of the EU priorities. Th is trend is amplifi ed by the very rapid changes in 
the world’s geopolitical balance, which clearly go to the disadvantage of Europe. 
Th ere have been repeated symptoms of this in Copenhagen, Washington, Beijing 
and Africa, for example. 
3. TWO SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 
Th ere are contradictory streams in the Lisbon Treaty. Th ey could lead to (at least) 
two diff erent outcomes. 
Scenario A supposes that, after an adaptation period, the various actors involved 
will use certain potentialities of the new institutional system eff ectively. From the 
multiplicity of presidencies genuine leadership will arise (the best bet now would 
seem to be some kind of polarity of power between the President of the European 
Council and the European Parliament). Member States will better enforce the 
strategic orientations defi ned through “soft” methods (stability pact, open method 
of coordination, foreign policy strategies). Th e High Representative will fi nally 
fi nd some kind of balance between the Member States, the Commission and the 
European Parliament. Simplifi ed revisions, passerelles and enhanced cooperation 
in its various shapes and formats will be increasingly used to defuse the ever grow-
ing pressure of expanding membership and the risk of institutional and political 
gridlock. 
Scenario B is based on the possibility that most of the above, after successive experi-
ments, will fi nally appear unattainable. In that event, it may become necessary to 
go back to the basics of the “Community method”, rationalize the institutional 
system much more radically, and ditch the symbiotic paradigm of shared and 
pooled powers created by the Lisbon Treaty. Th is could then trigger the setting 
up of various forms of strong diff erentiation inside the Union. 
4. IN NEED OF A NEW SPIRIT
Both scenario A and scenario B will be a tall order. Either will require a change in 
the vision and behaviour of the present leaders. Th ey need to realize that, in spite 
of ever more frequent meetings and photo-ops, Europe’s standing in the world — 
political, economic, cultural — is now declining very quickly. Th ere is an urgent 
192
The Treaty of Lisbon — A Second Look at the Institutional Innovations
need for a mental reset. Leaders — in Brussels as well as the capitals — must 
also stop presenting European negotiations as a zero-sum game or, worse still, a 
negative-sum one. 
A lot of time, energy and money has been spent during the last 10 years on improv-
ing the relationship between Europe and its citizens. Various changes in the Lisbon 
Treaty were introduced for that same reason (extension of co-decision, strengthen-
ing of national parliaments, citizens’ initiative). However, this will probably not be 
enough to engender a real political debate — and a Demos — at the European level. 
Many recent elections, negotiations, or even judicial decisions, indicate that nation-
alism is on the rise. It is diffi  cult to grasp, however, how this could help dealing 
with the numerous challenges mentioned above. It would be nice if Heads of State 
or Government emphasized this basic reality more often and more intensely. 
In practice, no institutional system is fully optimal and entirely coherent. Any 
system refl ects, to some extent, the diff erent views of its architects, their contra-
dictions, hesitations, doubts and ambiguities. Th e institutional edifi ce set up by 
the Treaty of Lisbon is no exception to this rule. It does, however, also refl ect an 
additional complication attributable to the considerable time lag. Th e reforms now 
enshrined in it were conceived and largely drafted in 2002-2003; they are being 
implemented in 2010. 
Th e spirit that prevailed in the fi rst period was based on confi dence and innova-
tion: a new method (the “Convention”), new Member States, new participants in 
the political debate. A few referendums, the ruling of the German Constitutional 
Court, a systemic crisis in world fi nance and its cascading eff ects on the economy, 
tectonic shifts in the allocation of world power have created an entirely diff erent 
atmosphere — a political “climate change” in its own right. Fear of the future 
and lack of self-confi dence prevail in Europe today. Th ey lead to a resurgence of 
nationalism with, as a quasi-natural corollary, an extension of euro-scepticism. Th is 
should be a major source of concern. 
Th e implementation of the Lisbon Treaty will in no circumstances be easy. Provi-
sions that are complex and sometimes ambiguous lead to technical challenges and 
legitimate questions and dilemmas. But, as is always the case, the spirit in which 
texts are implemented is essential. 
If institutional innovations such as the passerelle clauses and simplifi ed revision 
procedures are considered with suspicion; if enhanced cooperation is deemed dis-
criminatory and majority voting divisive; and if opt-outs are presented as a success, 
then the implication is that the Lisbon Treaty changes are unwelcome. If unanimous 
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decision-making by Member States acting in an intergovernmental mode is to be 
the norm, and the Community method the exception (as a sort of relic from a past 
European dream), it could be argued that we do not really need to implement a 
new treaty. Even the best possible institutional framework cannot work without a 
high level of personal engagement and political commitment. 
At present, these two core ingredients seem to be lacking. It should be the main task 
of the European institutions (including the Parliament and the various presidencies) 
to foster them and set the example. More fundamentally still, this should be the 
task of national leaders, not only in the framework of the European Council but 
also in their daily internal political action. No matter how often the media speak 
of “Brussels”, the success of the Lisbon Treaty will be made — or unmade — in 
and by the national capitals. 
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